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Preface 
 
The work presented in this thesis is derived from three joint studies which have been 
published in refereed journals or are currently under review. 
 
Chapter 3 is published as: 
Frino, A., A. Lepone and B. Wong, 2009, ‘Derivative use, fund flows and investment 
manager performance’, Journal of Banking & Finance, 33, 925-933. 
 
Chapter 4 is a working paper currently under review:  
Frino, A., S. Satchell and B. Wong, 2009, ‘How much does an illegal insider trade?’, 
Working paper of the Capital Markets Co-operative Research Centre. 
 
Chapter 5 is a working paper currently under review: 
Lepone, A., R. Segara and B. Wong, 2009, ‘Does broker anonymity hide informed 
traders?’, Working paper of the Discipline of Finance, University of Sydney. 
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Synopsis 
 
This dissertation contains three essays that examine the interaction between informed 
and uninformed parties in securities markets. Given the influential role that informed 
traders have in shaping securities prices, trading activity, market-wide and even 
economy wide outcomes, this research provides empirical evidence on significant and 
important issues. Each essay addresses a topical, yet under-developed research strand 
to ensure that the results of this dissertation are relevant to both academic and non-
academic parties. The conclusions drawn from the three essays have the potential to 
influence the decisions of fund managers, regulators, market designers and, direct and 
indirect investors in securities markets. 
 
The first essay examines the interaction between mutual fund managers and the 
investors that seek their services. Fund managers often incur significant adverse 
selection, transaction and opportunity costs when executing investors’ liquidity 
requests. Prior research hints that index futures are able to mitigate these costs, though 
no research has provided convincing empirical evidence, primarily due to the fact that 
existing data on fund managers’ use of derivatives is imprecise. Using unique survey 
data which indicates whether a fund manager uses index futures to manage investor 
flows or not, this essay is the first to provide conclusive empirical evidence on this 
issue. The results indicate that fund managers who trade index futures in this manner 
are unencumbered by investor flows and have superior fund flow conditional alpha 
and market timing measures of performance relative to their non-derivative trading 
peers. Informed fund managers are able to maintain their advantage even when their 
trading decisions are partially dictated by uninformed parties. 
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The second essay in this dissertation examines the interaction between illegal insider 
traders and the regulatory body that prosecutes these individuals. Drawing upon 
insights developed in the literature which describes crime through the prism of 
economic thought, the essay develops a model which predicts the intensity of an 
illegal insider’s crime: their traded volume. The predictions of the model are tested 
using data drawn from case files of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
As such, this essay is the first empirical study of illegal insider trading to investigate 
the behaviour of the insider, with all previous empirical research instead examining 
the market’s response to insider trading. The study hypothesises that insider volume is 
a function of two factors in control of the regulatory body and associated law makers: 
the expected return and expected penalty from the insiders’ trades. Furthermore, 
insider volume is hypothesised to be negatively related to the variance of the stock 
traded. The results, which validate the hypotheses and are robust to sample selection 
bias, have important policy implications for regulators seeking to detect illegal insider 
trading. 
 
While the first two essays consider specific examples of informed traders, the final 
essay in this dissertation examines informed traders in general. In particular, the study 
investigates whether broker anonymity in electronic order driven markets obscures the 
presence of informed traders during the lead up to a significant information event. 
This research is important given the prolific changes to this feature of market design 
in recent years across electronic exchanges globally, and the fact that all prior 
research in this area has yet to consider the effects of broker anonymity on 
information transmission during periods of large information asymmetry. The study 
presents three pieces of evidence that informed traders are better camouflaged when 
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the identity of the broker intermediary is hidden vis-à-vis when the identity is visible. 
Naturally, this suggests that uninformed traders suffer at the expense of informed 
traders during the periods examined in this study. This finding has important policy 
implications for exchange officials deciding whether or not to reveal broker identifiers 
surrounding trades, especially considering that almost all prior research suggests that 
broker anonymity is correlated with improved liquidity in the form of lower bid-ask 
spreads. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Information plays an important role in the function and dynamics of securities 
markets, a fact evinced by the number of prominent economic and financial theories 
underpinned by information. The efficient markets hypothesis describes how security 
prices are determined by information and the extent to which market participants can 
successfully profit from it (Fama, 1970). The process by which prices become 
informationally efficient is modelled extensively in the rational expectations literature 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Brown and Jennings, 1989; Grundy and McNichols, 
1989). Differences in the precision of private information possessed by individuals is 
hypothesised to influence trading activity (Wang, 1994), while the release of 
information into the public domain also generates trading (Kim and Verrechia, 1991). 
Uncertainty about whether a trader is informed or uninformed creates volatility and 
dramatic market movements (Gennotte and Leland, 1990; Jacklin, Kleidon and 
Pfleiderer, 1992). The extent of volatility, in turn, influences the likelihood of an 
option market being established for a particular asset (Mayhew and Mihov, 2004). 
The extent of information uncertainty influences the spread setting behaviour of 
intermediaries such as specialists and dealers (Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 
1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987) as well as 
the amount of stock they are willing to offer (DuPont, 2000; Caglio and Kavajecz, 
2006). Information influences prices, price changes, volume, volatility, trading costs 
and liquidity. 
 
Beyond security specific outcomes, information influences a myriad of other 
important economic outcomes. Information costs determine the distribution of 
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investable capital to fund managers (Huang, Wei and Yan, 2007). Heterogeneity in 
the types of information used by participants in markets is hypothesised to dictate the 
optimal structure of a market (Anufriev and Panchenko, 2009; Bottazzi, Dosi and 
Rebesco, 2005). The value of insider information shapes the optimal enforcement 
policy of illegal insider trading (DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty, 1998). The extent of 
informed (insider) trading can influence the cost of capital in an economy 
(Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002). 
 
A key feature of almost all information based models is the existence of an interactive 
element between two (or more) parties. For example, information based models of the 
bid-ask spread typically describe the interaction between informed traders, liquidity-
motivated traders and the market maker. More precisely then, it is not information per 
se that influence prices, trading activity and other characteristics of the market and 
economy. Rather these characteristics are the observable outcomes of the interactions 
between economic agents who possess information and those that react to its 
presence. The primary goal of this dissertation is to examine the behaviour of 
informed individuals, and in particular, their interaction with some other (uninformed) 
participant in securities markets. Given the influential role of information in shaping 
security specific and economy wide outcomes, an understanding of these relationships 
is extremely valuable. 
 
This dissertation consists of three essays. Each examines the interaction between an 
informed and uninformed party in securities markets. It is clear from the preceding 
exposition and the literature review in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that the topic of 
‘information in securities markets’ is explored extensively in the academic literature. 
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To ensure that each essay provides a novel contribution to extant knowledge, each 
study is built around a topical, yet under-developed research niche to provide new 
insight into the behaviour of informed individuals in financial markets. 
 
The first essay examines the interaction between mutual fund managers and the 
investors who seek their services. In particular, the essay examines how mutual fund 
managers use index futures to mitigate the negative effects of investor flows, such that 
informed fund managers can maintain superior returns even when their trading 
decisions are partially dictated by uninformed, external parties. In examining this 
interaction, the study also contributes to the under-researched area of mutual funds’ 
use of derivative securities. 
 
The second essay concerns the interaction between illegal insider traders (i.e. 
individuals with access to price-sensitive non-public information) and the regulatory 
body that prosecutes these individuals. The essay provides a model which describes 
the volume traded by an illegal insider as a function of two factors directly in control 
of the regulatory body and associated law makers: the expected profit and penalty of 
the insider’s trades. While there are several studies which explain the volume traded 
by informed traders (e.g. Kyle, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987), the second essay in 
this dissertation investigates the trading decisions of a peculiar class of informed 
traders – illegal insiders – whose decision process involves weighing up potential 
profit against a punitive risk. The study empirically tests this prediction using data 
drawn from SEC case files. As such, this essay is the first empirical study of illegal 
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insider trading to investigate the behaviour of the insider trader, rather than the 
market’s response to the presence of illegal insider trading. 
 
While the first two essays consider specific types of informed traders (fund managers 
and illegal insiders), the final essay considers informed traders in general. This essay 
examines how broker anonymity in electronic limit order markets affects the ability of 
uninformed traders to detect informed traders in the lead up to a significant 
information event. This essay is the first study to examine how broker anonymity in 
electronic markets affects information transmission between informed and 
uninformed investors during periods of large information asymmetry. The following 
exposition introduces each topic in detail and explains the contribution of the work to 
the existing body of knowledge. 
 
1.1. Derivative use, fund flows and mutual fund performance 
The issue of mutual funds’ use of derivatives appears to have attracted increased 
scrutiny in the financial press and other public channels. Several recent articles 
published in the Wall Street Journal comment on mutual funds’ increasing investment 
in derivatives, often with headlines that draw upon the negative perceptions 
surrounding derivative investment4 (Liase, 2007; 2006, Pollock, 2006). While less 
sensationalist in its delivery, this cautious sentiment was echoed in a recent speech by 
the SEC, which urged fund managers to appropriately manage the risk of increased 
                                               
4
 The subtitle of one particular article went so far as to question whether derivatives represented 
“devil’s spawn” (Pollock, 2006). 
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derivative exposure and to take a measured response towards investment in these 
securities (Gohlke, 2007).  
 
Despite the attention this matter has gained in the financial press, very little academic 
research examines the use of derivatives by mutual funds. Koski and Pontiff (1999) 
attempt to infer mutual fund derivative trading behaviour by comparing the portfolio 
returns and their higher moments of derivatives users vis-à-vis non-users. 
Interestingly, there exists little difference in the (unconditional) distributional 
properties of several risk and return metrics between the two groups. While no 
significant difference is identified in unconditional risk, when conditioned on prior 
returns, Koski and Pontiff (1999) find that users of derivatives experience lower inter-
temporal variation in risk between consecutive six month periods. They conclude that 
managers trade derivatives to minimise the impact of new fund flow on risk. The 
result is significant only for systematic risk (not idiosyncratic), suggesting that index 
futures feature prominently in the trading strategy of derivative users. 
 
While a significant first step, their research is unable to further explore the effects of 
this particular derivative trading strategy, or indeed any other strategy that managers 
may decide to employ using derivatives. This is due to imprecision in their data with 
respect to the allocation of the derivative user characteristic. All mutual funds that use 
derivatives are aggregated into a single group and effectively no distinction is made 
between different types of derivative trading strategies. This broad classification 
method is also employed in studies of derivative use by investment managers in the 
U.K. (Fletcher, Forbes and Marshall, 2002), in Canada (Johnson and Yu, 2004) and 
Australia (Fong, Gallagher and Ng, 2005; Pinnuck, 2004). As such the analyses 
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contained in Koski and Pontiff (1999), as well as these other studies, are only able to 
provide insight into ‘average’ derivative trading behaviour. Indeed Koski and Pontiff 
(1999) note that due to the limitations associated with their method of data collection 
(telephone survey) they are ‘unable to obtain more in-depth information about the 
choice and purpose of specific instruments’ (p. 796). The aim of the essay in Chapter 
3 is to fill this gap in the literature by examining a particular and well-defined 
derivative trading strategy implemented by investment managers. Building upon the 
initial findings of Koski and Pontiff (1999), this study investigates further the use of 
stock index futures for managing cash flows. In industry, this process is often referred 
to as ‘cash-equitisation’ of investor flows. 
 
To perform this analysis, this study has access to unique survey data compiled by the 
Sydney Futures Exchange on Australian managed funds, the equivalent to U.S. 
mutual funds. This data is superior to that used in previous studies since the data 
indicates which funds use index futures for the purposes of cash equitisation of 
investor flows and which funds do not use derivatives for this purpose. Due to greater 
precision in the allocation of the derivative user characteristic, it is possible to provide 
additional and deeper insight into the use of derivatives by investment managers. 
Since this study analyses a particular derivative trading strategy, it is possible to 
identify ex ante the instances when returns might differ between ‘users’ and ‘non-
users’ and direct the research accordingly. Chapter 3 of this dissertation outlines a 
simple model of cash-equitisation. The model predicts that funds which engage in this 
behaviour experience superior alpha and market timing measures of performance, but 
only when fund flows are significant. When fund flows are negligible the model 
predicts little difference, on average, between equitisers and non-equitisers. Given the 
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size and sophistication of the Australian investment management industry, this 
research is relevant to fund managers in other prominent economies in North 
America, Europe and Asia. At the end of 2007, the dollar value of funds under 
management in Australia reached approximately 1.2 trillion USD. This places 
Australia as the fourth largest investment management industry in the world behind 
the U.S., Luxembourg and France and the fourth largest in the world per capita of 
population5 behind Luxembourg, Ireland and Hong Kong (Investment Company 
Institute, 2008, p157). 
 
Why would an investment manager decide to manage fund flows using index futures? 
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that fund flows are a significant impediment 
to wealth creation in mutual funds. Edelen (1999) shows that fund flows are 
negatively related to funds’ alpha performance. The result is based upon the 
hypothesis that fund flows force otherwise informed managers to engage in trading 
that is essentially liquidity motivated. In the rational expectations model of trade (e.g. 
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980), equilibrium is only achieved when these traders sustain 
losses to the informed. Additionally, if fund flows cause managers to increase the 
(uninformed) turnover of securities, then the fund’s alpha performance will suffer as a 
result of transaction costs such as the bid-ask spread, market impact costs and 
commissions. For example, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) provide evidence that 
investment managers with higher turnover rates experience significantly greater round 
trip market impact costs. 
 
                                               
5
 Population data used to calculate each economy’s per capita funds under management are sourced 
from the United States Census Bureau International Data Base. 
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Edelen (1999) also shows that mutual funds’ market timing performance, under 
certain conditions, is hindered when experiencing large investor flows. If managers 
delay the investment of new funds, this causes temporary dilution of the fund’s beta. 
Since there is a strong positive correlation between fund flows and market returns 
(Warther, 1995), fund managers exhibit reduced portfolio betas at exactly the point 
when they should be increasing them, hence negative market timing. The negative 
relationship between fund flow and portfolio betas is also documented at the 
aggregate level by Ferson and Warther (1996) and Ferson and Schadt (1996). 
 
The results from Edelen (1999) and related studies indicate that managers face a 
trade-off when determining how to manage their fund flows. On the one hand, 
immediate and rapid investment of fund flows is costly in terms of adverse selection 
and transaction costs. This ultimately reduces the alpha performance of mutual funds. 
The alternative course of action for fund managers, patient trading, results in sub-
optimal portfolio betas and negative market timing skills. Essentially, managers trade 
off the costs of accessing risk against the opportunity costs of not accessing that risk. 
The underlying rationale for using index futures to manage fund flow is that the 
security provides an inexpensive mechanism to access market risk, thereby alleviating 
both problems simultaneously. 
 
It is apparent that this research is not only relevant to the literature on the use of 
derivatives by investment managers, but is also related to studies that examine the 
interaction between fund flows and concurrent or subsequent performance.6 As a by 
product of the framework in which the analysis is constructed, the essay in Chapter 3 
                                               
6
 This is in contrast to the literature that examines the reverse, how performance affects subsequent 
fund flows (e.g. Ippolito, 1992). 
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provides a mechanism for re-examining, in a different experimental setting, the 
hypotheses contained in Edelen (1999), Ferson and Warther (1996) and Ferson and 
Schadt (1996). In the most general terms, the methodology employed in these studies 
is to examine fund performance as fund flow varies and to draw inferences from this 
analysis. For example, to test the hypothesis that fund flows cause negative market 
timing by diluting fund betas at periods of higher expected returns, Ferson and 
Warther (1996) regress changes in fund flows against changes in mutual fund (public-
information conditional) betas. Their results indicate that fund flows are negatively 
correlated with fund betas, but cannot definitely determine if fund flows cause the 
reduction in portfolio beta. Complementing this approach, this study examines the 
scenario where two funds experience large, material fund flows but one fund uses 
index futures to mitigate the costs of these flows while the other does not. If the 
hypotheses contained in the aforementioned studies are true (and index futures are an 
effective means of alleviating the costs associated with increased fund flow), then the 
manager that trades index futures under these conditions should experience superior 
performance relative to the other manager. Through investigation of this very 
question, this study provides additional insight into the relationship between fund 
flow and performance. Importantly, the analysis does not solely rely on examining the 
correlation between fund flow and performance. By examining the return differential 
associated with the use of index futures, given a fixed level of fund flow, additional 
evidence is presented as to whether fund flows effect negative fund performance or 
merely covary with it.  
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1.2. How much does an illegal insider trade? 
Insider trading remains an important concern of regulators despite almost two decades 
of innovation in enforcement since the prominent scandals of the 1980s.7 For 
example, in the 2008 fiscal year, the SEC initiated the largest number of insider 
trading cases in the Commission’s history (SEC, 2008). Indeed, a recent action 
brought against employees of several well-known Wall Street firms and hedge funds 
(SEC v Guttenberg et al., 2007) reveals that the scale of insider trading schemes 
remains as large as they were during the era of Boesky, Milken and Levine. 
  
While there is considerable academic interest in insider trading, only a handful of 
studies provide empirical evidence on the issue.8  Meulbroek (1992) uses data sourced 
from SEC case files and finds that trading by illegal insiders is correlated with 
abnormal price movement and volume. Cornell and Sirri (1992) examine illegal 
insider trading before the 1982 acquisition of Campbell Taggart by Anheuser-Busch 
and conclude that insider trading leads to more informative prices, but does not impair 
liquidity. Chakravaty and McConnell (1997) reach similar conclusions but use data 
from Ivan Boesky’s trades in Carnation prior to the company’s takeover by Nestle. 
However, Chakravaty and McConnell (1999), using the same data set, find that Ivan 
Boesky’s trades did not move prices any more than normal buyer-initiated trades, 
casting doubt over the proposition that insider trading, per se, moves prices. Finally, 
Fishe and Robe (2004) examine a sample of 30 stocks featured in an influential 
Business Week column and find that illegal insider trading is associated with wider 
                                               
7
 Seyhun (1992) documents the changes in enforcement policy over time.  See re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. 
Litig., 957 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1992) which is one of the most famous insider trading cases prosecuted. 
8
 Academic interest towards insider trading primarily addresses the debate as to whether insider trading 
should be made illegal or not. See for example, Manne (1966), Carlton and Fischel (1983), Cox (1986), 
Demsetz (1986), Manove (1989), Ausubel (1990), Leland (1992), Georgakopoulos (1993) and Manne 
(2005). 
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spreads and lower depth in specialist markets.  Clearly, the empirical literature to date 
has focussed on the effect of illegal insider trading on market behaviour.9 The essay in 
Chapter 4 extends this literature by examining the behaviour of the insiders.  
Specifically, the study builds on the seminal work of Becker (1968), who developed 
an economic theory to explain criminal behaviour, and provides a model which 
identifies the factors which affect the intensity of an illegal insider’s crime – i.e. the 
volume that they trade. The model supposes that illegal insiders act in a manner 
consistent with Becker (1968) crime utility maximisers and Markowitz (1952) return 
mean-variance optimisers. As such, traders respond to both the expected gains and 
costs of the crime as well as the expected return and variance of the stock for which 
they have sensitive information. This is a novel contribution to the illegal insider 
trading literature. These predictions are tested using data drawn from publicly 
available SEC litigation reports. 
 
The behaviour of illegal insiders is important to regulators. An understanding of the 
factors that influence the volume traded by insiders can assist in building better 
detection mechanisms. To this end, one contribution of the essay is to show that 
insiders behave as normal investors insofar as the size of their position in the security 
is negatively related to the volatility of its returns. This is an interesting result because 
it suggests that, despite what one might expect, insiders do not possess information 
(or believe that they posses information) that is completely precise.10 Furthermore, 
this research question is important from a policy formation perspective. DeMarzo, 
                                               
9
 Rather than using actual insider trading data, a related strand of empirical literature uses the date of 
initiation and first enforcement of insider trading laws to make inferences regarding the efficacy of 
insider trading laws (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Bris 2005; Beny, 2005, 2007; Fernandes and 
Ferreira, 2009). The research presented in Chapter 4 is also distinct from these studies. 
10
 This might occur for example, when an individual knows that a company is the target of a takeover 
attempt but does not know the exact offer price. 
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Fishman and Hagerty (1998) develop a model to determine the optimal regulation of 
illegal insider trading. They show that it is optimal to only investigate information 
events for which pre-announcement volume exceeds some threshold which is 
dependant on the value of the non-public information. Upon detection, an insider is 
then levied the maximum penalty. In developing their model, the authors assume that 
insiders set volume to maximise their expected profit, where profit (and hence 
volume) is a function of the expected return from the illegal behaviour, the probability 
of detection and the expected penalty (DeMarzo, Fishman and Hagerty, 1998, p 611). 
The essay in Chapter 4 explicitly tests this assumption with empirical data. 
 
1.3. Broker anonymity and the detection of informed traders 
One of the most prominent market design issues considered by exchange officials of 
electronic order driven markets in recent years is the decision regarding whether to 
reveal broker identifiers surrounding trades. Between 1999 and 2005 no fewer than 
seven exchanges made changes to their respective broker identification regimes and 
the high incidence of such changes has led to an equally high incidence of academic 
studies investigating the effect of the transparency change on market quality. 
Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007) investigate the switch to pre-trade broker 
anonymity on the Paris Bourse in April 2001 and find that quoted bid-ask spreads 
decrease after the change and that spreads become less informative about future 
volatility. Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica (2005) examine the affects of broker 
identification changes on the Paris Bourse, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Korean 
Stock Exchange and find that improved market quality, in the form of reduced relative 
and effective bid-ask spreads, is correlated with pre-trade broker anonymity. Finally, 
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) document decreased bid-ask spreads, increased 
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depth and greater order flow after the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) removed pre-
trade broker identifiers and delayed the reporting of post-trade broker identifiers on 28 
November 2005. Table 1.1 summarises the recent broker identification changes 
implemented by electronic exchanges and related academic studies.11 The focus of 
such studies has been broad in nature, with an emphasis on the effects of the 
transparency change on general market quality indicators. 
 
Table 1.1 
Recent changes to broker identification rules and related literature 
This table summarises recent changes to broker identification rules that have occurred on electronic 
order driven markets since 1999. All exchanges, except for the Korea Stock Exchange, removed broker 
identifiers surrounding trades on the date listed. The Korea Stock Exchange added broker identifiers to 
trading screens on 25 October, 1999. Studies which investigate the respective transparency change are 
presented in the final column.  
Exchange Date of change Academic Literature 
Korea Stock Exchange 25 October, 1999 Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) 
Paris Bourse 23 April, 2001 Foucault, et al. (2007); Comerton-Forde et al. 
(2005) 
Brussels Stock Exchange 21 May, 2001 Maher et al. (2008) 
Deutsche Boerse 27 March, 2003 to 10 
April, 2003 
Hachmeister and Schiereck (2006) 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 30 June, 2003 Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) 
Borsa Italiana 21 January, 2004 No academic literature 
Australian Stock Exchange 28 November, 2005 Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) 
 
Despite the extensive literature on broker identification, no studies in this area 
examine how a change in broker anonymity affects market participants during periods 
of large information asymmetry. This is an important distinction since one would 
naturally expect that anonymity is more relevant during periods of high information 
                                               
11
 Theoretical work by Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen, (2007) and Rindi (2008), and a study conducted 
in an experimental market by Perotti and Rindi (2006) support these empirical results. The 
overwhelming consensus amongst published literature is that pre-trade or post-trade broker anonymity 
reduces bid-ask spreads. 
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asymmetry vis-à-vis periods when no information event is pending. Intuitively, broker 
anonymity impairs the ability of uninformed traders, followers and dealers to discern 
the advent of some significant price-sensitive announcement from the pool of 
liquidity-motivated trades.12 The hidden nature of broker identifiers is not as 
problematic (beneficial) for uninformed (informed) traders when no information event 
is about to occur. Furthermore, the interpretation of market quality statistics can be 
fundamentally altered depending upon the level of informed trading across the period 
analysed. For example, during periods when no information event is pending, tight 
bid-ask spreads represent lower transaction costs for uninformed traders, whereas 
tight bid-ask spreads before unanticipated material announcements with active 
informed traders, imply that liquidity providers are not adequately engaging in price 
protection. It is not possible to disentangle the two scenarios by examining, as 
previous studies have, market quality statistics averaged across all market conditions.  
 
The purpose of the essay in Chapter 5 is to investigate whether the removal of broker 
identifiers camouflages the presence of informed traders prior to a significant 
information event. To perform this analysis, the study investigates pre-announcement 
trading in a sample of 258 takeovers, announced between 28 November 2003 and 28 
November 2007, corresponding to a time period two years either side of the 
aforementioned transparency change that occurred on the ASX on 28 November 
2005. As recognised by Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005), takeover announcements 
provide an ideal setting to test hypotheses related to information transmission in 
markets. The magnitude of potential returns provides a strong incentive for informed 
traders to trade and indeed it is well established that informed traders are active prior 
                                               
12
 This reasoning is in the same spirit as Pagano and Röell (1996). However, their paper concerns the 
effects of order book price and depth transparency rather than broker identifiers. 
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to takeover announcements (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Jarrel and Poulson, 1989; 
Meulbroek, 1992). Furthermore, unlike earnings announcements, the timing and 
occurrence of takeover announcements is completely unknown to uninformed traders. 
As such, if abnormal volume or price activity occurs before these announcements, it 
most likely coincides with trading by informed participants. This study, therefore, 
explicitly addresses the issue of broker anonymity effects in the context of large 
information asymmetry. This is important given the frequency of changes to broker 
transparency that have occurred in financial markets in recent years and the fact that 
almost all studies to date suggest that improved liquidity (in the form of smaller bid-
ask spreads) is correlated with an anonymous regime. The results indicate that 
informed traders are better off after a switch to anonymity, a finding which needs to 
be considered together with previous studies when assessing the implications of 
broker anonymity changes on market quality.  
 
This study benefits significantly from access to a proprietary data set provided by the 
ASX which contains the broker counterparties to every trade executed on the 
exchange. Prior studies, including all those listed in Table 1.1, which investigate 
changes in the transparency of broker identifiers have yet to utilise data of this nature, 
resorting instead to broad trade and quote level data. While this can be suitable, and 
indeed two of the hypotheses in the essay require only trade and quote level data, one 
could argue that the most natural observational unit for a study of broker identifier 
transparency is the individual broker. This is the first study of broker transparency to 
incorporate within its analysis, research directed at the level of the individual broker. 
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The data set provided by the ASX allows for the calculation of the average permanent 
price impact of each broker’s trades and the dispersion of this variable across brokers. 
The rationale for examining this metric is that, all other things being equal, the 
dispersion of permanent price impact across brokers provides an indication of the 
extent to which the market utilises the identifier to distinguish informed from 
uninformed trades. For example, all other things being equal, if the dispersion of 
average permanent price impact across brokers is zero, then the market places no 
informational weight on the identifier. Clearly in the anonymous broker regime it is 
impossible for the market to extract any information from the broker identifier. A 
comparison of the dispersion of broker price impact before and after the change, 
allows one to determine if the identifier has incremental signalling value in the 
transparent period in the lead up to takeover announcements. If it contains value, then 
by definition, its absence suggests that the informed traders are less detectable after 
the change to anonymity. 
 
The analysis also investigates the extent to which liquidity suppliers adequately price 
protect themselves as well as the ability of the market to correctly interpret the 
information content of order imbalances in the 40 days prior to takeover 
announcements. Bid-ask spreads are examined since they provide a natural indication 
of whether informed traders are being detected by liquidity providers (Bagehot, 1971; 
Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). 
The analysis also involves using the strength of the order imbalance to price 
relationship in the days leading up the announcement as another indicator of how well 
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informed traders can disguise their status.13 Studies show that informed trading is 
likely to manifest itself as an imbalance between buyer and seller initiated trades 
(Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman, 1996; Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara, 1997). 
Since the periods being analysed in this study are likely to coincide with informed 
trading, the extent to which the market reacts to order imbalances during this time is 
another measure to assess the ability of informed traders to remain hidden from the 
market. 
 
1.4 Summary 
The three research essays contained in this dissertation each examine the interactive 
relationship between an informed agent and some other significant, but uninformed, 
party. The insights provided by these essays are important given the influential role 
that informed traders have in financial markets. Each essay incorporates a topical, yet 
under-developed research area within the analysis, ensuring that these studies are 
relevant for practitioners and academics alike. The empirical evidence provided in this 
dissertation shows that informed traders affect the decisions of direct and indirect 
investors, regulators, law makers and market designers. 
 
The rest of this dissertation is organised as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of 
prior literature pertaining to the relationships examined in the three essays (fund 
manager and investor; insider trader and regulator; informed and uninformed traders). 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present the three research essays discussed in this chapter.  Each 
                                               
13
 Another data-related advantage arises from the fact that the market being analysed is a centralised 
electronic limit order market. Therefore trade classification algorithms, such as the Lee and Ready 
(1991) algorithm commonly adopted in studies of U.S. markets, are not required to discern trade 
direction. Since all trades (excluding upstairs trading) must be executed at either the best prevailing bid 
or ask, it is possible to classify with certainty whether a trade is buyer or seller initiated. This facet of 
the data allows for accurate calculation of order imbalances for all firms in the sample. 
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chapter contains sections describing hypotheses, data and sample, research design, 
empirical results, additional tests and conclusions reached. Chapter 6 concludes by 
highlighting how the results presented in this dissertation provide insight into the 
behaviour of informed traders in financial markets. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The interaction between fund managers and investors 
To understand the vast literature on investment management it is useful to begin with 
a simplified description of the investor-manager relationship. In the most basic terms, 
the role of an investment fund is to trade on behalf of the funds’ investors in securities 
markets permitted by the investors. The process of investment in mutual funds can be 
described in two steps. Firstly, investors provide capital to a manager. Secondly, the 
manager determines how that capital is allocated within or across asset classes with 
the returns of that allocation directed back to the investor. Despite the simplicity of 
this exposition, much of the research on the investment management industry can be 
classified as an attempt to understand the processes and outcomes of these two steps. 
 
The first step is characterised by the decision process of the investor, while the second 
part is that of the manager. While the decision processes of investors and managers 
are (likely) complex and unobservable, the outcomes of those decisions are 
quantifiable, readily available and possess intuitive economic interpretation. Investor 
decisions are manifested by the flow of capital into mutual funds, whereas the 
decisions of fund managers are revealed in the returns of their portfolios. A large 
body of literature is therefore directed at examining the determinants of mutual fund 
flows and the performance of investment managers.  
 
Moving beyond the initial description of the investor-manager relationship additional 
complexities arise. It is important to note that the two steps of the relationship are not 
necessarily independent of each other nor treated as such in the literature. For 
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example, from the earliest studies, it has been noted that the prior performance of a 
manager is a prominent determinant in the allocation of new capital to that manager 
(e.g.  Ippolito, 1992; Gruber, 1996; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Due to the ubiquity of 
this finding, studies have taken to not only uncovering those variables which 
determine the level of investor flows but also investigating whether those variables 
influence the strength of the performance-flow relationship. Section 2.1.1 reviews the 
literature on the determinants of fund flows. Less explored, though no less relevant, is 
an analysis of how the timing and magnitude of flows into a fund affects the 
subsequent performance of the manager (e.g. Edelen, 1999). Section 2.1.2 provides an 
overview of research which investigates how investor flows can (negatively) affect 
the performance of fund managers. 
 
The above exposition suggests that the interaction between investor and manager is 
unidirectional. That is, investors react to managers and their performance whereas 
managers, while being affected by investor capital flow, do not fundamentally alter 
their behaviour because of it. This is an incorrect assertion. Research suggests that 
fund managers are aware of both the impact performance has on subsequent investor 
flows (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) and the affect investor flows have on subsequent 
performance (Koski and Pontiff, 1999; Greene, Hodges and Rakowski, 2007). Section 
2.1.3 reviews the literature on how managers respond to investors. 
 
Finally, since the focus of Chapter 3 is how investment managers trade stock index 
futures, Section 2.1.4 provides a review of the papers that investigate the use of 
derivatives by investment managers.  
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2.1.1. The investor decision process and the determinants of investor flows 
Ippolito (1992) represents one of the first papers to model the optimal response of 
rational investors to managerial performance. In his model there are only two types of 
managers. Low quality managers do not generate risk adjusted returns and simply 
levy expenses on their fund holders. High quality managers generate positive risk 
adjusted returns net of expenses. Any given return provides only a noisy signal of 
whether the manager is high or low quality. Nevertheless, the model shows that it is 
optimal to invest in the most recent best performer even if there is only one 
observation to assess the pool of available managers.14 From a Bayesian updating 
perspective, the probability of picking a high quality manager conditional on a large 
return is greater than the probability of picking a high quality manager 
unconditionally. An empirical analysis of yearly returns and investor flows of 143 
open end mutual funds over a twenty year period (1965-1984) confirms the prediction 
of his model. Investor flows are positively related to prior performance, whether 
measured as annual returns from the previous three years or as the average of returns 
over the last five years.  
 
Interestingly, Ippolito (1992) also shows that the response to performance is 
asymmetric. The inflow of funds to better performers is stronger than the outflow of 
funds from poorer performers. That investors condition their investment decisions on 
prior performance and react more strongly to positive performance is confirmed by 
numerous studies and appears robust to different time periods, sampling frequencies 
                                               
14
 The model of Berk and Green (2004) modifies this relationship by allowing investors to condition 
future performance on both prior performance and the number of observations already observed. The 
basic relationship remains the same. However, the marginal information content of an additional 
observation decreases with the number of observations already observed. This prediction is confirmed 
by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) who find that investor flows respond less strongly to prior 
performance as the age of the fund (i.e. the number of observations) increases. 
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and measures of prior performance.15 Gruber (1996), examining 227 mutual funds 
over the period 1985 to 1994, documents an asymmetric relationship between investor 
flows and prior year’s performance, where performance is measured as the alpha from 
his 4-factor model. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) use yearly data for 449 mutual funds 
that operated during 1983 to 1993 and find a similar result. In their study, 
performance is measured as the simple difference between raw and market returns. 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997) analyse a survivorship-bias free sample of funds that 
existed between 1978 and 1988. They document a significantly positive relationship 
between raw returns and investor flows for the best performing quartile and a weaker 
negative flow-performance relationship for the bottom half of funds. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) examine yearly data for 670 mutual funds over the period 1970 to 1991 and 
show that the top performing quintile of funds attracts a statistically significant 
amount of new money, whereas investor flows are insensitive to the performance of 
the bottom quintile of funds. The authors use a swathe of raw and risk-adjusted 
measures of prior returns to rank funds (see Table III, p1602 of their paper). More 
recently, Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) analyse the quarterly returns and flows of at 
least 3,446 funds over the period 1981 to 2001.16 They find a similar non-linear 
relationship between flows and prior performance where prior performance is 
measured as the alpha from Jensen’s (1968) one-factor model or Carhart’s (1997) 4-
factor model. 
 
                                               
15
 Several studies find that prior performance is an influential factor in determining to which funds 
investors allocate their capital, but they do not document or test for the asymmetry in the flow-
performance relationship. These studies include Spritz (1970), Smith (1978), Kane, Santini and Aber 
(1991), Patel, Zechkhauser and Hendricks (1994), Capon, Fiztsimons and Prince (1996) and Wilcox 
(2003).  
16
 The authors do no explicitly state how many funds they analyse in total, but provide the amount of 
funds available for analysis in each year. The largest yearly value is 3,446 which represents the amount 
of funds operating in 2000 (see Table 1, p1290 of that paper). 
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Lynch and Musto (2003) provide an explanation for the convex flow-performance 
relationship which is consistent with the idea that investors rationally use past 
performance as a signal of unknown future performance.17 They argue that asymmetry 
of investor response arises when investors, who usually condition future performance 
on prior performance, are able to disconnect the two variables under certain 
circumstances. One such circumstance is a change of manager or strategy. Since funds 
typically replace managers and strategies only after poor performance, investor flows 
are less responsive, on average, to the information content of poor performances. 
Using data on managerial changes and proxies for strategy changes the authors 
confirm the predictions of their hypothesis. 
 
Besides prior performance, another determinant of fund flows investigated 
extensively in the literature is the ‘salience’ of a given mutual fund. Salience refers to 
factors such as marketing, investor search costs and presentation, that increase the 
probability of an investor choosing a particular fund amongst the vast universe of 
available options. In terms of the direct impact that marketing has on investor flows, 
Jain and Wu (2000) provide evidence that advertising in investment magazines 
attracts more money into funds compared to similar non-advertised peers. Confirming 
this result, Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) show that funds which spend more 
resources on marketing (as indicated by the level of 12b-1 fees levied) attract greater 
fund flows. Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2005) suggest that not even advertising is 
necessary, showing that name changes towards current popular styles are enough to 
warrant additional capital from investors.  
 
                                               
17
 Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) offer different theories to explain the 
asymmetry in the flow-performance relationship. These papers are discussed elsewhere in the literature 
review. 
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Del Guercio and Tcak (2002) document the importance of an external, influential 
rating agency on fund flows. They show that Morningstar ratings subsume the 
incremental explanatory power provided by Jensen’s alpha in describing investor 
flows. This result is confirmed by Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince (1996) who, in a 
survey of 3,386 individual mutual fund investors, find that the most important 
information source for decision making are published performance rankings of mutual 
funds. 
 
Studies also investigate the role that the family fund structure plays in increasing the 
salience of a fund. Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) show that having one star 
performer18 within a fund family induces investor flow externalities to other funds 
within that family. They also show that affirmation of star performance by 
Morningstar increases the flow of new money into other funds within that family. 
Their results suggest that salience by association can be a prominent determinant of 
mutual fund flows. Following on from this finding, Kempf and Ruenzi (2008a) show 
that being in the top decile of performers within a given fund family attracts 
additional capital (beyond that which would have been received due to its 
performance ranking relative to all funds in the sector). They argue that this could be 
the result of increased prominence for the top funds within a fund family and greater 
advertising spent on promoting these funds. 
 
Complementing these studies, Sirri and Tufano (1998) examine how fund salience, 
specifically the role of investor search costs, can influence the strength of the flow-
performance relationship. They use three measures to proxy for the search cost of the 
                                               
18
 The authors classify a fund as a star performer if the fund performs in the top 5% of all funds within 
their sample in the previous 12 months. Funds are ranked according to their Fama and French (1993) 3-
factor alpha performance. 
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investor – the size of the fund complex within which the fund resides, the amount of 
fees levied on investors (which is a proxy for resources spent on marketing) and the 
amount of media coverage the fund receives. Their results indicate that funds that 
belong to larger families enjoy greater fund flows, but it does not have a discernable 
bearing on the flow-performance relationship. Levying higher than normal (i.e. 
greater than the median) fees doubles the amount of investor flows received by the 
best performing quintile of funds, but has no statistically significant effect at the 5% 
level for the remaining funds. Media attention does not influence the strength of the 
flow-performance relationship.  
 
The literature has identified another set of determinants which influence the decision 
process of mutual fund investors. These determinants can be broadly categorised as 
‘investment costs’ and include one off costs such as front-end or back-end load fees19 
and switching costs, or continuous charges such as expense ratios and taxes.  
 
In terms of direct fees charged by managers, Sirri and Tufano (1998) find a negative 
relationship between total fees incurred by the investor (calculated as the annual 
expense ratio plus one-seventh of the up-front load fee) and the flow of new money 
into that fund. Ippolito (1992) finds that the strength of the flow-performance 
relationship is influenced by whether the fund charges front-end load fees or not. 
Funds which do not charge load fees attract 1.7 times more investor flows for a given 
level of return compared to funds that charge load fees. Barber, Odean and Zheng 
(2005), analyse a large sample of mutual funds over the period 1970 to 1999 and find 
that investors respond to up front costs by reducing investment in those funds with 
                                               
19
 A load fee is a payment made by the investor that acts as a form of sales commission for brokers. 
Front-end load fees are paid at the time of initial investment, whereas back-end load fees are paid upon 
redemption of fund shares. 
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higher front-end load fees. They also document an unintuitive result that annual 
expenses have little influence on fund flows over this period for all funds, or 
perversely, have a positive impact on fund flows for certain funds. They provide 
evidence that this apparent anomaly is driven by the fact that a certain portion of fees 
are used for marketing purposes, such that the deterrence effect associated with an 
increase in fees might be offset by the increased salience of the fund.20 Using a sub-
sample of their data they find some evidence to support this claim. The magnitude of 
management fees (which are not used for marketing purposes) has a negative impact 
on new money flows for most funds except the top 50 largest funds and those funds 
greater than five years old. The results of these studies suggest that mutual fund 
investor, like typical consumers of goods and services, are influenced by the explicit 
costs associated with their purchase.21 
  
Taxes represent another form of investment cost. Several studies examine the role that 
taxes play in the demand for funds management services. Barclay, Pearson and 
Weisbach (1998) examine a particular tax effect associated with capital gains. Like 
other investors, mutual funds incur a tax liability when they sell shares which have 
appreciated in value. Unrealised gains in a fund’s portfolio act as an indirect cost for 
any new investors since those investors are liable for the tax when the gains are 
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 The authors also note that this anomaly could be caused in part by behavioural biases. Building upon 
the results of Wilcox (2003), they hypothesise that investors respond more strongly to load fees 
because they are more salient compared to annual fees, which are subsumed by the natural volatility of 
returns. The authors also hypothesise that investors learn slowly about fees in general and the 
difference in distaste between load fees and annual expenses becomes more apparent after the first fund 
purchase made by an individual. They test for this effect by comparing purchases of funds by first time 
investors versus non-first time investors. They find that non-first time investors have a tendency to 
avoid load fee funds, consistent with their hypothesis. 
21
 The work of Massa (2003) also supports this conclusion, though he does not directly examine the 
role of fees on investor flows. Massa (2003) hypothesises that being part of a large mutual fund family 
can increase the demand for a given fund because funds often allow investors to switch between funds 
at low cost. This provides a valuable option to investors – a value which is attributable in part to a 
reduction in switching fees. Therefore, his hypothesis naturally assumes that investors are sensitive to 
transaction costs. The results of his study confirm his hypothesis. 
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realised, without sharing in any of the benefits. This is referred to as ‘capital gains 
overhang’. The authors show that for two years in their sample, 1994 and 1995, where 
they have access to appropriate data, inflows into equity mutual funds are negatively 
related to the size of the overhang. Expanding these findings, Bergstresser and 
Poterba (2002) investigate the effect that taxes in general have on investor flows. 
After making certain assumptions, the authors construct the tax burden for each fund 
implied by the form of its observed payouts. The authors show for a given level of 
return, investor flows are lower for funds with greater tax burdens, suggesting that 
investors are influenced by after-tax returns more than pre-tax returns. 
 
From the papers discussed so far it is apparent that investors allocate their capital to 
fund managers according to three factors: prior performance (in an asymmetrical 
manner), fund salience and investment costs. A recent paper by Huang, Wei and Yan 
(2007) links these three factors into one coherent framework of investor behaviour. 
Their model revolves around a utility maximisation problem, where potential 
investors trade off the gains made from investment (returns) against the costs 
associated with making that investment (which they term ‘participation costs’). To 
make their allocation decisions, investors use prior performance as a (noisy) signal of 
future performance. Fund salience enters the model as the cost required by the 
investor to become more familiar with the fund, that is, to reduce the variance of the 
signal (information costs). Investment costs are incorporated in the model as 
transaction costs associated with investing in a given fund. Ceteris paribus, funds 
with greater salience are more likely to be investigated by potential investors and 
upon investigation, funds with lower transaction costs are more likely to attract 
investor capital. These two aspects of the model lead to well documented 
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asymmetrical response of inflows to prior returns. Specifically, funds that have high 
participation costs will attract increased capital only when the returns are sufficiently 
high to offset those costs. When returns are in the medium range, inflows are less 
sensitive to prior returns because the returns are not sufficiently large to warrant 
investors to investigate the fund (i.e. pay the information costs) or if they choose to 
investigate the fund, to pay the transaction costs. If a fund chooses to lower its 
participation costs (i.e. through attaining greater salience or decreasing transaction 
costs), the flow-performance relationship is still kinked, but at a lower threshold. The 
authors test the implications of their model using a large sample of equity mutual 
funds over the period 1981 to 2001. Utilising various proxies for information and 
transaction costs they examine the sensitivity of inflows to prior performance 
conditional on the level of participation costs. The results confirm the predictions of 
their model and are broadly consistent with previous studies which examine the 
influence of prior returns, salience and investment costs on inflows. 
 
Finally, several papers investigate the effects of behavioural biases on the investment 
decisions of individual investors. Goetzmann and Peles (1997) examine the extent of 
cognitive dissonance in a sample of sophisticated and non-sophisticated mutual fund 
investors. Cognitive dissonance is the tendency of individuals to alter current beliefs 
to retrospectively justify their own past decisions. The individuals were surveyed 
about several features of their mutual fund investments. Part of this sample included a 
control subgroup of investments chosen by an external party for the non-sophisticated 
investors. The results are consistent with the respondents exhibiting cognitive 
dissonance with respect to their investments. All respondents overstated the success of 
their investments, with non-sophisticated investors overstating the returns of the funds 
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they chose themselves by a greater magnitude than the funds chosen for them. These 
investors also expressed greater satisfaction with funds they chose relative to funds 
chosen for them. The authors use these results to explain the observed convex 
response of investor flows to returns. Cognitive dissonance implies an inability to 
recognise or act upon poor performance,22 hence investor flows will be less sensitive 
to substandard performance. The authors show that a convex relationship exists but do 
not provide any evidence that their hypothesis better explains the data relative to other 
competing hypotheses. 
 
Building on the early work of Patel, Zeckhauser and Hendricks (1991), Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2006) investigate the behavioural phenomenon known as status quo bias, 
which induces individuals to irrationally select an outcome merely because it was 
chosen before. To test the extent of the bias, the authors estimate the explanatory 
power that previous year’s investor flows have on the current year’s flows. Given that 
status quo bias is positively related to the number of available options (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988), the relationship between year to year flows should be greatest for 
funds that exist in large segments of similar, substitutable funds. The results indicate 
that the size of the coefficient on previous year’s flow increases monotonically with 
the number of available alternatives, and flattens after the investor has approximately 
100 options to choose from. The results of this analysis and Goetzmann and Peles 
(1997) indicate that besides rational factors, behavioural factors influence the decision 
processes of investors when deciding where to allocate their capital. This is not 
entirely surprising given the survey results of Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince (1996) 
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 This result is also consistent with Shefrin and Statman (1985) who find weak evidence that investors 
irrationally ride their mutual fund losses (i.e. the disposition effect).  
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which reveals that a large number of investors are naïve and uninformed about their 
investment decisions. 
 
2.1.2. The effect of fund flows on fund manager performance 
Fund managers attempt to generate incremental wealth for their fund holders by 
allocating investors’ capital across a set of securities which the manager believes is 
underpriced relative to some benchmark. Managers with skill are those that generate 
positive incremental wealth. In general, studies of fund manager performance 
implicitly accept this stylised framework of managerial evaluation.23 Several articles 
however, recognise that investor flows represent an exogenous and costly distortion to 
the process of funds management. The basic premise of these articles is that investor 
flows compel managers into actions they might not otherwise undertake. As such, the 
observed performance of managers arises from some combination of their own 
decisions (skill) and the net cost associated with behaviour outside of their control 
(trading attributable to flow). This section reviews the literature which quantifies and 
examines the different types of costs attributable to fund flow.24 It also surveys studies 
that attempt to assess the performance of asset managers in light of this externality. 
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 The general literature on fund manager performance is extensive. Several important papers include 
Jensen (1968), Lehman and Modest (1987), Ippolito (1989), Grinblatt and Titman (1989a, 1992, 1993), 
Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997), Wermers (2000) and 
Pinnuck (2003). 
24
 Several theoretical papers utilise the intuition that investor flows impose general negative 
externalities on fund managers, without outlining the types of costs involved or specifying the 
mechanism by which costs are generated. For example, in Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000), the 
presence of flow induced costs is used to explain why managers set load feeds (load fees deter 
redemptions and therefore reduce flow costs). In Berk and Green’s (2004) model of fund growth and 
performance, fund managers experience diminishing marginal returns as the size of the fund increases. 
Part of this is attributable to the increasing marginal costs of managing a larger portfolio. Since one 
way for a fund to grow is through investor flows, by implication his model utilises the idea that flows 
generate significant costs. 
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One type of cost directly related to investor flows is the cost of switching between 
cash and securities whenever investors redeem or purchase shares in the fund. Such 
costs include the bid-ask spread, market impact costs and brokerage. Surprisingly, 
while many studies analyse the transaction costs of asset managers in general25, 
relatively few studies directly examine the relation between fund flows, transaction 
costs and fund manager performance. 
 
The only study of fund flows and transaction costs at the micro-level is Johnson 
(2004). Utilising a proprietary data set, he examines the attributes of individual 
investors in a particular mutual fund family to ascertain which characteristics can 
predict the length of their investment period. He finds that the characteristics which 
provide information about the duration of holding period are also correlated with 
simulated measures of liquidity costs. Specifically, short term investors impose 
greater transaction costs on fund managers than longer term investors. Part of the 
reason why shorter term investors create larger transaction costs is that they have 
greater liquidity needs, as manifested in larger gross fund flow, and therefore require 
the fund manager to trade on their behalf more often. Using transaction costs 
estimates of general trading from Jones and Lipson (2001), Johnson (2004) calculates 
that the gross fund flows of investors contributes between 67 to 195 basis points 
annually in transaction cost underperformance, depending on the investment style of 
the fund. 
 
Several studies investigate the relationship between fund size and performance. These 
studies show that, all things equal, as fund size increases managerial performance 
                                               
25
 See for example Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995), Keim and 
Madhavan (1997), Jones and Lipson (1999), Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (1999), Wermers (2000), 
Bollen and Busse (2006) and Kacperczyk, Sialm, Zheng (2008). 
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deteriorates (e.g Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004; Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala and 
Rau, 2007; Yan, 2008; Pollet and Wilson, 2008). Out of these studies, Chen, Hong, 
Huang and Kubik (2004) and Yan, (2008) show that the magnitude of 
underperformance is negatively related to the liquidity of the portfolios they hold. 
Since liquidity is inversely proportional to transaction costs, the results of these 
studies suggest that transaction costs play a significant role in the underperformance 
of large funds. Intuitively, performance should worsen as size increases due to the 
difficulty of investing even greater capital amongst the pool of investable and desired 
securities. To the extent that investor flows contribute to fund growth, these studies 
provide insight into how flows affect performance due to transaction costs. For 
example, Yan (2008) shows that for funds that hold stocks with low spreads, the 
largest quintile of funds underperform the smallest quintile of funds by 35 basis points 
a month (see Table 6, p758 of his paper). 
 
Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala and Rau, (2007) investigate the relationship between fund size, 
fund flows and performance. Interestingly, they show that the negative relation 
between fund size and performance hinges on the concurrent level of fund inflows. 
Specifically, when fund inflows are low, size does not affect performance. As fund 
inflows become larger, the performance differential between large and small funds 
increases. The results suggest that it is not size per se that generates 
underperformance, but rather, the effect of large inflows is amplified as fund size 
increases. In light of the results of Yan (2008) and Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik 
(2004), this suggests that fund inflows generate significant transaction costs for fund 
managers. For example, large inflows contribute 21 basis points per month in 
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underperformance for the largest quintile of funds relative to the smallest quintile of 
funds (see Table 4 of their paper, p966). 
 
Several studies examine the relationship between aggregate fund flows and market 
movements at short intervals. Since short term movements in securities markets are 
related to the magnitude of market impact costs (see for example, Kraus and Stoll 
1972), such studies provide insight into macro-level effects of investor flows and 
transaction costs. Edelen and Warner (2001) examine the daily relation between 
aggregate flow of funds into U.S. equity mutual funds and stock market returns. The 
authors find evidence that unexpected flows into mutual funds cause stock prices to 
move within a given day. Furthermore, they also document that these price 
movements are reversed somewhat by the end of the next day, suggesting that the 
trading caused by flow generates price impact costs at the aggregate level. For days 
with extreme inflow (outflow) the magnitude of this temporary price impact is 
substantial measuring 20 (38) basis points.  
 
Goetzmann and Massa (2002) analyse the relation between daily flows and intraday 
returns for three S&P500 index funds covering a four year sample period, 23 March 
1994 to 31 December 1997.26 They find that daily investor flows are positively related 
to afternoon returns on the S&P500 index, but not morning returns. This finding 
suggests that at higher frequency levels, fund flows cause short term market 
movements. However, the results of their analysis also show that prices are not 
reversed by the next day, making it difficult to infer the extent of fund flow induced 
market impact costs (if indeed any exist at all in their sample). Their result is 
                                               
26
 Two of the funds only have data starting 4 January 1993. However, their analysis of returns and fund 
flows (Table 4 of that paper) only considers the common period. 
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consistent with there being no transitory market impact effects, and therefore no 
market impact costs. Alternatively, actual price reversals may occur at intervals 
longer or much shorter than that examined in the paper, making proper identification 
of the price reversal problematic. 
 
Apart from transaction costs, the provision of liquidity services to mutual fund 
shareholders gives rise to significant uninformed trading costs, also known as adverse 
selection costs. As argued by Edelen (1999), when investors utilise the liquidity 
services of open-end mutual funds, the flows of capital to, or from, a fund cause the 
fund manager to engage in uninformed liquidity-motivated type trading. In rational 
expectations models of trade (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) equilibrium is 
reached when liquidity-motivated traders suffer losses to compensate informed traders 
for the costs associated with becoming informed. As such, the liquidity-motivated 
trades of fund managers are, on average, value destroying. To test this hypothesis, 
Edelen (1999) constructs a proxy for liquidity-motivated trading using fund flow and 
turnover data and assesses the alpha performance of mutual funds conditional on this 
metric. The results indicate that the level of liquidity-motivated trading exhibits a 
negative relationship with fund alphas, consistent with the idea that the provision of 
liquidity services contributes to underperformance in open-end mutual funds. 
Unconditional assessment of performance indicates that managers underperform their 
benchmarks by about 1.6% per year. Importantly, when conditioned on liquidity-
motivated trading, the average abnormal return after fees is not significantly different 
from zero. In a rational expectations framework, these results suggest that fund 
managers act as informed traders generally, but also act as uninformed traders when 
they experience fund flow. 
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The effects of liquidity-motivated trading are further explored in a study by 
Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007). They utilise a much larger sample of mutual 
funds27 and a different proxy for liquidity-motivated trading vis-à-vis Edelen (1999). 
The authors argue that the direction and magnitude of trading, conditioned on the 
concurrent level of investor flows, provides insight into the motivation of a fund 
manager’s trades. Specifically, when a fund manager experiences large net outflows 
(and is therefore compelled to disinvest) but sells only a small dollar value of shares 
and distributes that selling over a large amount of securities, such trades are likely to 
be liquidity-motivated. Conversely, if the fund manager experiences large net 
outflows, purchases a large dollar value of stock and concentrates that buying in a 
small number of securities, such trades are likely to be value-motivated. An 
equivalent argument is made for large net inflows. Using a combination of monthly 
fund flow data and quarterly portfolio holdings to infer trade direction and magnitude, 
the authors examine the returns on portfolios conditioned on their motivation. The 
annual excess return on a portfolio motivated by liquidity based purchases is an 
insignificant -0.41%. The annual excess return on value-motivated purchases is a 
significant 2.79%. Taken together, these results suggest that managers are skilled and 
have the ability to generate positive excess returns. However, when forced to engage 
in liquidity-motivated trading their excess returns drop to zero. Similar results, of an 
opposite sign, are documented for liquidity and value-motivated sell portfolios. These 
results are entirely consistent with Edelen (1999) when one notes that the returns in 
Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007) are implied from the portfolio holdings of mutual 
funds and are therefore on a before fee basis, whereas Edelen’s (1999) returns are on 
an after fee basis.  The results of this study and Edelen’s (1999) suggest that investor 
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 Edelen (1999) analyses the semi-annual fund flows and monthly returns of a sample of 166 mutual 
funds over the period 1985 to 1990. Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007) use a sample of 1,400 mutual 
funds with a sample period ranging from January 1980 to December 2003.  
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flows are detrimental to fund manager performance when they cause managers to 
engage in substantial amounts of liquidity-motivated trading. 
 
The two types of flow related costs examined thus far occur when the fund trades to 
meet the liquidity demands of the fund’s shareholders. However, the performance of 
fund managers can also be hindered if the manager does not trade, or does not trade 
fast enough in response to the instructions of investors. Underperformance arises 
because delays in trading distort the portfolio from its optimal level of systematic risk 
(Edelen, 1999). When a manager receives net positive flow, but delays trading, the 
portfolio holds a greater relative weight in cash vis-à-vis if the manager trades 
immediately. Similarly, when a manager receives net negative flow and delays 
trading, the portfolio holds a greater relative weight in stock. Being overweight cash 
or stock does not hinder the risk-adjusted performance of the fund in and of itself.28 
Underperformance arises because investor flows and market returns are 
contemporaneously correlated (Warther, 1995). Therefore, in the above scenarios, it is 
more likely that the fund will be overweight cash when the market is rising and 
overweight stock when the market is falling. In terms of market-timing performance 
metrics introduced by Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981), 
managers will exhibit perverse market timing skills, holding low (high) beta portfolios 
while the market is rising (falling). 
 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) provide preliminary evidence for this effect. They find that 
public information conditional betas of their sample of mutual funds are negatively 
correlated with aggregate net flows of money into funds of that investment style. 
                                               
28
 Though this may give rise to agency costs if the manager systematically deviates from risk levels 
desired by investors.  
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Building upon this finding, Ferson and Warther (1996) show that public information 
betas are negatively correlated to fund flows and fund flows are positively correlated 
with indicators that point towards rising markets (i.e. high dividend yields and low 
treasury yields). Finally, Edelen (1999) directly measures the effects of investor flows 
on the market timing performance of mutual funds using fund flow adjusted versions 
of the classic market timing models of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson 
and Merton (1981). His results indicate that fund managers exhibit perverse market 
timing only when they experience fund flows. Otherwise, the market timing 
performance of managers is neutral. Each of these studies provides evidence that fund 
flows impair the performance of managers by moving portfolio systematic risk away 
from levels that would be optimal given the expected return on the market. 
 
The previous exposition explains how post-flow optimal risk levels of the fund are 
affected by material investor flows. A related concept is the effect of anticipated fund 
flows on pre-flow risk levels. If a manager expects volatile or large fund flows, she 
may hold a greater proportion of cash to reduce the need to constantly trade in and out 
of position. Chordia (1996) provides evidence that there is a correlation between the 
expected volatility of fund flows and the amount of cash held by a fund. His paper 
though makes no comment on the performance effects of holding cash. Theoretically, 
a greater proportion of cash reduces the overall absolute performance of the fund 
since the return to cash is lower, on average, than the return to risky assets. This does 
not impair the risk-adjusted performance of the fund, but it does give rise to agency 
costs if the manager does not deliver a level of risk expected by the investors.  
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Another strand of literature examines the costs that arise when investors 
opportunistically take advantage of purchase (or redemption) prices offered by open-
end mutual funds, for which the future short run returns are predictable, but the prices 
are currently ‘stale’. Bhargava, Bose and Dubofsky (1998) represent one of the first 
studies to explore this phenomenon, which they explain using the example of 
international equity mutual funds domiciled in the U.S. To avoid confusion in the 
following exposition, the prices at which mutual fund units can be bought or sold are 
referred to as net asset values per share or ‘NAVs’, while the prices of securities in 
the fund’s portfolio are referred to as ‘prices’. Generally, a fund’s current NAV is 
calculated using the last traded prices for the securities in the portfolio. However, 
because investors in the U.S. can submit orders to trade mutual fund units as late as 
4:00pm EST, the last traded prices for international securities are several hours old 
depending on the location of the market where the shares trade. At 4:00pm EST, these 
prices are stale insofar as they do not reflect any information made available since the 
close of the foreign market. The fund’s NAVs are, therefore, also stale. Due to the 
correlated nature of asset returns worldwide, the future movements of stale share 
prices might be predictable. In such circumstances investors can trade units in the 
fund at stale NAVs and reap a benefit when the prices (and NAVs) update to their full 
information values. While the profitability of such strategies has been investigated by 
several papers with respect to international equity mutual funds,29 it is applicable 
generally to any mutual fund with mispriced NAVs. For example, domestic (U.S.) 
equity funds which hold illiquid securities are another candidate for stale price 
arbitrage. Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (2001) document significant positive daily 
returns for domestic small cap equity funds while Zitzewitz (2003) documents 
                                               
29
 See for example Bhargava, Bose and Dubofsky (1998), Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (2001), 
Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst (2001), Boudoukh, Richardson, Subrahmanyam and Whitelaw 
(2002), Greene and Hodges (2002) and Zitzewitz (2003). 
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profitable returns for small to mid cap domestic equity funds, specialty equity funds 
and several classes of bond funds. 
 
While this type of behaviour confers a benefit to the investor making the trade, it 
imposes several costs on existing fundholders (Gastineau, 2004; Ciccotello, Edelen, 
Greene and Hodges, 2002). Firstly, as outlined previously in this review, excessive 
fund flows lead to significant transaction and uninformed trading costs. Because this 
strategy operates on daily mispricing, in order to capture substantial absolute profits 
without incurring market risk, flows of funds must be both large and transitory, 
exacerbating the extent of trading costs.30  
 
Secondly, this strategy causes existing fund holders to subsidise the trading shortfalls 
of short-term arbitrageurs. Specifically, mispriced NAVs allow arbitrageurs to 
effectively purchase (sell) assets at prices less (more) than that obtainable in actual 
markets. This occurs because the manager, upon the receipt (redemption) of funds 
from an arbitrageur, cannot subsequently trade securities at stale prices, because the 
very act of trading is likely to bring prices to their full information values. However, 
the arbitrageur still pays (receives) the stale price. The shortfall is borne by existing 
shareholders. Goetzmann, Ivokovic and Rowenhorst (2001) estimate the wealth 
transfer brought about by daily fund flows in a sample of 166 international open-end 
equity mutual funds operating in the U.S. in the period 2 January 1990 to 24 July 
1998. The authors find a very small percentage loss to existing shareholders as a 
result of this wealth transfer effect, measuring 0.006% per year at the median. 
                                               
30
 Charski (1999) provides anecdotal evidence that excessive transitory fund flows lead to significant 
underperformance. Her article recounts the story of Montgomery Emerging Asia Fund which received 
$7million USD in one day, a substantial portion of the fund which at the time only managed $30 
million USD. The flow was subsequently reversed, forcing the manager to sell good investments and 
incur substantial costs. 
 50 
However, certain funds experience material underperformance due to this effect with 
the worst affected quartile of funds experiencing losses between 0.539% and 0.035% 
annually. 
 
Zitzewitz (2003) estimates wealth transfer effects31 on a sample of 1165 open end 
mutual funds spanning a suite of fund categories including international equity, 
international bond, domestic small and mid cap equity and domestic bond funds. His 
sample spans February 1998 to September 2001. He finds a modest average 
annualised cost of 14 basis points across all funds in his sample. However, for 
regionally focused international equity funds (the funds most vulnerable to arbitrage 
activity) the wealth transfer effects measure 1.60% per year. For general international 
equity funds the costs borne by long term fundholders is 81 basis points per year. 
Specialty equity funds, Latin American and global equity funds and U.S. small and 
mid cap equity funds also posses significant, albeit smaller, annualised wealth transfer 
losses of 33 basis points, 23 basis points and 12 basis points respectively. 
 
The third type of cost attributable to mispriced NAVs arises when the flows of 
arbitrageurs dilute the returns of existing shareholders (Greene and Hodges, 2002). 
This cost occurs concurrently with the wealth transfer effect, but arises from the 
temporary cash holdings caused by the inability to trade, rather than the shortfall 
incurred upon trading. Consider the case where stale prices are expected to increase. 
An arbitrageur that provides money to the fund immediately has a proportional claim 
                                               
31
 Zitzewitz (2003) uses the term ‘dilution’ effect when referring to the wealth transfer effects 
documented in Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rowenhorst’s (2001). Both terms describe conceptually the 
same phenomenon and are calculated in a similar manner (see p259 of Zitzewitz and p307 of 
Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rowenhorst). In this review, the term wealth transfer effect is used to 
distinguish it from Greene and Hodges’ (2002) ‘dilution’ effect, which is a fundamentally different 
type of cost imposed by arbitrageurs of mispriced NAVs. 
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to the returns on the existing asset pool. However, managers often cannot allocate 
arbitrageurs’ funds before the stale prices update, either because the trades would be 
prohibitively costly or in the case of international funds, it is impossible to trade the 
shares. As such, existing investor returns are diluted, because the new money is still 
held as cash, but the arbitrageur that provided the cash has claim to a proportion of the 
subsequent positive portfolio returns.32 Greene and Hodges (2002) estimate the daily 
dilution costs for a sample of 833 open end mutual funds over the period 2 February 
1998 to 31 March 2000. They find that the average dilution effect causes a reduction 
in performance of -0.06% per year. This result is statistically significant but of 
questionable economic significance. However, for international equity funds, the 
dilution impact measures -0.48% per year, which is both economically and 
statistically significant. Furthermore, international funds which receive above median 
fund flows experience a dilution cost of 94 basis points a year. The results of this 
study as well as Zitzewitz (2003) and Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rowenhorst (2001) 
indicate that investors who attempt to take advantage of mispriced NAVs represent a 
significant impediment towards long-term wealth creation in mutual funds. 
 
The final fund flow related cost considered in this review is the affect of investor 
demands on the tax liability of all investors in the fund. As outlined in Dickson, 
Shoven and Sialm (2000), investors’ tax liabilities are accelerated when a manager 
experiences significant investor redemptions and is forced to sell appreciated 
securities. Furthermore, the effect of redemptions on tax liability is asymmetric. The 
                                               
32
 Interestingly, this cost is conceptually similar to the risk distortion effects of fund flow explored in 
Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Warther (1996) and Edelen (1999). Both costs arise due to a 
delay in trading new flow which, due to subsequent increases in the prices of assets, dilutes the returns 
of long term investors. The main difference between these two processes is that the mechanism which 
causes positive correlation in returns and flows is fundamentally different. Furthermore, the dilution 
effect operates over shorter horizons relative to t
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selling of depreciated securities does not confer an immediate capital loss benefit to 
existing fundholders. Therefore net negative investor flows can potentially increase, 
in present value terms, fund holders’ tax liability.33 Dickson, Shoven and Sialm 
(2000) simulate the net effect of fund flow on the overall tax liability for a 
hypothetical passive fund comprising the largest 50 stocks, by market capitalisation, 
in 1983. Their simulation estimates the fund’s tax liability under various fund flows 
assumptions using actual returns of these 50 stocks over a 15 year period. The results 
indicate that when investor flows are assumed to be -1% per month, the monthly 
after-tax returns of an equal weighted (value weighted) passive fund are reduced by 
approximately 5 basis points (8 basis points), relative to zero fund flow. The authors 
also simulate the tax effects of a hypothetical actively managed portfolio which 
comprises at any one point in time 30 out of the 50 stocks held by the passive 
portfolio. Depending on the inputs to the simulation, fund flows which average -1% 
per month (with a standard deviation of 4.5%) reduce monthly after tax returns by as 
much as 10 basis points per month relative to zero fund flow. The results of this study 
confirm that net negative fund flows can increase the tax liability of existing investors 
in a fund, therefore affecting their after tax returns. 
 
2.1.3. Fund manager response to investor flows 
Fund managers are typically compensated with respect to two criteria - the value of 
assets under management and performance. Direct compensation to managers is based 
on the value of assets in the fund, while performance determines whether the manager 
retains employment (Khorana, 1996). Performance also directly affects the value of 
                                               
33
 Dickson, Shoven and Sialm (2000) also note that investor flows into a fund confer a tax benefit to 
existing shareholders. As explained previously, new money into a fund dilutes the liability associated 
with unrealised capital gains (Barclay, Pearson and Weisbach, 1998). Their simulation also investigates 
the positive tax benefits associated with fund inflows. 
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assets under management, since superior performance grows the value of assets and 
attracts additional capital into a fund. It is apparent that features of the flow-
performance relation outlined in this review provide complex and potentially 
conflicting incentives for managers. For example, managers have an incentive, 
through superior performance or other means, to attract investor flows to the fund. 
Greater investor flows, however, create a drag on performance. The section reviews 
how managers respond to the salient features of the flow-performance relationship. 
Specifically, it examines the actions managers take to attract additional capital into a 
fund (besides improving risk-adjusted performance), especially in light of the non-
linear relationship between performance and flow. Also reviewed are studies which 
examine how managers attempt to minimise the costs associated with investor flows. 
 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) are the first to investigate how the non-linearity in 
the performance-flow relationship influences the behaviour of asset managers. They 
recognise that, since the flow of money into superior funds is greater than the outflow 
from underperforming funds, managers face an option like payoff structure with 
respect to their performance. They hypothesise that this convexity induces 
underperforming (or ‘losing’) managers to augment the risk of their portfolios, since 
the value of this implied (out-of-the-money) option is maximised as risk increases. 
Furthermore, they argue that overperforming (or ‘winning’) mangers have an 
incentive to ‘lock in’ profits by indexing their portfolios. To refine their hypothesis 
they draw on aspects of economic tournament literature, which emphasises the 
importance of relative, rather than absolute performance, against other ‘competitors’ 
in the tournament. The authors contend that since investors pay most attention to 
annual performance rankings the appropriate length of the tournament is one year, 
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beginning in January and ending in December. Their analysis, therefore, examines the 
correlation between relative performance in the first part of the year, with changes in 
risk between the first and second parts of the year.34 
 
Utilising a sample of 334 growth funds in the period 1976 to 1991, the authors find 
that managers who underperform (overperform) relative to their peers in the first part 
of the year are more likely to have the greatest (smallest) increases in risk over the 
second part of year. They also demonstrate that certain characteristics influence the 
strength of this relationship. Underperforming younger funds and underperforming 
smaller funds tend to implement riskier strategies in the second part of the year rather 
than older or larger funds. Consistent with the insights uncovered in the fund salience 
literature, the authors provide indirect evidence that the media plays an important role 
in informing consumers about the performance of managers. For example, the results 
are most pronounced when the interim period is measured from January to July, 
consistent with the idea that managers change their strategies after second quarter 
results are reported by the financial press. Furthermore the results also indicate that 
the tendency for underperforming managers to alter risk increases over the course of 
their sample period. They attribute this to the advent of publication of fund manager 
performance rankings in investment magazines such as Business Week or Money 
during the late 1980s.  
 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) investigate a similar research question though add 
additional insight not provided by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996). Using semi-
parametric analysis, the authors first generate the shape of the performance-flow 
                                               
34
 The first part of the year is defined as January to month M, where M = April, May, June, July or 
August. The second part of the year is defined as month M to December. 
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relation for funds of a given age. Using these functions as implied incentives for fund 
managers, the authors calculate optimal risk changes for a given interim level of 
performance. Consistent with intuition that was only assumed in Brown, Harlow and 
Starks (1996), the authors show that underperforming funds have an incentive to 
increase risk and superior funds have an incentive to wind back risk during the last 
quarter of the year. Using a sample of 449 mutual funds that operated during 1983 to 
1993, they authors show that managers, in general alter their final quarter risk in line 
with these incentives. This holds whether risk is measured as total portfolio risk or 
idiosyncratic portfolio risk. The result is marginally insignificant when beta risk is 
considered. Furthermore the authors show that the tendency for managers to increase 
risk after underperformance decreases with the age and size of the fund. 
 
Subsequent research has extended the insight developed in these early studies. Taylor 
(2003) develops a model which shows that in certain circumstances it is optimal for 
the superior funds to undertake risky strategies (rather than lock in performance) as an 
anticipatory move against underperforming funds. The incidence of winner funds 
undertaking risky strategies is directly proportional to a number of factors, including 
the volatility of the market, since high volatility increases the chance that a risk taking 
loser fund will overtake a passive winner over the last part of the year. His empirical 
results provide evidence that the incidence of well performing funds taking on greater 
risk is related to market volatility.  
 
Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) extend the analysis to the level of the fund family, 
providing evidence that similar risk shifting behaviour exists in intra-family 
tournaments. This research builds upon work by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008a) which 
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documents convexity in the flow-performance relation at the family level. The authors 
show that in large mutual fund families, winning and losing funds behave as they do 
in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996). Losing funds increase risk to get to the top of 
the mutual fund family, whereas winning funds lock in performance. However, they 
also show that for small mutual fund families, Taylor’s (2003) strategic behaviour 
effect becomes more pronounced. Winning funds anticipate the behaviour of rival 
funds within a family such that overperforming funds subsequently increase their 
year-end risk relative to underperforming funds. 
 
While Kempf and Ruenzi (2008b) investigate intra-family tournaments, Nanda, Wang 
and Zheng (2004) examine inter-family tournaments. Since the presence of a star 
performer provides positive fund flow externalities to other funds in the complex, a 
family has the incentive to produce at least one star. The authors show that one 
indicator of the ex ante probability of producing a star is high standard deviation of 
returns across the funds in the family. They also show that families with high standard 
deviation across member funds have inferior performance relative to other families. 
Put together, these results suggest that poorly performing families appear to undertake 
behaviour consistent with trying to produce a star and reaping the benefits of 
increased fund flow. In the context of their sample, this implies engaging in strategies 
to increase the standard deviation of returns across all funds in the family. 
 
The studies reviewed thus far examine how managers act to take advantage of the 
features of performance-flow relation. Complementing these studies, the literature 
also examines how fund managers react to the reverse relation – the effect of flow on 
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performance. This research examines the actions managers take to either deter fund 
flows or minimise the cost of those flows.  
 
Managers have several mechanisms at their disposal to dissuade frequent trading in 
and out of a fund. These include levying load fees (or entry/exit fees)35, enforcing 
minimum holding periods or minimum investment restrictions or, permitting only a 
set number of redemptions in a given year. In extreme cases, the manager can 
completely close the fund to new investors. Out of all these mechanisms to deter fund 
flows, the literature has investigated only two in detail – load fees and fund closures.  
 
Chordia (1996) develops a model of the mutual fund which provides insight into why 
mutual funds set load fees and the benefits that accrue from this decision. In his model 
investors are either long or short term investors. They are identical except that short 
term investors have a greater probability of redeeming their investment. Redemptions 
impose two costs on existing investors – a liquidation cost and an opportunity cost. 
The liquidation cost arises when the fund is forced to sell shares. The opportunity cost 
arises because, as the ex ante probability of liquidation increases, the fund holds a 
greater proportion of cash as precautionary measure against redemption. Load fees 
impose a higher expected cost on short term investors, while conferring a benefit to 
long term investors. A fund sets load fees to reduce the number of short term investors 
or in some cases to completely discriminate between the two classes of investors. As a 
result, the model predicts that funds with load fees have less need to hold cash and 
other liquid assets to facilitate the liquidity demands of fund holders. His empirical 
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 The distinction between load fees and entry/exit fees is that load fees are primarily designed to pay 
for marketing costs, whereas entry/exit fees are designed to discourage rapid trading into and out of a 
fund. Functionally they are very similar since both require the investor to pay a fee upon entry and/or 
exit from a fund. 
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results provide support for this prediction, though are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
  
Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000), extending the insights of Chordia (1996), 
develop a theoretical model to predict which factors cause funds to use load fees as a 
means of minimising fund flows. In their model, load and management fees are set 
endogenously in a competitive setting by managers who are aware that fees deter fund 
flows and that fund flows impair performance. Due to the lower costs they impose, 
managers prefer long term investors over short term investors. Since load fees are set 
endogenously, such fees can be set such that they always deter short term investors. 
When a manager chooses such an action they must compete with other managers for 
the remaining pool of long term investors. As such, better performing managers set 
load fees since they have a comparative advantage in attracting long term investors. 
Importantly, their model also predicts that as the costs attributable to fund flow 
increase, the need for load fees decrease. Taken together these predictions suggest that 
funds which face the greatest comparative disadvantage with respect to fund flows – 
that is managers with superior performance or managers with poor transaction cost 
management – have the greatest incentive to impose load fees. 
 
Greene, Hodges and Rakowski (2007) empirically test the intuition underlying the 
models of Chordia (1996) and Nanda, Narayanan and Warther (2000) – that fees 
levied on investor flows deter frequent redemptions. They test this issue using daily 
fund flow data for a sample of international equity, domestic growth, domestic 
income and domestic bond funds and investigate specifically the use of redemption 
fees by the fund managers to curb the short term arbitrage activity documented in 
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Section 2.1.2 of this review. The authors show that after initiating a redemption fee, 
the volatility of signed flows and the absolute value of daily flows decrease for all 
categories except domestic income funds. The authors also show that the initiation of 
redemption fees reduces arbitrage activity of the kind documented in Greene and 
Hodges (2002) and Zitzewitz (2003). The study, therefore, provides evidence that 
managers rationally impose redemption fees to reduce investor activity that impinges 
upon their assessed performance. 
 
Several papers investigate the role of fund closures on investor and manager 
behaviour. After a fund initiates a closure, any further investment comes only from 
existing investors. In theory, closures present a way for managers to reduce flows and 
their associated costs. Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala and Rau (2007) investigate whether 
closures indeed represent an effort by managers to reduce the effect of flows on 
performance or whether there are ulterior motives for closure. They present three 
hypotheses. First, managers initiate closures to reduce flow and maintain good 
performance. Second, managers use closures to justify increasing management fees. 
Third, fund families close a well performing fund to attract attention to other funds 
within a family. Investigating a sample of 140 closures, the authors find that, despite 
the fact that closures lead to a significant reduction in fund flows, the returns of 
closing funds deteriorate relative to pre-closure levels. Furthermore, the performance 
of closing funds is comparable to their non-closed peers after the fund is shut off to 
new investors. This result suggests that while closures have the desired effect on fund 
flows, they do not have the desired effect on performance. Further analysis indicates 
that closures seem to be motivated by their second hypothesis – fund closures are 
correlated with statistically significant fee increases. The results of this study confirm 
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earlier work by Zhao (2004), Manakyan and Liano (1997) and Smaby and Fizel 
(1995) which find that closed funds do not maintain their performance after initiating 
the investment restriction. Taken together, this suggests that fund closures do not 
seem to provide the expected performance improvement associated with lower fund 
flow. 
 
Most managers choose not to use restrictions or fund closures to curb investor flows. 
Summary statistics in Greene, Hodges and Rakowski (2007) show that out of their 
sample of 4569 international equity, domestic equity and domestic bond funds that 
operated during the years 2000 to 2003, only 190 or 4.16% charge redemption fees. 
Their paper also documents that the use of other restrictions such as minimum 
investment amounts (34.96%), front-end load fees (30.05%), deferred load fees 
(37.37%) and purchase constraints (28.33%) is not common for funds in their sample. 
Fund closures appear to be even rarer. Bris, Gulen, Kadiyala and Rau (2007) use 
multiple news sources to hand collect a sample of 140 closures of equity funds over a 
twelve year period, 1993 to 2004. Zhao (2004) uses a sample of 139 closures of 
equity and bond funds over a ten year period, 1992 to 2001. Given that funds appear 
reluctant to use restrictions and closures to dissuade fund flows, managers wishing to 
avoid flow related performance effects can instead directly target the costs attributable 
to flow. 
 
Derivatives represent one manner to reduce flow related costs. Koski and Pontiff 
(1999) provide the first evidence that portfolio managers use derivatives to minimise 
the risk distortion effects studied in Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Warther 
(1996) and Edelen (1999). The authors argue that since derivatives provide a 
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mechanism to manipulate portfolio risk, these securities can be readily used to 
rebalance the portfolio after fund flows distort its risk characteristics. Furthermore, 
they also note that investor flows are directly proportional to past performance. The 
hypothesis that follows from these arguments is that the negative relation between 
past performance and risk should be weaker for funds which use derivatives compared 
funds that do not. Analysing a sample of 679 equity mutual funds partitioned into 
‘derivative user’ and ‘derivative non-user’ groups, the authors estimate the 
relationship between six monthly performance and subsequent risk measures. The 
results indicate that the relationship between performance and risk is negative, but the 
relationship is non-existent or weaker amongst the derivative user group. Importantly, 
the study shows that managers are only able to repair changes to beta risk, suggesting 
that index futures or index options feature prominently in the execution of this 
strategy. 
 
Chincarini (2004) explores the issue further, examining the extent to which four 
prominent index futures contracts – the S&P500, Nasdaq-100, Russell2000 and 
S&P400 Midcap – can be used to minimise fund flow related risk costs for various 
sector funds. The effectiveness of a futures contract in reducing risk effects is directly 
related to the extent to which the derivative can be used to mimic the typical returns 
on the managed portfolio. For all four index future contracts, the author estimates 
over a 30-day period the position required to mimic the sector fund’s benchmark and 
then tests this estimated value on the next day’s returns. The results indicate that for 
most sectors (all except precious metals, commodities, real estate and utilities) using 
index futures in this manner produces returns that are closer to the sector fund’s 
benchmark than holding cash. Averaged across all sector benchmarks, the strategy 
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reduces tracking error by 9 basis points per day. While offering important insight, the 
results of this study presents only the hypothetical savings of using index futures to 
minimise risk effects of fund flows. It does not test whether these benefits are actually 
realised by fund managers. 
 
Besides dampening the risk distortion effects of fund flows, derivatives can also 
generate transaction cost savings for fund managers. Since futures markets are 
generally more liquid than equity markets (Fleming, Ostdiek and Whaley, 1996), 
funds that require transaction of large flows might find it more cost effective to 
engage in futures markets. Deli and Varma (2002) examine the factors that underscore 
the permission to invest in derivative securities and provide indirect evidence that 
fund managers use derivatives to reduce transaction costs. The authors find that the 
permission to trade derivatives is only provided to funds where transaction cost 
savings are likely to be large. There is a greater chance derivatives will be permitted 
for funds that hold less liquid portfolios and for funds that have greater turnover of 
shares. Furthermore, only those derivatives relevant to the portfolio are allowed to be 
traded. For example, equity funds can only trade equity derivatives and not bond 
derivatives. While this study provides evidence that derivatives are used to generate 
transaction cost savings, as in Chincarini (2004), these findings are only hypothetical. 
Without examining actual mutual fund return data, it is not possible to determine if 
fund managers actually realise these savings. 
 
2.1.4. The use of derivatives by mutual fund managers 
This section reviews all studies that investigate the derivative trading behaviour of 
investment managers. It covers the specific research questions examined in these 
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papers, the effects of derivative trading on performance and risk and the methods used 
to classify funds into derivative user and non-user groups. 
 
Koski and Pontiff (1999) is the first study to investigate the use of derivatives by 
investment managers. Their sample covers 679 equity mutual funds operating in the 
US over the period January 1992 to December 1994. Derivative user and non-user 
groups are classified according to the results of a telephone survey conducted by the 
authors. The paper first examines the characteristics that are correlated with the use of 
derivatives. Though it is not explicitly mentioned in the study, the results are 
consistent with the idea that derivatives are used to mitigate the costs of fund flows. 
Consistent with Deli and Varma (2002), funds with greater turnover are more likely to 
use derivatives. Funds which do not charge load fees or are part of fund family are 
more likely to trade derivatives. Both of these factors have been shown to increase the 
flow of money into a fund (Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005; Kempf and Ruenzi, 
2008a). In a largely exploratory analysis, the authors also investigate the distributional 
properties of return and risk metrics for the mutual funds in their sample. The results 
indicate that there is little statistical difference in the unconditional distributional 
properties of derivative users compared to non-users. Finally, as mentioned 
previously, the authors find that derivative users have lower intertemporal variation in 
beta risk (conditioned on prior performance) between consecutive six month periods 
relative to non-users. The authors use this result to suggest that a decrease (increase) 
in portfolio risk after strong (poor) performances is the result of fund flows, rather 
than incentive gaming as hypothesised in Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997). If gaming was the true cause of the intertemporal 
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variation in risk, the authors argue that derivative users should have a higher 
sensitivity of risk to prior performance rather than lower as they find. 
 
Johnson and Yu (2004) replicate aspects of the analysis of Koski and Pontiff (1999) 
using data of derivative investment by Canadian domestic equity, foreign equity funds 
and fixed-income funds. Their sample covers 221 users and 777 non-users of 
derivatives which operated during the period September 1995 to September 1998. To 
classify funds, the authors have access to mutual fund holdings data. The data provide 
the amount of investment in three derivative categories – warrants, index futures and 
‘other derivative securities’. As with Koski and Pontiff (1999), the authors find that 
the factors correlated with derivative usage indicate the derivatives might be used to 
dampen fund flow related costs. Derivative use is associated with the absence of load 
fees and indicators which describe large, high turnover funds, though this result is 
only apparent for domestic equity funds. In terms of risk and performance, the study 
finds that there is no difference between users and non-users of derivatives in the 
domestic and foreign equity income category, while fixed income funds have higher 
risk and return measures. 
 
Fletcher, Forbes and Marshall (2002) also replicate Koski and Pontiff (1999) on a 
sample of UK investment trusts investing in UK equities. Their sample consists of 98 
funds that operated between January 1995 and December 1997. Through a written 
survey, 22 funds are classified as users of derivatives. As with Koski and Pontiff 
(1999) and Johnson and Yu (2004) the authors show that there is no statistical 
difference in the performance metrics of user compared to non-user funds. The results 
show no difference in mean risk values, but indicate that the distribution of risk 
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metrics is more disperse for user funds. Finally the authors document that derivative 
users have lower intertemporal variation in conditional risk across consecutive six 
month periods. This is technically consistent with Koski and Pontiff (1999). However, 
the study also reports the incongruous finding that risk is positively related to prior 
performance. This is not consistent with the idea that fund inflows (outflows) 
accorded to strong (weak) performance bring about undesired dilution (concentration) 
of risk and provides considerable difficulty in adequately interpreting the results. The 
authors do not investigate the source of this incongruous finding. 
 
Three studies examine the use of derivatives by Australian equity managed funds. 
Pinnuck (2004) examines the use of options by investment funds. In general he finds 
that investment in options is small, and averages only 1.76% as a percentage of total 
portfolio value. Option usage does not appear to be correlated with performance, risk 
or turnover. The author states there is weak evidence that option usage is correlated 
with fund size. Fong, Gallagher and Ng (2005), undertaking a similar analysis to 
Koski and Pontiff (1999), note that unconditional risk and return metrics are not 
correlated with the use of derivatives. Despite this lack of difference in performance 
between the groups, the authors also find that fund managers tend to use options to 
initiate momentum strategies in rising stocks. Investment in options is accorded more 
strongly towards underlying stocks with recent good performance. Finally, the authors 
show that option trades by fund managers are not correlated with price moves in the 
underlying security, suggesting that options trades by fund managers are not 
informationally motivated or are not perceived as such by the market. Finally, 
Benson, Faff and Nowland (2007) investigate the risk shifting behaviour of derivative 
using managed funds. The authors find some evidence that the behaviour of fund 
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managers is consistent with the gaming hypothesis provided in Brown, Harlow and 
Starks (1996) and the active competition hypothesis of Taylor (2003). However, the 
results overall are mixed and not robust to the time period studied. 
 
The salient features of the data sets, sample periods and results of the studies 
reviewed in this section are provided in Table 2.1. The results summary reveals a 
general consensus that, in unconditional analyses of risk and performance, derivative 
users are not significantly different to non-users. Secondly, the classification of 
mutual funds into user and non-user groups varies in terms of data sources and data 
precision. Some data sets allow the researcher to determine which derivatives are 
traded – options or futures and some data sets allow the extent of derivative 
investment to be determined. None of these data sources, however, allow the 
researcher to determine the purpose of the manager’s derivative trading, e.g. is the 
manager hedging or speculating by trading a particular option? The purpose of 
derivative trades is inferred from comparisons of derivative users and non-users.  
 
The study of derivative trading behaviour in Chapter 3 extends the literature in this 
respect since it utilises unique survey data which provides detail as to whether fund 
managers trade index futures for the purposes of fund flow management or otherwise. 
The results of the study also challenge the consensus that derivatives do not seem to 
hinder or enhance performance of fund managers.  
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Table 2.1 
Summary of literature on the use of derivatives by investment managers 
This table summarises studies that investigate the derivative trading behaviour of investment managers. The table describes features of the sample used in each study – the 
number of user and non-user funds, the period analysed and the method used to classify user and non-user funds. The table also summarises results of analyses which 
examine whether users and non-users of derivatives differ in terms of unconditional risk and return metrics. The final column presents other findings documented in the 
respective study. 
Study Sample Features Summary of Results 
 Description Period Classification Method Unconditional risk/return Other findings 
Koski and Pontiff (1999) US equity mutual funds 
141 users, 538 non-users 
Jan 1993 to Dec 1994 Telephone survey 
indicates whether fund 
uses derivatives or not  
No difference 1. Derivatives usage is 
correlated with turnover, 
the absence of load fees 
and the membership of a 
family 
2. Users have lower 
variation in risk, 
conditioned on prior 
performance. 
Fletcher, Forbes and 
Marshall (2002) 
UK equity investment 
trusts 
22 users, 71 non-users 
Jan 1995 to Dec 1997 Written survey indicates 
whether fund uses 
derivatives or not 
Users have greater 
dispersion in risk metrics. 
No difference otherwise 
Users have lower 
variation in risk, 
conditioned on prior 
performance. 
Pinnuck (2004) Australian equity 
managed funds 
21 user funds, 16 non-
users 
Jan 1990 to Dec 1997 Confidential portfolio 
holdings indicate whether 
funds hold options 
No difference Options play an 
economically insignificant 
role for funds. 
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Johnson and Yu (2004) Canadian equity and 
fixed-income mutual 
funds 
211 users, 777 non-users 
Sep 1995 to Sep 1998 Portfolio holdings data 
reveals whether funds use 
warrants, index futures or 
other derivatives. 
No difference for equity 
funds. User funds have 
greater risk and return in 
fixed-income category  
Derivatives usage is 
negatively correlated with 
age (foreign equity and 
fixed-income) and 
positively correlated with 
size and factors 
attributable to growth 
funds (domestic equity). 
 
Fong et al. (2005) Australian equity 
managed funds 
17 users, 17 non-users 
Jan 1993 to Dec 1993 Confidential portfolio 
holdings indicate whether 
funds hold options or 
futures 
No difference 1. Options are purchased 
to gain exposure to recent 
winner stocks 
2. The options trades of 
fund managers are not 
informationally motivated. 
 
Benson et al. (2007) Australian equity 
managed funds split into 
two samples 
S1: 34 users, 68 non-users 
S2: 20 users, 10 non-users 
S1: Jan 2002 to Dec 2005 
S2: Jan 1994 to Dec 2003 
S1: Data obtained from 
fund annual reports 
S2: Data obtained from 
Russell Investment Group 
No difference Evidence that funds in the 
sample behave in a 
manner consistent with 
gaming or active 
competition. Results are 
not robust to time period 
analysed. 
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2.2. The interaction between insider traders and regulators 
Understanding crime and punishment through the prism of economic thought began 
with the pioneering work of Becker (1968). In his analysis on the supply of offences 
Becker notes that the expected utility of crime depends upon three variables – the 
expected gain from the crime (expressed as its monetary equivalent, Y), the 
probability of getting caught (p) and the punishment levied if caught (expressed as its 
monetary equivalent f). The expected utility from a crime is defined as: 
 
( ) (1 ) ( )j j j j j j j jEU p U Y f p U Y= − + −               (2.1) 
 
In the context of illegal insider trading this relation can take a slightly altered form, if 
one recognises that, given that an individual decides to commit insider trading, both 
the expected income from the crime and the probability of getting caught is a function 
of the volume traded. Furthermore, unlike crimes with more esoteric concepts of 
‘gain’ (e.g. sexual assault or vandalism), the gain from insider trading is 
predominantly monetary in nature and can be defined easily. The expected utility 
from insider trading is: 
 
( , ) ( ) (1 ( , ) ) ( )j j j j j j jEU p s x U s f p s x U sδ δ= − + −              (2.2) 
 
where s is volume traded by the individual, δ is the incremental value, in dollars per 
share, of the insider’s information and x represents any other factors which influence 
the probability of detection. This idea parallels the insight developed in Stigler (1970), 
which allows for the probability of punishment to be directly proportional to the gain 
incurred by the criminal. In the equation presented above, the factor that drives this 
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correlation is the volume traded by the insider. The consequences of Equation 2.2 are 
more formally explored in Chapter 4, but at first instance it is worthwhile noting that a 
utility maximising illegal insider trader chooses s to maximise EU given the other 
parameters, f, p and δ. 
   
This intuition provides the motivation for exploring the interactions between illegal 
insiders and regulators, since the decisions of the regulator play a large role in 
determining these three factors. In essence, the regulator governs the behaviour of 
insider traders. Clearly, f and to a large extent, p are determined by the regulator. Not 
as clear is the influence of the regulator on the incremental value of the insider’s 
information, δ. At first glance, it would seem that the acquisition of information by 
insiders is a process independent of the regulator’s actions. Even if one accepts this to 
be true, it is nevertheless possible to argue that the incremental value of that 
information, once acquired, is affected by the regulatory and legal environment in 
which the insider operates. This is because the regulatory environment (e.g. disclosure 
laws, insider trading laws and corporate governance standards) has a strong bearing 
on the efficiency of the market (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009; Beny, 2005; Bris, 
2005). By definition the efficiency of the market determines the value and longevity 
of inside (non-public) information. 
 
This part of the literature review summarises studies which examine the interaction 
between illegal insiders and regulators. Section 2.2.1 reviews studies which 
investigate how insiders respond to factors which increase the punitive side of 
Equation 2.2 – i.e. increases in fines or probability of conviction. Section 2.2.2 
reviews the literature which investigates factors that influence the gains of insider 
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trading. Finally, because Chapter 4 presents an empirical study of illegal insider 
trading, Section 2.2.3 reviews the general empirical literature on insider trading not 
included in Section 2.2.1 or 2.2.2. The entirety of Section 2.2 surveys literature on 
illegal insider trading, though where it is relevant literature on legal (reported) insider 
trading is also included. 
 
2.2.1. Illegal insiders and expected penalty 
The expected penalty of a crime is the product of two factors – the probability of 
conviction and the penalty upon conviction. To investigate the effect of expected 
penalties on the behaviour of insiders, the literature naturally turns to the legislative 
and enforcement environment in which insiders operate. Studies tend to divide the 
legislative environment into several regimes of increasing severity – no insider 
trading laws, insider trading laws with zero or very poor enforcement of those laws 
and finally, enacted and enforced insider trading laws. Further to this, studies also 
examine how insiders react to changes in the punishment levied upon transgressors. 
 
Banerjee and Eckard (2001) examine a period in US history before the existence of 
insider trading laws to determine how insiders behave under complete impunity. 
Analysing a sample of mergers from the ‘Great Merger Wave’ of 1897-1901, the 
authors find evidence of substantial insider trading. For a selection of firms for which 
the first announcement of the merger is a notice indicating the merger is nearing 
completion,36 the results indicate that insiders appropriate all the pre-announcement 
                                               
36
 In this period, disclosure requirements and takeover laws were not as they are in modern times. It 
was possible to have a merger de facto completed before announcing it to the market. 
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returns. This study shows that insiders trade to realise the maximum profit when the 
threat of prosecution is non-existent.37 
 
The results of Madison, Roth and Saporeschenko (2004) suggest a similar 
phenomenon – that insiders act readily to utilise information if there is no punishment 
attached to the behaviour. Their analysis however, is different to Banerjee and Ekard 
(2001) and indeed most studies in this area, in that it examines insider non-trading. 
Purchasing shares in a yet-to-be-announced takeover target produces the same 
terminal wealth effects as delaying the sale of shares already held. Only the former is 
illegal. Examining reported share sales of upper management of commercial banks, 
the authors find evidence that insider selling activity drops to zero, at the median, in 
the last two months prior to a merger announcement. Consistent with Banerjee and 
Eckard (2001), this study suggests that insiders act to capture 100% of the gains if the 
threat of prosecution is absent. 
 
What happens if insider trading is illegal but the activity is not enforced? 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorgenson, Kehr (2000) investigate stock price run-ups in a 
sample of Mexican news announcements. In Mexico insider trading laws exist but are 
not enforced. Insiders act with a technical, but not real, threat of prosecution. The 
results of the study indicate that there is no significant abnormal return on the day of 
news announcements in the Mexican Bolsa de Valores. Other factors which are 
                                               
37Bris (2005) examines the same research issue in a modern context. As part of his broader analysis of 
the efficacy of insider trading laws, he documents a significant but modest cumulative abnormal return 
of 1.37% at announcement for a sample of mergers picked from a pool of 43 countries that first passed 
insider trading laws in the 1990s. The reliability of this part of his analysis, however, is questionable, 
given the sample size (27 – less than one per country) and includes countries with under developed 
markets. Furthermore the average premium associated with the mergers (100 days pre to 1 day post 
announcement) is an insignificant 0.52%, which appears completely at odds with typical researched 
mergers. 
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typically associated with levels of information asymmetry – increased volatility, 
greater bid-ask spreads, increased volume – are also absent on the announcement date. 
The authors find evidence of complete information leakage prior to the event, 
suggestive of insider trading. The results of this study show that the mere presence of 
insider trading laws does not appear to prevent insiders from being active in markets 
prior to sensitive news announcements. Wisniewski and Bohl (2005) provide 
contributing evidence from the Polish market, where insider trading laws are also 
poorly enforced. Their study shows that reported insider trades predict significant 
abnormal returns on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
 
Studies suggest that it is the enforcement, rather than the presence, of insider trading 
laws that changes the behaviour of insider traders, though the evidence is only 
indirect. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find that the company cost of equity 
decreases in a sample of 103 countries after the first enforcement of insider trading 
laws but not after the enactment of the laws. The authors speculate that this reduction 
in the cost of equity could occur in one of two ways. Firstly, liquidity providers 
tighten bid-ask spreads as adverse selection costs decrease under stricter enforcement. 
This improves prices for investors and hence reduces their required rate of return. 
Alternatively, under strict enforcement the behaviour of large shareholders is tipped 
towards greater scrutiny of management. In a regime of lax enforcement, management 
could ‘bribe’ large shareholders from undertaking costly monitoring through sharing 
of insider information. The shift towards greater monitoring under enforced laws 
makes investment more attractive and thus decreases the required rate of return. 
Importantly, both scenarios are associated with a lower incidence of insider trading. 
Beny (2005; 2007) provides evidence that ownership dispersion in an economy is 
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positively correlated with whether enforcement in that economy occurred by 1994. 
Beny offers several reasons why greater ownership dispersion suggests lower insider 
trading and they are similar to those mentioned in Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). 
Both these studies therefore, provide (indirect) evidence that the enforcement of laws 
has a real effect on the behaviour of insider traders. 
 
Once insider trading laws are passed and are well enforced, what factors affect the 
probability of detection? Due to the inherent data-related difficulties in answering this 
question38, the literature offers only scant empirical evidence. Park, Jang and Loeb 
(1995) develop a model of insider trading before earnings announcements where the 
probability of detection is a decreasing function of the days until the news is released. 
Their model predicts that, conditional on the insider having sensitive information and 
choosing to trade on it, insider trading activity should decrease as the information 
event approaches. To test their hypothesis the authors investigate reported insider 
trading activity in the 40 days prior to earnings announcements. The results indicate 
that insider trading activity is greater than normal 40 to 21 days before the 
information event and significantly lower than normal 10 to 1 days before the 
information event. While the analysis is conducted only on reported insider trades, the 
findings suggest that insiders are aware that trading immediately before a material 
announcement is likely to draw attention to the activity. This suggests that the 
proximity to the announcement date is a determinant of the detection probability. 
 
Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) provide contributing evidence for this conclusion. 
They examine reported insider trading activity before earnings announcements, in 
                                               
38
 In order to determine the factors which relate to the probability of detection, one needs to have data 
on illegal insiders who were not detected. Such data is generally unavailable. 
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which reported earnings decrease compared to the corresponding quarter of the 
previous year. Such events, which the authors term a ‘break’, are shown to involve 
significant abnormal negative price reactions on announcement day. The authors find 
an absence of insider selling activity in the two quarters prior to a break. However, 
there is evidence of significant selling activity between seven to three quarters prior to 
the break. This is consistent with detection minimisation behaviour on the part of 
insiders and like Park, Jang and Loeb (1995) suggests that the probability of detection 
is lower the further away an insider trades from the event. 
 
Finally, several papers investigate the effect that increases in penalties have on the 
behaviour of insider traders. Seyhun (1992) investigates the change in insider trading 
behaviour surrounding the introduction of two key laws that increased the maximum 
punishment levied on insiders. These statutes were the Insider Trading Sanctions Act 
(1984) and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act (1988). In the 
appendix of Seyhun (1992), a simple model of insider trading is developed which 
predicts that greater penalties upon conviction result in lower volumes of insider 
trading. Investigating all reported insider open market transactions in 8,856 firms over 
the period January 1975 to December 1989, the author finds mixed evidence for his 
hypothesis. Specifically, insider trading volume in general increases after the 
enactment of harsher regulations. However, in the 30 day period prior to earnings 
announcements insider trading decreases substantially after the enactment of new 
laws. These results complement those of Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003), and suggest 
that at the very least, the regulations caused insiders to reduce their trading at times 
when the regulators were most likely to scrutinise their behaviour. 
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Garfinkel (1997) finds corroborating evidence with respect to earnings 
announcements and the passing of the Insider Trading Securities and Enforcement 
Act (1988). Examining reported insider trades in 13,862 quarterly earnings 
announcements between January 1984 and March 1991, the author finds that after the 
passing of the act, the frequency of insider trading before the announcement 
decreases. Specifically, insiders postpone liquidity motivated trades to after the 
announcement and the incidence of pre-announcement trades which are in the same 
direction as the earnings surprise (buys for positive surprises and sells for negative 
surprises) decreases substantially. The results suggest that insiders respond to 
increases in expected penalties by reducing their traded volume 30 days prior to 
earnings announcements. A caveat with respect to the results of Seyhun (1992) and 
Garfinkel (1997) is that both studies use data on insider trades reported to the SEC. 
By their very nature, such trades are unlikely to be as motivated by information as 
covert insider trades. These studies only provide limited insight into the effect of 
greater sanctions on the behaviour of illegal insider traders. 
 
2.2.2. Illegal insiders and expected gains 
Regulators and legislators establish the rules and laws that govern exchanges and 
related financial systems. Their actions help determine, amongst other things, the 
efficiency of the market (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009; Beny, 2005; Bris, 2005). As 
such, regulators play a large role in influencing the expected returns to insider trading, 
since by definition, the extent of market efficiency determines the value and longevity 
of inside (or price-sensitive) information. The exact relationship between insider 
trading laws and market efficiency is the subject of debate. Several studies investigate 
how the enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws influences the information 
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environment of the markets in which illegal insiders operate. Prominent critics of 
insider trading laws, such as Manne (1966), suggest that the insider trading should 
improve the price efficiency of the market since there is a strong incentive to trade on 
information to the point that stock prices are at their full-information values. 
However, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) suggest that the presence of insider trading 
might reduce the informational efficiency of a market since it crowds out other 
information seekers. Furthermore, the ability to profit from insider trading might 
create incentives for corporate insiders to withhold information from the market, 
thereby reducing efficiency (Benabou and Laroque, 1992). 
 
The extant literature on the relationship between informational efficiency and insider 
trading laws is sparse and inconsistent. Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), in a cross-
country study of 48 economies, empirically test whether the enforcement of insider 
trading laws improves or worsens market efficiency. Using several metrics for 
information efficiency, the authors show that market efficiency improves after the 
enforcement of insider trading laws, but only for developed economies. In developing 
economies, they suggest that the lack of appropriate legal safeguards acts as a 
deterrent for market professionals to fill the gap left by insider traders. Therefore, 
these economies do not exhibit improvement in market efficiency after the first 
enforcement of insider trading laws.  
 
Beny (2005, 2007) performs a similar analysis, however only utilises one measure of 
market efficiency – the extent of stock price synchronicity between firms – and 
investigates the effect of insider trading laws in only 33 economies. Her results 
indicate that the harsher insider trading laws are correlated with greater information 
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efficiency, but unlike Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) she does not test for differences 
between developed and non-developed countries. 
 
In a related study of 100 countries, Bushman, Piotrowski and Smith (2005) investigate 
how the first enforcement of insider trading laws affects the extent of sell-side analyst 
coverage of firms. Investigation of analyst coverage is interesting because this group 
of individuals represents one prominent source of non-insider information-based 
traders. The results indicate that the first enforcement of insider trading laws is 
correlated with a subsequent increase in analyst coverage, with greater percentage 
increases for emerging, non-liberalised markets. This result is somewhat at odds with 
the finding in Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), although the two papers can be 
reconciled if one believes that analysts in emerging markets do not contribute 
substantially to the informational efficiency of those markets (Chan and Hameed, 
2006). 
 
Finally Bris (2005) examines the stock price run-up prior to 4,541 takeover 
announcements before and after the first enforcement of insider trading laws in 52 
economies. His study indicates that the announcement day return contributes a greater 
percentage of the total takeover premium (defined as the pre-announcement run-up 
plus announcement day return) after the first enforcement of insider trading laws. In 
an environment where insider trading laws are not enforced, announcement day 
returns contribute to 39.27% of the takeover premium. This compares to 44.44% after 
the first enforcement. This study provides evidence inconsistent with Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2009) and Beny (2005, 2007) since it suggests that markets become less 
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strong-form efficient and more semi-strong form efficient after the first enforcement 
of insider trading laws. 
 
While there is no consensus on the effect of regulator action on market efficiency, it is 
nevertheless important to discuss how changes in market efficiency might affect 
insider trading behaviour. Put differently, how do insiders behave if the value of their 
information changes? This question is difficult to address in the context of the 
enforcement of insider trading laws because the change in the value of their 
information associated with changes in market efficiency are also accompanied by a 
change in the expected penalty for the use of that information. Bris (2005) suggests 
that while insider trading laws might deter overall illegal trading activity (leading to 
greater announcement day returns for his sample of takeovers), those insiders that 
choose to trade capture greater profits. In terms of standard economic theory, the 
presence of insider trading laws creates less competition amongst the suppliers of 
crime, thereby increasing their rents. This provides little indication however, as to 
how an individual insider acts when the value of their information increases, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Economic theories of crime provide some insight into how insiders might behave 
when the value of their information increases. An inspection of Equation 2.2, which is 
drawn from Becker (1968), suggests that as the potential gain from crime increases 
insiders supply more of their crime – i.e. take a greater position in the security – since 
the return is more likely to offset the expected penalties of transgression. In other 
words, there is greater incentive to act on insider information when the value of that 
information is larger. The only study that provides evidence for this assertion is 
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Seyhun and Bradley (1997). Their study investigates the selling behaviour of insiders 
prior to corporate bankruptcy. Their results indicate that insiders begin selling shares 
as early as five years before the onset of disaster. Importantly, as the event becomes 
imminent (and presumably the probability of disaster increases), selling by insiders 
reaches a peak. This suggests that as the expected value of the information rises39, 
insiders trade more stock. 
 
2.2.3. Other empirical studies of illegal insider trading 
Empirical studies using illegal insider trading data focus exclusively on the effect of 
insider trading on the broader market. This section summarises the nature of the data 
sources, the research questions and related findings of these studies. 
 
Meulbroek (1992) uses data gleaned from SEC litigation reports and confidential 
prosecution case files to ascertain the effect of illegal insider trading on price 
discovery and volume. Her data set comprises all insider trading cases initiated by the 
SEC from 1980 to 1989 and covers the illegal trading activity of 320 defendants. Her 
unit of observation is an ‘insider trading episode’ which involves all trading by 
defendants in a security before a material information announcement. There are 183 
of these episodes in her sample.  
 
To ascertain the effects of insider trading on price discovery, Meulbroek (1992) 
estimates a modified market model regression using daily price data before the 
announcement date. She incorporates a dummy variable into the regression, which 
equals one if her data indicate an illegal insider traded on that day, to ascertain the 
                                               
39
 ( ) ( )*E value P bankruptcy Cost= . So as the probability of bankruptcy increases the value of 
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effect of insider trading on price discovery. Her results show that on days in which 
illegal insiders trade the abnormal return on the stock is on average 3.06%. 
Furthermore the average pre-announcement cumulative abnormal return of all insider 
trading days is 6.85%, which is 47.56% of the total information content of the 
announcement. This suggests that insiders contribute significantly to price discovery 
in the days leading up to information release. Meulbroek (1992) also shows that 
volume on insider trading days is 64% larger than normal (excluding the insiders’ 
trades). 
 
Cornell and Sirri (1992) access criminal and civil judgements of cases regarding 
illegal insider trading in the 1982 acquisition of Campbell Taggart by Anheuser-
Busch to identify trades conducted by 38 illegal insider traders. The authors conduct a 
daily analysis of the effect of insider trades on price, volume and liquidity in 
Campbell-Taggart. Their results indicate that on days when the insiders trade, the 
abnormal return of the stock is significantly positive consistent with Meulbroek 
(1992). Interestingly, the authors also note that bid-ask spreads did not increase during 
the period when insiders were active, a result inconsistent with adverse selection 
models of the bid-ask spread (e.g. Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985). Furthermore, market impact costs marginally improved during the period when 
the insider traders were active. The authors attribute this to increased volume in the 
security during the pre-announcement period. 
 
Chakravaty and McConnell (1997) investigate similar research questions to Cornell 
and Sirri (1992) but instead use case files regarding Ivan Boesky’s trading in 
Carnation, before its subsequent takeover attempt by Nestlé in 1984. The authors 
 82 
conduct both a daily and an hourly analysis of the affect of Boesky’s trades on the 
price of Carnation stock. Consistent with Meulbroek (1992) and Cornell and Sirri 
(1992), the trades conducted by the insider are contemporaneously correlated with 
abnormal returns. In their hourly analysis, the authors also provide evidence that 
Boesky’s trades caused prices to move, rather than the reverse (i.e. Boesky waited for 
large price movements to trade). Like Cornell and Sirri (1992), Chakravaty and 
McConnell (1997) also show that market liquidity – bid-ask spreads and depth – were 
not adversely affected by the trades of superiorly informed individuals. 
 
Chakravaty and McConnell (1999) challenge the findings of the previous three studies 
that suggest that insider trading contributes to improved price discovery. Using the 
same data set of Ivan Boesky’s trades analysed in Chakravaty and McConnell (1997), 
the authors undertake a methodology which compares the price impact of insider 
trading against non-insider trading of the same direction. The results indicate that Ivan 
Boesky’s trades in Carnation are statistically indistinguishable from non-Boesky 
trades in Carnation in terms of their impact of returns. These results suggest that some 
caution is required in asserting that insider trading promotes improved price 
discovery. 
 
Finally, Fishe and Robe (2004) analyse trades conducted by brokers who had advance 
access to an influential Business Week column entitled ‘Inside Wall Street’, for their 
effect on bid-ask spreads and depth. The authors take advantage of the fact that of 116 
stocks featured in the column during the period of the insiders’ trading, the brokers 
took positions in only 40 securities. This allows the authors to compare the liquidity 
effects of insider trading on the traded stocks, with the non-traded stocks forming a 
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control group. The results indicate that bid-ask spreads widen and depth falls when 
insiders trade, but only for trades conducted in the specialist market (i.e. NYSE). 
These results are inconsistent with the findings of Cornell and Sirri (1992) and 
Chakravaty and McConnell (1997). 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis takes the empirical literature on insider trading in a new 
direction. Instead of focusing on the affects of insider trading on market quality and 
price discovery, this chapter examines the behaviour of insider traders as inferred by 
the position they take in the securities for which they have sensitive information. The 
work builds upon the insights developed by Becker (1968) and models the decision 
process of insiders as an economic problem of utility maximisation. 
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2.3. The interaction between informed agents and uninformed agents in 
securities markets 
The first two essays of this thesis examine two specific relationships of informed 
agents (fund managers and insider traders) and another party (investors and 
regulators). In the final essay, the general relationship between informed traders and 
uninformed traders is explored, with a particular focus on how broker transparency 
affects the ability of uniformed traders to detect and protect themselves from informed 
trading in stock markets.  
 
Section 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 provide a review of selected literature on how 
uninformed agents respond to the presence of informed traders in stock markets. 
These sections focus on three prominent indicators of informed trading – permanent 
price impact, the bid-ask spread and order imbalances, respectively. These particular 
metrics are examined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. In each of these sections, the theory 
underpinning how these metrics relate to informed trading is discussed. Following 
this, each section reviews prominent empirical studies which utilise these metrics to 
make inferences regarding informed trading or the detection of informed trading in 
markets. Since Chapter 5 concerns broker anonymity, Section 2.3.4 reviews the 
literature on the effects of broker anonymity in securities markets. 
 
2.3.1. Permanent price impact and the detection of informed traders 
The total price impact of a trade can be divided into two components: transitory and 
permanent (Kraus and Stoll, 1972). The transitory component measures the price 
impact associated with temporary liquidity constraints and microstructure effects 
(such as minimum tick size) at the time of the trade. In contrast, the permanent 
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component measures the longer lasting price impact of the trade. Importantly, this 
metric can be used to ascertain the market’s assessment of the information content of 
the trade, under the basic rationale that long term price movements are primarily 
caused by the incorporation of new information into security prices by market 
participants (Hasbrouck, 1991).40 As such, several studies examine permanent price 
impact to make inferences regarding the level of informed trading (as assessed by the 
market) associated with a particular class of trades or a particular event or even a 
particular type of trading platform. The traditional measure of permanent price impact 
is to examine the simple return from a benchmark equilibrium price prior to the trade 
(for example, the opening price on the day of the trade or the closing price the day 
before) to a point after the trade (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, 1987). This 
approach is utilised in many studies. 
 
Early studies in this area investigate the price effects and information content of large 
block transactions. Block transactions are particularly relevant for investigation since 
it is reasonable to assume, at least in the first instance, that informed investors would 
trade large quantities to extract the most value from their information. Kraus and Stoll 
(1972) represents one of the first papers to investigate the information content of 
block trades. The authors estimate the permanent price impact as the simple return 
from the close on the previous day of the trade to the close on the day of the trade. 
The authors find significant positive permanent price impact for buyer initiated trades 
(1.42%) and significant negative permanent price impact for seller-initiated trades (-
1.148%). This result allows the authors to make two important conclusions regarding 
the information content of block trades. Firstly, block trades are perceived to contain 
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 Indeed a recent study by Chung, Li and McInish (2005) shows that permanent price impact is 
positively related to the Easley, O’Hara, Kiefer and Paperman (1996) measure of the probability of 
informed trading. 
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information not otherwise incorporated into the price before the execution of the 
trade. Secondly, the information content of buyer-initiated trades is perceived by the 
market to be larger than the information content of seller-initiated trades. These two 
findings are confirmed in numerous subsequent studies on the information content of 
block trades and are robust to different sample periods, stock markets and types of 
trades analysed. 
 
For example, Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers, (1987) examine the information 
content of block trades on the NYSE executed during 1982 and find a permanent price 
impact of 1.610% for block buys and -1.180% for block sales. In a follow up study, 
the same authors find a permanent price impact of 0.500% for block buys and -
0.340% for block sales for NYSE block trades executed during 1982 to 1984 
(Holthausen, Leftwhich and Mayers, 1990). Qualitatively similar (though 
quantitatively different) results are documented for block trades on the ASX (Aitken 
and Frino, 1996a; 1996b), the LSE (Gemmill, 1996), and the upstairs market of the 
NYSE (Madhavan and Cheng, 1997). Rather than examining block trades in general, 
Chan and Lakonishok (1993) examine trades executed by a sample of 37 fund 
managers during the period 1986 to 1988. They also document an asymmetry in buys 
and sells for block trades. Finally, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) examine the 
permanent price impact of trade packages of institutional investors (rather than 
individual trades) and document positive permanent price impact of block buys which 
is larger than the permanent price impact of block sales.41  
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 The permanent price impact of block sales in Chan and Lakonishok (1995), however, are positive 
rather than negative as per the previous studies. 
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For the purposes of this dissertation, the magnitude of the permanent price impact 
documented in these studies is not as important as the underlying approach exhibited 
in their interpretation of this metric – namely, that permanent price impact is a direct 
indication of the market’s assessment of the information content of a trade and can be 
used to infer the presence of informed traders (assuming the market is, on average, 
adept at detecting informed trading). As an example of this, several of the 
aforementioned studies seek to explain the asymmetry in the permanent price 
response of block purchases and sales as a product of asymmetry in the information 
content of purchases versus sales. Kraus and Stoll (1972) suggest that the block 
purchases exhibit greater price response because of the information content of their 
trades is not only rich, but also biased upwards due to inclusion of many takeover 
targets in their sample. Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) and Keim and Madhavan 
(1995) also suggest that block purchases possess greater information, since a purchase 
indicates a direct preference for one particular firm over all other firms in the market. 
As such, the decisions of these investors are more likely driven by positive 
information concerning the stock in question. In contrast, block sales are more likely 
attributable to portfolio rebalancing considerations since sellers are typically restricted 
to selling only those stocks they own. 
 
Beyond investigating the information effects of block trades, Barclay and Warner 
(1993) utilise permanent price impact to ascertain which trade size is most often used 
by informed traders. The authors examine the 30 day lead up period to a sample of 
108 selected tender-offer announcements, and attempt to infer which trade size causes 
the greatest permanent price impact. Their results indicate that medium sized trades, 
where the trades are 500-9900 shares, are associated with 92.8% of all permanent 
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price movements during this period. Furthermore, the study finds that medium sized 
trades are associated with the greatest price movements during normal trading periods 
(though the results are not as strong as during tender offer pre-announcement periods) 
and therefore, concludes that medium sized trades are most likely to be used by 
informed traders. Chakravaty (2001) reconfirms this finding using a different sample 
of NYSE stocks which exhibit at least 5% price movement over the three month 
period, November 1990 to January 1991. The results of the study indicate that 
medium sized trades account for 79% of the permanent price movement for this 
sample of securities consistent with the idea that informed traders use medium sized 
trades. Furthermore, the data in that study allows for identification of the initiating 
party of all trades. Additional tests show that almost all of the trades that account for 
79% of the price movements originate from institutional investors. Put together these 
results imply that the market places large informational weight on medium sized 
trades of institutional investors. 
 
Several papers examine the permanent price impact of trades around information 
events to determine the extent of informed trading associated with these 
announcements. Barclay and Dunbar (1996) examine the permanent price impact of 
block trades around quarterly earnings announcements to ascertain whether informed 
trading is significant during these periods. Their sample of quarterly earnings 
announcements is from 1984 and consists of 2,567 buyer initiated block trades and 
2,624 seller initiated block trades. The authors find that block trades exhibit positive 
(negative) permanent price effects for buyer (seller) initiated trades of between 0.64 
and 0.67 (-0.72 and -0.68) %. However, the results are not materially larger than a 
control group of block trades executed during normal trading periods, suggesting that 
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it is the block trades rather than the forthcoming information announcement that 
generates the price effect. Daley, Hughes and Rayburn (1995) investigate a similar 
question, but instead examine a slightly different series of quarterly earnings 
announcements (October, 1984 to April, 1985) and compare pre-announcement price 
impact to post-announcement price impact. The results indicate overall a significant 
difference between the two which suggests, in contrast to Barclay and Dunbar (1996), 
that informed traders are active before these information announcements. The results 
are particularly strong for a sample of small firms, which indicates that these 
securities have the greatest levels of information asymmetry before quarterly earnings 
announcements.  
 
Koski and Michaely (2000) provide a comprehensive analysis of permanent price 
impact during three information environments: pre-dividend announcements periods, 
regular periods and ex-dividend periods. The authors argue that these three periods 
correspond to decreasing levels of information asymmetry and examine permanent 
price impact of trades to test their hypothesis. Their sample consists of all trades in 
378 firms listed on the NYSE that paid dividends during 1987 and 1988 and were 
present in the S&P500 during those years. The authors measure permanent price 
impact for trades of various sizes, where permanent price impact is the cumulative 
excess return from the five trades either side of the trade of interest. The results 
indicate that for block purchases (trades of 50,000 shares or more) the permanent 
price impact is positive and increases with the level of information asymmetry as 
proxied by the information environment. This result adds nuance to the already 
established link between permanent price impact and the information content of the 
trade – specifically, block purchases signal new information to the market, but the 
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strength of that signal depends on the information environment in which the trade is 
executed. In contrast, the permanent price impact for block sales, while negative and 
significant, does not differ according to the information environment. 
 
The papers cited above use a simple cumulative return to ascertain the permanent 
price impact of a trade. Another method of estimating the price impact of trades is 
outlined in Hasbrouck (1991) which explicitly models the dynamic relationship 
between permanent price impact and informed trading as a vector autoregressive 
system (VAR). In his model a market maker sets initial bid and ask quotes. The 
purpose of the paper is to explain how these initial quotes are revised to incorporate 
the information contained in 1) new trades and 2) non-trade public information (i.e. 
news announcements). The model assumes that quote revisions are determined by 
three components: previous quote revisions, the size and sign of current and previous 
trades and new non-trade public information. The inclusion of previous quote 
revisions suggests an autoregressive function of revisions. Furthermore, the time t 
trade is itself a function of previous quote revisions, previous trades and an 
unexpected component of trade (i.e. all that cannot be described by the other 
determinants)42. These two equations create a vector autoregressive system in which 
important new information resides in the public information term or the unexpected 
component of trade term. The relevant term for the purposes of this review is the 
unexpected component of trade. When the VAR is estimated, the coefficient on this 
variable is an indication of not only the permanent price impact of the trade but also 
its information content. As such, Hasbrouk’s (1991) model creates a link between 
trading, permanent price impact and information. A handful of papers utilise 
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 Both the non-trade public information component and the unexpected component of trade have zero 
means and are jointly and serially uncorrelated. 
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Hasbrouk’s (1991) model to explore hypotheses related to price impact and 
information. 
 
Dufour and Engle (2000) examine the relationship between permanent price impact 
and the time between trades to draw conclusions regarding the temporal nature of the 
trading environment when informed trading occurs. They generalise Hasbrouck’s 
(1991) model of quote revisions and trade to incorporate the time between trades and 
find that as trading intensity increases, the price impact and the autocorrelation of 
signed trades increase. They use this finding to conclude that informed traders are 
particularly prevalent during periods of very active trading. 
 
Pascual, Escribano and Tapia (2004) estimate the information content of each trade in 
IBM during the period February to June 1996 using the permanent price impact 
coefficient from Hasbrouck’s (1991) VAR model. In the paper the model is modified 
to include variables related to current market conditions: the bid-ask spread, depth at 
the best quotes, volatility, the hour in which the trade is conducted and following 
Dufour and Engle (2000), the time since the last trade. The results indicate that larger 
trades sizes executed during more illiquid and volatile periods are positively related to 
price impact. Confirming Dufour and Engle (2000), rapid trading also creates a larger 
price impact. Finally, trades executed during the first and last half hour of the day 
have greater price impact on average compared to other trading periods. The authors 
use the results from the estimated VAR to simulate adverse selection costs for IBM. 
To accomplish this, the paper draws upon the intuition that price impact is a measure 
of the market’s perception of the probability of informed trading and can therefore be 
used to estimate the magnitude of adverse selection costs. 
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Finally, Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003) investigate order flow 
competition between market makers on the NYSE and NASDAQ against electronic 
communication networks (ECNs). As part of their analysis the authors examine where 
informed traders choose to execute their trades. Like Dufour and Engle (2000) they 
utilise Hasbrouk’s (1991) VAR model to estimate the price impact associated with 
trades in various trading venues to infer the presence of informed trading. They find 
that the price impact is 50% greater on ECNs compared to other trading venues and 
thus, conclude that informed traders use ECNs to execute their trades. The authors 
hypothesise that this occurs because market makers on the NYSE and NASDAQ are 
adept at recognising informed traders and route their orders to other venues. 
Furthermore, informed traders are able to execute their trades cheaply on the 
anonymous ECN order book and therefore, tend to gravitate towards this platform. 
 
2.3.2. The bid-ask spread and the detection of informed traders 
Bagehot (1971) is one of the first articles to propose the idea that the bid-ask spread 
set by a market maker incorporates the risk of trading with informed traders. His 
central argument is that there are (at least) two types of traders – specifically, traders 
with superior information who trade to take advantage of uninformative prices, and 
second, traders who trade for liquidity purposes only. The market maker always 
makes a loss when trading with informed traders – since these traders only engage 
with the market maker when it is to their advantage and not otherwise. In contrast, the 
market maker makes a positive expected return when trading with liquidity-motivated 
traders, since their demand for the security allows for continuous turnover of the 
stock, through which the market maker earns the bid-ask spread. Bagehot (1971) 
argues that to succeed as a market maker, the spread needs to be set such that the 
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losses made to informed traders are offset by the gains made from liquidity-motivated 
traders. This implies that the size of the spread is directly proportional to the chance 
of trading with an informed trader. This initial intuition is formalised in a series of 
papers that model the spread setting behaviour of market makers.  
 
Copeland and Galai (1983) develop a one period model that follows the broad outline 
of Bagehot (1971) and presents the setting of the spread as an optimisation problem 
for the market maker. A larger spread reduces the risk that a given quote will be ‘in-
the-money’ for an informed trader and therefore reduces the losses to these 
individuals. However, the model also allows for liquidity-motivated traders to have 
price-sensitive demand for the security, and for competition to exist between market 
makers, such that excessively large spreads might lead to a reduction in uninformed 
demand for the security. Therefore, the market maker sets the bid-ask spread to 
balance these two competing factors and maximise revenue. An important implication 
of the model is that as the percentage of informed traders in the market increases, the 
bid-ask spread widens. 
 
The analysis in Copeland and Galai (1983) details only the equilibrium spread setting 
behaviour of the market maker. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) extend this analysis by 
providing a sequential trade model which describes the evolution of the spread 
towards the equilibrium value. They posit that market makers act in a Bayesian 
manner – setting the price of a quote conditional upon the quote being taken. 
Furthermore, unlike in Copeland and Galai (1983), each trade against the market 
maker does not fully resolve the information asymmetry and instead, the market 
maker uses each trade to Bayesian update the probability that the current quotes are 
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informationally efficient. Like Copeland and Galai (1983) a key implication of the 
model is that the bid-ask spread is proportional to the percentage of informed traders 
in the market, ceteris paribus. Easley and O’Hara (1987) expand the analysis to 
account for stochastic information arrival and the ability of individuals to trade 
different sized lots. While more complex than Glosten and Milgrom (1985), the same 
fundamental result remains: the bid-ask spread is proportional to the market maker’s 
assessment of the rate of informed trading. 
 
Several papers utilise this prediction to make inferences with respect to the level of 
information asymmetry around particular information events. Morse and Ushman 
(1983) represent one of the first studies to examine bid-ask spread changes around an 
information event. They examine daily closing bid and ask quotes for a sample of 25 
NASDAQ stocks that traded between 1973 and 1976 and in particular examine spread 
behaviour around quarterly earnings announcements. The authors do not find 
evidence that bid-ask spreads change significantly around these events. This result is 
inconsistent with subsequent studies that examine a broader cross-section of 
securities, utilise multivariate analysis and examine finer data. 
 
Chiang and Venkatesh (1986) examine daily closing bid-ask spreads in the days prior 
to earnings and dividend announcements for a random sample of 75 NYSE listed 
stocks. The authors consider instances when the announcements are made 
simultaneously and when the announcements are separated by at least ten days. They 
hypothesise that a delay between the announcements (which are usually announced 
jointly) signals that the second announcement has a greater likelihood of being a non-
routine, price-sensitive information event. As such, bid-ask spreads should be wider 
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around the second announcement relative to the first announcement or relative to joint 
announcements. After controlling for the inventory cost component of the spread, the 
authors find evidence that bid-ask spreads are on average wider before the second 
announcement, consistent with the idea of greater information asymmetry around this 
information event. 
 
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) provide one of the first studies to examine intraday 
bid-ask spreads around earnings announcements. The authors examine bid-ask spread 
values (taken at half hour intervals throughout the day) for a sample of 230 NYSE 
listed firms that traded in 1988. The authors find that in the 26 half hour intervals 
(equivalent to two full trading days) before an earnings announcement, bid-ask 
spreads are significantly larger than expected. Specifically, bid-ask spreads are 1.28% 
larger two days before the announcement and 1.44% larger one day before the 
announcement. Multivariate analysis, which controls for volume and autocorrelation 
in returns, confirms these initial univariate results. Interestingly, the authors also note 
that spreads tend to be largest for a sub-sample of firms which have the largest price 
changes on the announcement day. This suggests that specialists are adept at 
identifying those particular firms with the largest amount of information asymmetry, 
and adjust their spreads accordingly to reflect this fact. 
 
Rather than examining the total bid-ask spread, Krinsky and Lee (1996) analyse the 
components of the bid-ask spread in advance of earnings announcements. By focusing 
on the adverse selection component of the spread, this study is able to better ascertain 
whether the increased spreads documented in previous studies are linked to increased 
information asymmetry around the announcement date. The authors examine intraday 
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data (half hour intervals) for a sample of 511 quarterly earnings announcements made 
for NYSE and AMEX traded securities during 1989 and 1990. The results indicate 
that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly larger during the 26 
half hour intervals before the announcement, at 59.5% of the percentage spread, 
compared to 46.6% during a non-information benchmark period. This suggests that 
market makers are sensitive to the presence of informed traders prior to earnings 
announcements. Incidentally, the other components of the spread (order processing 
and inventory holding) are significantly smaller during the pre-announcement 
window, which the authors attribute to greater transactional volume during this 
period. 
 
Besides earnings announcements, other prominent market sensitive announcements 
examined in the literature are merger and takeover announcements. Conrad and Niden 
(1992) examine daily closing bid ask spreads in the ten days leading up to 37 takeover 
announcements on the NYSE during 1983. They find that the bid-ask spreads 
significantly decline on the day before and the fourth day before the information 
announcement. There is also weak evidence that closing spreads increase two days 
before the announcement date on average. In cross-sectional tests using regression 
analysis, the authors find no abnormal changes to bid-ask spreads before or after the 
takeover announcement.  
 
Jennings (1994) examines a sample of 168 takeovers on NYSE listed firms during 
1987 and 1988. In contrast to Conrad and Niden (1992), the authors use intraday 
spread data and analyse, in particular, the five quotes before and after the 
announcement of the takeover. The results indicate that bid-ask spreads are not 
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significantly larger prior to the information event in this short window, however there 
is some evidence that the adverse selection cost component of the effective spread 
rises, if not the overall quoted spread. 
 
Apart from merger and earnings announcements, the behaviour of spreads around 
other information events is also considered. Rao, Tripathy and Dukes (1991) examine 
bid-ask spread changes on a firm’s equity around the commencement of option listing 
for that same firm. They find that spreads decrease after the options listing date, 
which they attribute to reduced adverse selection costs for equity market makers. The 
authors argue that adverse selection costs decrease since informed traders migrate to 
the options market where trading is cheaper and potentially more profitable for them, 
and also because market makers can utilise options to hedge information risk. 
Tripathy and Rao (1992) examine the temporal behaviour of bid-ask spreads around 
the announcement dates for seasoned equity offerings and find that bid-ask spreads 
are larger than expected in the 80 days leading up to the announcement. Franz, Rao 
and Tripathy (1996) analyse bid-ask spreads after the announcement of director open 
market share repurchases. These events typically signal positive private information 
about the company, and therefore the authors hypothesise that this should resolve any 
existing information asymmetry. The results suggest the bid-ask spreads decline 
following the announcement, consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
While not made explicit, the previous papers imply that market makers are successful 
at detecting informed traders in the market. When this assumption is made, it is 
possible to infer the extent of information asymmetry around a particular event by 
examining the behaviour of bid-ask spreads. Put differently, the ability of market 
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makers to detect informed trading is considered certain, whereas the existence of 
information asymmetry is uncertain. Under these assumptions, the bid ask spread then 
becomes an indicator of information asymmetry, if any. Alternatively, it is possible to 
assume the reverse – that information asymmetry is certain and market makers are 
imperfect with their detection of informed trading. In this case, the bid-ask spread is 
an indicator of how successful market makers are at detecting informed traders. Such 
an approach is used in a handful of empirical papers, with a particular focus as to 
whether a non-anonymous, floor traded, monopolist market maker structure (e.g. 
NYSE or AMEX) is better able to detect informed trading relative to an electronic, 
anonymous, multiple market maker system (e.g. NASDAQ). 
 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) focus on a class of trades which they hypothesise 
to contain a greater proportion of informed trading than normal – namely, medium 
sized trades (500-9900 shares)43 conducted by corporate insiders – and examine 
market maker’s spread setting behaviour around these trades. In particular, their 
research examines whether the different market structures on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ allow for greater anonymity of informed trading in the competitive dealer 
market. The authors find that effective bid-ask spreads are significantly larger 
(relative to a control sample) on days in which insiders trade for NYSE listed shares, 
but are not significantly larger for NASDAQ listed shares, suggesting that specialists 
can detect informed trading better than dealers in a competitive market. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical model of repeated broker-specialist interactions of 
Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992). Their model supposes that specialists are 
better able to detect informed trading because the nature of repeat interactions 
                                               
43
 This definition follows Barclay and Warner (1993) who find that medium sized trades are more 
likely to be utilised by informed traders. 
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between floor brokers and the specialist provides incentives for brokers to be candid 
about whether their client is informed or otherwise. These repeated face-to-face 
interactions are not possible on the electronic NASDAQ market. 
 
Fishe and Robe (2004) analyse trades conducted by brokers who had advance access 
to an influential Business Week column entitled ‘Inside Wall Street’. These traders 
were indicted by the SEC for insider trading and so it is fair to assume that in this 
scenario informed trading occurred with certainty. The authors analyse the 
intertemporal behaviour of bid-ask spread in the time leading up to the trades. The 
authors show that bid-ask spreads widened but only in the specialist market (i.e. 
NYSE). This finding suggests that informed traders are more readily detectable by 
monopolist market markers (i.e. specialists) compared to market makers acting 
competitively and is consistent with the empirical evidence in Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran (2003) and the theoretical predictions of Benveniste, Marcus and 
Wilhelm (1992).  
 
Gleason (2007) investigates to what extent market maker competition affects the 
ability of dealers to respond to informed trading. She examines a sample of reported 
open market purchases of NASDAQ shares by corporate insiders, and ascertains the 
relationship between the size of the bid-ask spread, the intensity of insider trading and 
the number of market makers for that security. The results indicate, as expected, a 
positive relationship between bid-ask spread and insider trading intensity. 
Interestingly, this result is twice as strong for a sub-sample of securities with below 
the median number of market makers, indicating that market maker competition 
dampens market-wide ability to detect informed trading. This research is important 
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because it provides additional insight into what drives the different rates of informed 
trading detection between exchanges. Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992) 
suggest that the non-anonymity of brokers leads to greater detection of informed 
trading in floor-traded exchanges. However, besides anonymity, exchanges differ in 
numerous ways – market maker competition is one such difference – and it is entirely 
possible that the results of studies which compare NYSE/AMEX to NASDAQ are 
driven by one of these other differences. Gleason’s (2007) results indicate that market 
maker competition might indeed be another factor driving this distinction in informed 
trading detection. 
 
Finally Heidle and Huang (2002) examine changes in bid-ask spreads when firms 
switch their listing between the three prominent U.S. exchanges (NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ) to ascertain which structure can best detect informed trading. The authors 
utilise the probability of informed trading measure (PIN) developed by Easley, Kiefer, 
O’Hara and Paperman (1996) as a proxy for the level of information-based trading for 
a given security. The authors find that when a stock shifts to the NASDAQ from the 
NYSE or AMEX, the PIN for that stock rises. Similarly, the PIN falls for the reverse 
switch and remains statistically similar for changes between the two monopolist 
market maker exchanges (NYSE and AMEX). Interestingly, the authors also find that 
bid-ask spreads are positively related to the probability of informed trading, indicating 
that market makers across the three exchanges are adept at ascertaining the level of 
informed trading and adjusting their bid-ask quotes effectively. Their work is the only 
paper which concludes that NASDAQ dealers respond appropriately to information 
based trading. 
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Much of the development of information-based theories of the bid-ask spread concern 
markets with designated market makers. Does the same theory apply to electronic 
limit order book markets with no designated market makers? In other words, is the 
risk of trading with an informed trader proportional to the size of the bid-ask spread 
when all traders are free to post limit orders? Glosten (1994) develops a model that 
describes investor behaviour in an anonymous electronic limit order market and how 
such a market fares against competing market structures. While the article considers 
issues beyond the relationship between bid-ask spreads and information, part of the 
theoretical development assumes that liquidity suppliers factor in the probability of 
trading with an informed trader (see Glosten, 1994, p1140). The model shows that no 
matter how small the tick size, a bid-ask spread will exist as long as there is the risk of 
trading on private information. Interestingly, the analysis also shows that the 
electronic limit order book mimics a monopolist market maker insofar as adverse 
selection costs are averaged out against returns from liquidity motivated traders. This 
insight is fundamental to all the aforementioned theoretical models of bid-ask spread 
and information in dealer markets. 
 
Foucault, Moinas and Theissen (2007) provide a model of an electronic limit order 
book where informed traders possess information about a stock’s future volatility and 
act as liquidity suppliers. They compete for order flow with uninformed liquidity 
suppliers, who behave according to the participation rate of informed dealers in the 
market. Nature decides whether an information event occurs, and if so, informed 
dealers enter the market and act first by posting limit orders which maximise their 
expected profit. If there is no information event, a pre-committed dealer acts first. 
Uninformed liquidity suppliers post orders after the initial round. By definition, 
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uninformed liquidity suppliers cannot tell whether an information event has occurred, 
but they can infer the presence of informed traders by the state of the order book when 
it is their turn to post orders.44 The authors consider two scenarios: one in which 
informed dealers are known to others as signalled by their broker identity (transparent 
market) and one in which informed dealers are unknown (anonymous market). The 
anonymous market is the only scenario relevant to the discussion of informed trader 
detection since in a transparent market, uninformed dealers behave as if they have 
perfect information as to whether an order book is set by an informed dealer or 
otherwise. For an anonymous market, when the participation rate of informed dealers 
is low, uninformed liquidity suppliers never assign a large enough probability of an 
information event (even when the order book looks like it has been set by an informed 
dealer), such that the profit maximising response is to provide price improvement (i.e. 
reduce the spread). Similar reasoning leads the authors to conclude that, when the 
participation rate of informed dealers is large, spreads widen such that there is a 
positive correlation between bid-ask spreads and the participation rate of informed 
dealers. 
 
Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007) assume that uninformed traders are able to 
accurately assess the participation rate of informed dealers and act accordingly. In 
reality however, the behaviour of uninformed dealers is not determined by the 
participation rate of informed dealers, but rather the uninformed dealers’ beliefs about 
the participation rate of informed dealers. The bid-ask spread is therefore an indicator 
of such beliefs and prior to significant information events the bid-ask spread is an 
                                               
44
 A wide bid-ask spread indicates a greater probability that an information event has occurred. 
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appropriate measure of the extent to which uninformed liquidity suppliers can discern 
the presence of informed liquidity suppliers in an electronic limit order book market. 
 
2.3.3. Order imbalance and informed trading 
Order imbalance is a measure of excess buyer over seller initiated trading in a given 
period, where trading can be defined by the total number of shares traded, the total 
dollar value of trades or simply, the total number of trades (Chordia, Roll and 
Subrahmanyam, 2002). While not as widely utilised as permanent price impact and 
the bid-ask spread, there nevertheless exists a small body of literature which 
recognises order imbalance as an indicator of informed trading. The basic theory 
underlying the use of order imbalance in this way is that informed traders trade only 
in one given direction, moving the price until it reaches its full information value. In 
contrast, it is assumed that the combined preference of liquidity and other uninformed 
traders is directionless (i.e. no preference for buying versus selling). As such, when 
informed investors trade they exert pressure on one side of the market, manifesting 
itself as an order imbalance. Early theoretical studies on the spread-setting behaviour 
of market makers draw upon this basic framework to explain how specialists use 
order flow to update their beliefs on the true value of their security (Kyle, 1985; 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). 
 
Extending these early studies, Easley, O’Hara, Kiefer and Paperman (1996) formalise 
the intuition that order imbalances are inherently linked to the presence of informed 
traders. They develop a mixed discrete-continuous time model of market making, 
with a particular focus on the mechanics that determine the arrival rate of buys and 
sells to the market maker. The market contains both informed traders and liquidity 
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motived investors. For informed traders, their arrival rate to the market maker is 
determined by the existence of an information event and whether that information 
event is good or bad news. Specifically, when an information event occurs (which is a 
stochastic process) and the news is good (bad), the informed buy (sell) arrival rate is 
µ. The arrival rate of noise traders is constant regardless of the information 
environment and is termed ε in their paper. The result of these assumptions is that on 
days in which informed traders are active, there exists an imbalance between buy and 
sell orders. This imbalance is proportional to the arrival rate of informed traders, µ. 
On days with no information event, and hence no informed traders, the arrival rate of 
buys and sells is equal and there is no imbalance. This simple exposition outlines the 
link between order imbalances and informed trading.45 If one accepts that order 
imbalances arise due to informed trading46, then the market’s response to the 
existence of an order imbalance is an indication of how well the market can assess the 
presence of these traders. A handful of studies empirically examine the relationship 
between informed trading and order imbalances. 
 
Lee, Liu, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2004) examine order imbalances in an electronic 
limit order book setting, using all trades in the largest 30 stocks on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange during the period September 1996 to April 1999. The study benefits from a 
unique data set which enables identification of the trader type (domestic institution, 
domestic individual and foreign institution), and therefore a more nuanced analysis of 
                                               
45
 The authors extend the analysis, after applying several more assumptions, to develop the well-known 
probability of informed trading measure (PIN). Their paper examines the relationship between order 
imbalance, via PIN and the bid-ask spread. In contrast, the study in Chapter 5 examines the relationship 
between order imbalance and returns. 
46
 Order imbalances can also reflect temporary liquidity shocks. If that is the case, then the response of 
the market is characterised not by the adverse selection paradigm, but rather the inventory control 
paradigm. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) investigate the relationship between order 
imbalances and returns on an aggregate (i.e. market) level. Their analysis, therefore, is devoid of 
information asymmetry considerations and instead focuses on inventory control effects of order 
imbalances on returns. 
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order imbalances. The authors first investigate which agents cause the greatest price 
pressures and find that domestic and foreign institutions have persistent order 
imbalances. The source of the persistence for institutions is due to both herding by 
multiple agents within the trader class and order splitting by the same institution over 
several days. Importantly, analysis of the price impact and profit of the marketable 
limit orders executed by domestic institutions reveals that these traders appear to be 
most informed, providing evidence consistent with the theoretical predictions of 
Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) that those traders which initiate the 
greatest order imbalances are also those which have superior information. 
 
Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005) investigate the respective roles of options and stock 
markets in the price discovery process prior to takeover announcements. The authors 
examine a sample of 78 option-listed firms which were the subject of a takeover 
during the period 1986 to 1994. The study hypothesises that the options market 
replaces the stock market during periods of extreme information asymmetry, such as 
the period before a takeover announcement, as the main market for price discovery. 
This occurs because the inherent leverage in options securities attracts informed 
traders to this market. To test this hypothesis, stock returns are regressed against 
lagged and contemporaneous daily order imbalances in shares, puts and calls with the 
implication being that the market’s assessment of the information content of order 
imbalances should be reflected in the returns on the security. The analysis is split into 
whether the period is a pre-announcement period (days -30 to -1) or a ‘normal’ period 
(days -200 to -100). The results indicate that returns are positively related to call 
imbalances and share imbalances, though the coefficient on call imbalances is larger 
during pre-announcement periods. During periods when a takeover is not pending 
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only share imbalances are positively related to stock returns. These results support the 
paper’s main hypothesis that price discovery occurs in the options market prior to an 
important information announcement (i.e. a takeover). While not made explicit in the 
paper, the result also implies that traders and market makers in stock markets are 
adept at interpreting the information content of order imbalances in options markets, 
particularly when significant information asymmetry exists. 
 
Brown, Walsh and Yuen (1997) represents one of the very few studies to examine 
order imbalances in the context of an electronic limit order book. The paper 
investigates the relation between daily, semi-daily and hourly order imbalances and 
returns for 20 stocks that traded on the ASX during the period January 1994 to 
December 1995. The lack of designated market makers on the ASX removes the 
possibility that adjustments in price or volume after order imbalances are driven by 
inventory control considerations. As such, the authors argue that any relation between 
order imbalances and returns are probably driven by information considerations. The 
authors conduct causality tests on their data and find, in their intraday analysis, that 
excess buy orders correlate with future positive returns for up to 3 hours. Similarly, 
excess sell orders lead to negative stock returns for up to 3 hours. Given the structure 
of the ASX, this result suggests that order imbalances are perceived to contain 
information by participants in this electronic limit order book market. 
 
Finally, Lee (1992) examines order imbalances around earnings announcements for a 
sample of 230 NYSE-listed firms which traded during 1988. The paper investigates 
the nature of order imbalances in the lead-up to both good news and bad news 
announcements. The analysis considers the order imbalance deriving from both large 
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and small trades. The study finds that prior to the announcement, order imbalances are 
uninformative regarding the eventual outcome of the announcement. Good (bad) news 
is not preceded by excessive buying (selling) activity. The author uses this result to 
conclude that informed traders are inactive prior to earnings announcements, and 
therefore, there is little information leakage. Unfortunately, the paper does not 
investigate further the connection between order imbalances and informed trading and 
instead focuses on the post-announcement properties of order imbalances. 
 
2.3.4. Broker anonymity 
Changes to broker identification rules have occurred on at least seven electronic 
exchanges since 1999 – the Korea Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
Australian Stock Exchange, Paris Bourse, Deutsche Boerse, Brussels Stock Exchange 
and the Borsa Italiana. The high incidence of such changes has led to an equally high 
incidence of empirical studies on the issue, with the primary research question being 
the effect of the transparency change on market quality of the relevant exchange. 
 
Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007) examine the change to bid-ask spreads on the 
Paris Bourse after the removal of broker identifiers from the trading screens on 23 
April 2001. The authors develop a model (reviewed in Section 2.3.2 of this literature 
review) of an electronic limit order book which predicts that the removal of broker 
identifiers leads to a change in bid-ask spreads. The model does not indicate which 
direction the change occurs (thinner or wider bid-ask spreads), but does predict that if 
spreads are thinner (wider), the bid-ask spread becomes less (more) informative of 
future price volatility. All trades in a sample of 39 stocks are examined to determine 
the validity of their hypothesis. The results indicate that the quoted euro spread, the 
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quoted percentage spread and the effective spread decrease after the change to broker 
anonymity. The quoted euro spread and the effective spread decrease by 
approximately 0.02 euros. Importantly, the results also indicate that bid-ask spreads 
are informative about future price volatility prior to the change, but this relationship is 
weaker after the change to an anonymous broker market. These results confirm the 
predictions of their model. 
 
Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica (2005) examine the affects of broker 
identification changes on the Paris Bourse, the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Korean 
Stock Exchange. The first two exchanges removed pre-trade broker identifiers from 
their trading screens on 23 April, 2001 and 30 June, 2003 respectively, whereas the 
Korean Stock Exchange introduced pre-trade broker identifiers on 25 October, 1999. 
The paper examines a sample of the largest stocks by market capitalisation for each 
exchange. In univariate and multivariate analyses the results indicate that time 
weighted relative bid-ask spreads are correlated with the absence of broker identifiers 
for all exchanges. For the Paris Bourse and Tokyo Stock Exchange, the price impact 
from simulated market orders also declines following the removal of broker 
identifiers. These results suggest that trading costs decrease when there are no broker 
identifiers on the trading screens of electronic exchanges. 
 
Comerton-Forde and Tang (2008) investigate the effects of broker identification 
removal on bid-ask spreads, immediacy costs, order aggressiveness and order flow 
competition. The subject market is the ASX, which removed broker identifiers on 28 
November, 2005. The authors consider trading in a sample of 463 stocks and stratify 
their analyses according to whether the stock is in the top 200 by market capitalisation 
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(large stocks) or outside this definition (small stocks). The results concerning market 
quality are consistent with the studies of Comerton-Forde, Frino and Mollica (2005) 
and Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007). Multivariate analysis indicates that the 
reduction in bid-ask spreads for large (small) stocks is 5 (25) basis points after the 
removal of broker identifiers. The analysis also considers immediacy costs by 
simulating the market impact of trades of various sizes for both the transparent and 
anonymous regimes. The results indicate that the market impact of trades decreases in 
the anonymous regime for large stocks. For small stocks, market impact costs are 
lower for all trade sizes except for trades worth more than $500,000.  
 
Besides market quality, the paper also investigates the order aggressiveness of stocks 
and the competition for order flow after the removal of broker identifiers. The results 
indicate that order aggressiveness decreases for all classes of stock. The authors 
attribute this finding to a greater willingness of informed brokers to submit limit 
orders, rather than market orders, since anonymity reduces the incidence of front 
running. Importantly, this explanation suggests that informed traders are more 
concealed in the anonymous broker regime. Finally, the paper investigates whether 
the change induces a shift in order flow from the transparent upstairs market to the 
anonymous downstairs market. The results indicate that the propensity to execute 
trades in the upstairs market is lower after the downstairs market becomes 
anonymous, though this result only holds for large stocks. 
 
Hachmeister and Schierek (2006) analyse the change to market liquidity after 
exchange officials removed information concerning post-trade broker identifiers from 
the trading screens of the Deutsche Boerse in March 2003. The authors find that 
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quoted effective spreads decrease and quoted depth increases for a sample of 30 DAX 
stocks after the removal of post-trade broker identifiers. These results are consistent 
with aforementioned literature which examines pre-trade broker anonymity. Taken 
together, the results suggest that broker anonymity of any form appears correlated 
with improved liquidity. Interestingly, the authors also investigate whether the Easley, 
Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) measure of informed trading (PIN) changes 
after the anonymity switch. The results indicate that, contrary to expectations, PIN 
decreases after the change to anonymity. The authors attribute this finding to the fact 
that the PIN measure, developed in Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996) is 
only relevant in the context of a market maker setting, such that the imbalance of 
liquidity demanded determines the probability of informed trading. In an electronic 
market such as the Deutsche Boerse, informed traders are also free to provide 
liquidity, and thus PIN does not account for this phenomenon. If informed traders, due 
to the protection afforded by anonymity, change strategies to provide more liquidity 
this will reduce the PIN measure, though not necessarily the incidence of informed 
traders in the market. 
 
As is apparent from the preceding literature review, the primary focus of studies on 
broker transparency in electronic limit order book markets is to examine the effect of 
transparency/anonymity on market quality. The overwhelming consensus is that 
broker anonymity, whether pre- or post-trade, is correlated with improved liquidity. 
These results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Rindi (2008) and 
findings from an experimental market (Perotti and Rindi, 2006). Several studies have 
touched upon the information transmission effects of broker anonymity, though no 
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study has explored it in great detail. The essay in Chapter 5 seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
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Chapter 3. Derivative Use, Fund Flows and Investment 
Manager Performance 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Section 2.1.4 shows that there exists only a modest body of empirical studies on the 
use of derivatives by institutional investors. Furthermore, no study to date has sourced 
and analysed data on a specific application of derivatives by mutual fund managers. 
This essay seeks to fill this gap in the literature by examining a well-defined and often 
used trading strategy: the cash-equitisation of investor flows. To perform this 
analysis, this study uses unique survey data on Australian managed funds which 
describes whether a given fund manager uses index futures to manage investor flows 
or not. This study provides important insight into the relationship between fund 
managers and the investors who seek their services. It shows how informed investors 
can maintain superior returns even when their trading decisions are partially dictated 
by uninformed, external parties. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides the theoretical 
background on the relationship between fund flow, derivative use and the two 
components of fund manager performance – alpha and market timing. Section 3.3 
describes the data and sample selection criteria. Section 3.4 presents the results of the 
analysis. Section 3.5 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis development 
Section 2.1.3 shows that mutual fund managers are acutely aware of the effects that 
investor flows have on their assessed performance. Koski and Pontiff (1999) provide 
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evidence that one method to dampen the extent of fund flow externalities is to trade 
derivatives. This section provides a model which links fund flows and performance. 
First, a simple model is developed which describes how fund flows affect 
performance when the fund manager does not undertake any form of fund flow 
management and simply allocates new money to replicate the returns of the existing 
portfolio. Second, the process of derivative-based fund flow management is explained 
and the hypotheses with respect to this process are outlined. 
 
3.2.1. Fund flow and performance 
If a fund receives no new cash flow at the start of the period, then the fund’s 
performance is simply the return over the period, atr , , on existing assets at the start of 
the period, ta . Equation 3.1 provides the benchmark with which to assess the impact 
of cash flows on fund return.  
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When a fund experiences fund flow the manager determines how much of this cash is 
invested in assets immediately, .tλ  Any part of new flow that cannot be invested (or 
the fund manager chooses not to invest) is held as cash, tγ , to be invested later. When 
net fund flow is negative, ,tλ  and tγ  are equivalent to the dollar value of assets sold 
and cash borrowed (or paid out from reserves), respectively, to meet redemptions of 
the fund’s shares. Assuming that the fund experiences flow at the beginning of the 
period and the manager’s allocation decision is also made at that time, the return on 
the fund is defined as: 
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For ease of exposition, the return on the newly invested flow, ,tλ  is expressed as the 
return on existing assets less some cost factor, λθ t  (in dollars). This ‘catch all’ 
variable represents the cost of obtaining immediacy in equity markets. The part of 
new flow held as cash earns a return, rt,c , which can be zero or some nominal value. 
 
The effect of fund flow on performance is therefore, the difference between Equation 
3.2 and the zero fund flow benchmark, Equation 3.1: 
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From Equation 3.3 it is possible to discern the two factors which hinder performance 
in the presence of investor flows. The first factor is λθ t , the cost of obtaining 
immediacy. The bid-ask spread almost certainly forms part of this cost, since 
immediacy is obtained using market orders. Market impact costs may also be a factor 
if the magnitude of tλ is substantial. If new cash causes the manager to engage in 
liquidity motivated trading, then adverse selection costs are another component of 
λθ t . This is an expected result of the rational expectations model of trade where 
trading equilibrium is only achieved if noise traders sustain losses to entirely 
compensate the informed for the costs associated with being informed (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980). Empirically, Edelen (1999) shows that approximately 70% of gross 
fund flow is invested as liquidity-motivated trades, and approximately 1.5% (which is 
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statistically significant) of the value of these noise trades is lost via adverse selection 
costs. 
 
The other factor that hinders fund manager performance is the opportunity cost of 
holding cash, represented by the second term in the numerator of Equation 3.3. 
Several papers have speculated that the costs of holding cash are inherently linked to 
negative market timing results documented extensively in the literature.47 
Specifically, because there is a strong correlation between market returns and 
aggregate flow (Warther, 1995) and fund managers cannot or choose not to 
immediately invest the new cash, funds accumulate more cash during rising 
markets.48 In the context of Equation 3.3 this represents a positive value for the 
opportunity cost of cash. In the context of market timing studies this represents a 
decrease in portfolio beta at exactly the time when a manager should increase beta, 
hence negative market timing. Therefore, opportunity costs of cash, fund flows and 
negative market timing are intrinsically related. Empirical evidence for this 
hypothesis is found in Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson and Warther (1996). Both 
studies show that fund betas (conditional on public information) are negatively related 
to aggregate fund flows. Edelen’s (1999) work reaches a similar conclusion, but his 
analysis is at the level of the individual fund. He estimates managers’ market timing 
skills, conditional on the level of concurrent flow experienced by the manager. When 
conditioned on investors’ liquidity demands, the market timing skill of the average 
manager in his sample is neutral. 
 
                                               
47
 Papers that document negative market timing skills include Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Kon (1983) 
and Henriksson (1984). 
48
 By parity of reasoning funds also accumulate more stock during falling markets. Funds pay out 
redemptions from their cash reserves in the short run, and thus increase the relative holdings of stock.  
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The relationship between fund flow and performance can be summarised succinctly. 
Fund flows reduce alpha when the manager rapidly converts new cash to stock, since 
this type of trading attracts adverse selection and other trading costs. Fund flows 
impair market timing when managers delay investment of their cash, because fund 
flows are positively correlated with market returns. The appropriate action to take in 
response to new fund flow is an unenviable decision for the manager. Both trading 
and non-trading can reduce fund assets through trading costs and opportunity costs 
respectively. A reduction in one type of cost is likely to increase the other. 
 
3.2.2. Derivative-based management of fund flows 
A simple fund flow management strategy might involve purchasing (shorting) stock 
index futures when faced with incoming (outgoing) fund flow. Exact synthetic 
replication49 of index returns is possible by purchasing an appropriate amount of stock 
index futures and risk free assets (Frino, Wearin and Fabre, 2004; Miller and Meckel, 
1999). Regardless of the particular strategy, the general aim of derivatives-based 
management of flow is to rapidly obtain risk exposure with derivatives in the first 
instance, and then unwind the position into stock or cash as required. Due to the 
leveraged nature of futures contracts, obtaining exposure to the desired position does 
not require complete investment of all flow and therefore the balance of funds 
remains as cash. The return on a fund that uses index futures to manage flow can be 
described by: 
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49
 Theoretically, an appropriate combination of long positions in the index futures and interest bearing 
securities exactly replicates the returns of the underlying security including dividends. Practically, there 
is a small degree of tracking error associated with this strategy (see Frino, Wearin and Fabre, 2004). 
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where the returns on the ‘portfolio’ of index futures (and residual cash) is itr , , and the 
magnitude of flow is tϕ .The affect of the initial investment in futures, relative to the 
zero fund flow benchmark (Equation 3.1) is similar to the form of Equation 3.3: 
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The two terms in the numerator reflect the two costs of the index futures trading 
strategy. The first, ϕθ t  represents the cost of immediacy in the futures market. The 
second, )(
,, itatt rr −ϕ , represents the amount of ‘tracking error’ associated with the 
strategy – that is, how closely the fund manager is able to replicate existing portfolio 
returns with index futures. Since investors seek funds with investment styles that 
match their individual risk appetites, agency problems are minimised when the 
manager trades futures in such a way that the fund flow achieves a level of risk 
exposure similar to existing assets. 
 
How might trading derivatives in this manner improve performance relative to 
outright trading in stocks? With respect to alpha performance it is hypothesised that 
using index futures involves lower adverse selection and other transaction costs. 
Mathematically, λϕ θθ tt < . Subrahmanyam (1991) develops a model which describes 
the adverse selection costs associated with trading a portfolio of individual securities 
versus a single security of multiple stocks (such as index futures). His model predicts 
that even when informed traders possess information about systematic factors, 
adverse selection costs are lower when trading index futures compared to trading the 
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individual securities, because the directions of firm value signals tend to offset each 
other in a security representing multiple stocks.50 Secondly, in terms of bid-ask spread 
and market impact costs, futures market transactions are considerably cheaper than 
the underlying market (Fleming, Ostdiek, Whaley, 1996; Berkman, Brailsford and 
Frino, 2005). Therefore, in the first instance, trading futures should deliver adverse 
selection and other transaction costs savings over trading underlying stock. 
 
Using index futures to manage fund flow, however, involves two rounds of trading 
rather than one. It is worth exploring the trading returns and costs associated with the 
transition from futures to stock. Interestingly, it is possible that the second round of 
trading leads to positive alpha returns. Having ‘parked’ incoming cash in the futures 
contract, fund managers are free to shift their positions into stock when they receive 
private signals about firm value. These trades are completely discretionary and 
assuming fund managers are well informed, generate value for fund shareholders. In 
support of this, Edelen (1999) finds that in the absence of liquidity-motivated trading, 
fund managers exhibit positive alphas (before expenses) and fill the role of informed 
traders in the rational expectations model of trade. In terms of costs, trading out of the 
futures position involves another set of brokerage costs and potentially bid-ask spread 
and market impact costs, depending if the manager uses market or limit orders.  
 
The extent to which derivative-based fund flow management reduces the costs of 
liquidity-motivated trading (if at all) is an empirical question. The first set of 
hypotheses can be stated as: 
                                               
50
 Empirically Frino, Kruk and Lepone (2007) document complete price reversals after transactions in 
futures markets, suggesting that the market does not perceive trades in index futures to be 
informationally motivated. 
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Hypothesis3.1:  The alpha performance of non-user funds is negatively related to fund 
flow. 
 
Hypothesis3.1a: The alpha performance of user funds is not materially affected by 
fund flow.  
 
The first hypothesis is the same hypothesis tested in Edelen (1999), though Edelen’s 
analysis does not focus on the distinction between users and non-users of derivatives. 
The second hypothesis reflects the reduction in adverse selection costs associated with 
derivatives-based fund flow management. If both hypotheses are true, then ceteris 
paribus, user funds have higher fund flow conditional alphas than non-user funds. 
 
Derivatives-based management of cash flows might also improve market timing 
performance of fund managers. Since new cash is rapidly exposed to market risk via 
futures, there should be minimal dilution of portfolio beta during rising markets. In 
terms of Equations 3.3 and 3.5, it is hypothesised that )()(
,,,, ctatitat rrrr −<− . This 
relationship will hold if managers are able to replicate existing portfolio risk with 
index futures, or choose not to manipulate risk to game incentive systems. Koski and 
Pontiff (1999) show that funds that use derivatives are able to alleviate undesired 
changes to fund systematic risk associated with increased fund flow. They therefore, 
provide indirect evidence for the hypothesis that fund managers use derivatives to 
access risk, though they do not specifically address the issue of market timing using 
the traditional specifications of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) or Henriksson and Merton 
(1981). Importantly, their results also indicate that fund managers who use derivatives 
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do not tend to manipulate risk in order to game incentive systems. With respect to 
market-timing performance the hypotheses are: 
 
Hypothesis3.2: Market timing performance measures of non-user funds are negatively 
related to fund flow. 
 
Hypothesis3.2a: Market timing performance measures of user funds are not materially 
affected by fund flow. 
 
In summary, stock index futures allow funds to achieve sufficient risk exposure at low 
cost, alleviating the dual problem that managers experience when faced with fund 
flows – specifically, investment of flows is costly, but non-investment increases 
opportunity costs of cash. Section 3.4 investigates the extent to which fund managers 
achieve transaction cost savings and improved market timing with index futures. 
 
3.3. Data and sample selection 
This section describes the two primary data sources used in this essay. The first data 
source is Morningstar Direct, from which general information concerning fund 
returns, fund size and fund age are sourced. The second data source is a unique survey 
conducted by the Sydney Futures Exchange which describes whether a fund uses 
index futures for the purposes of fund flow management or otherwise. 
 
3.3.1. Fund data 
An initial search of Morningstar Direct for active, large-cap, long-only Australian 
investment trusts yields a preliminary sample of 471 funds. The period of analysis is 
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31 July, 2003 to 31 July, 2006, representing three years of monthly fund data before 
the survey was completed. This study encounters a similar problem to that 
experienced by Koski and Pontiff (1999). A longer time frame potentially improves 
the precision of the parameter estimates and the generalisability of the results. 
However, increasing the length of analysis increases the time between the date of 
information on derivative trading behaviour and the date of the fund returns. This has 
the potential of lowering the accuracy of the survey data. Following Koski and Pontiff 
(1999), three years of monthly fund data are also examined.  
 
Monthly data on fund size and returns is acquired for all funds in the sample. Returns 
are net of expenses, but do not include entry and exit fees. Standardised net fund 
flows (SFF) are calculated as follows: 
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SFF                (3.6) 
 
This calculation is based on the intuition that any change in fund size not attributable 
to fund returns must be due to (net) fund flow. Data on gross flows of funds are not 
available. 
 
Certain features of the funds management industry in Australia present complications 
that might affect the analysis contained in this study. Firstly, a number of institutions 
establish funds which pool money, mainly from retail investors, in order to directly 
purchase units in a single wholesale fund of an external manager. These ‘funds’ are 
not unique entities in themselves and including them in the analysis has the affect of 
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double counting the returns of the underlying wholesale manager. Secondly, several 
firms offer ‘fund of funds’ products, whose inclusion also results in a double counting 
of the constituent investment managers. Finally, a number of institutions outsource all 
or part of their funds management operations to external managers, making it difficult 
to identify the manager responsible for each fund. While this does not represent 
double counting, correct identification is necessary in order to properly allocate the 
characteristic of user, or non-user, of derivatives to a particular fund. 
 
To resolve these issues, each prospectus (also known as the Product Disclosure 
Statement) of the 471 funds in the preliminary sample are sourced and read. There are 
144 funds that indirectly invest in equities through purchasing units in another fund 
and 53 funds of funds. After removing these from the sample, the number of 
remaining funds is 274. Where a fund outsources its operations the name of the 
external manager is noted.  
 
3.3.2. Derivative use 
These 274 funds are matched to their responses in the survey data compiled by the 
Sydney Futures Exchange on Australian fund managers. The survey was conducted 
over the course of six weeks via telephone interview. Respondents were asked 
whether they traded SPI 200 index futures for the purposes of cash equitisation, and 
whether they traded any other derivatives.  
 
The data indicate that of the 274 funds a very high proportion of managers engage in 
some form of derivatives trading. Twenty-eight funds indicate that they do not trade 
derivatives at all. Of the total, 246 indicate that they trade index futures to manage 
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fund flow. Nineteen funds in the sample did not have information on their derivative 
trading behaviour. Information provided by the Sydney Futures Exchange indicates 
that these funds did not wish to participate in the survey. Twenty eight funds indicate 
that they do not use derivatives at all. In total, almost 90% of funds manage fund flow 
using index futures.51  
 
Of the 246 funds that use derivatives for cash-equitisation, 79 funds indicate that they 
also trade derivatives (index futures and options) for reasons unrelated to fund flow 
management such as for portfolio insurance and tailored trading strategies. Since the 
purpose of this study is to identify the incremental benefit of using index futures to 
manage cash flows only, these 79 funds are removed from the sample. While their 
inclusion potentially reduces the standard error of the coefficient estimates, in the 
interests of experimental design, these funds should be removed to provide a cleaner 
test of the affects of this particular derivative trading strategy and avoid the 
aforementioned issues of aggregating across different types of derivative trading 
strategies. Therefore the final sample of funds used in this study is 175 – of which 147 
(84.1%) are derivative users and 28 (15.9%) are non-users. In terms of monthly fund 
data, there are 3738 monthly fund observations for users and 674 for non-users.  
 
 
 
                                               
51
 Several structural factors contribute to this high rate of cash equitisation amongst Australian 
investment funds. Every year since 1993 employers in Australia are compelled to contribute to each 
employee’s superannuation (retirement savings) the equivalent of 9% of the employee’s annual salary. 
Nationwide, almost all of this cash is invested with superannuation managed funds. Therefore, 
investment management companies in Australia have had experience dealing with significant and 
constant fund flows for almost fifteen years. While we can only speculate, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that this fact has contributed to the high rate of index futures trading by fund managers. This is 
probably even more the case given that the market for exchange traded index funds (ETFs), an 
alternative security that can be used to manage fund flows, is not well developed. Trading ETFs attracts 
very high transaction costs. We calculate daily closing percentage bid-ask spreads for these 
substitutable securities during 2006 and find that ETFs attract on average a 51.56 basis points round 
trip transaction cost compared to only 6.52 basis points for index futures.  
 124 
Table 3.1  
Summary statistics of mutual funds 
Sample of 175 Australian investment funds from Morningstar Direct. SFF is the monthly standardised 
net fund flow as defined in Equation 3.6 and |SFF| is its absolute value. Size refers to the value of 
assets under management in dollars. The variable is first averaged across the time series of values for a 
given fund. The summary statistics are based on these mean values. Autocorrelation of SFF is 
calculated by measuring the correlation between consecutive SFF per individual fund. The values 
presented below are summary statistics of these correlations.  
 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on several fund characteristics. Both users 
and non-users of derivatives receive on average similar amounts of fund flow, 
whether measured as the signed or absolute value of SFF. Non-users experience mean 
fund flow (absolute fund flow) equivalent to 2.63% (4.87%) of assets under 
management. For users of derivatives, this value is equal to 2.59% (4.77%). The 
period of analysis corresponds to a rising market and so it is unsurprising that funds 
experienced positive fund flow at the mean and median. As in Pinnuck (2004), funds 
that use derivatives have greater assets under management than non-users of 
derivatives. The average non-user has $96 million under management while the 
average user manages almost three times as much at $280 million. However, this is 
due to the fact that several very large funds use derivatives. The median value of 
funds under management is reasonably similar between the groups. 
 
Panel A: All Funds (n=175) Mean Median Standard Deviation 
SFF (%) 2.41 0.82 5.01 
|SFF| (%) 4.79 3.20 4.45 
Size ($ millions) 286.11 46.92 643.32 
Autocorrelation of SFF 0.09   
Panel B: Non-users of derivatives (n=28)   
SFF (%) 2.63 1.37 4.66 
|SFF| (%) 4.87 3.33 3.46 
Size ($ millions) 96.17 21.46 184.38 
Autocorrelation of SFF 0.02   
Panel C: Users of derivatives (n=147)   
SFF (%) 2.59 0.58 6.22 
|SFF| (%) 4.77 3.20 4.62 
Size ($millions) 280.24 34.64 631.88 
Autocorrelation of SFF 0.10   
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3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Alpha returns 
This section investigates the extent to which investor flows affect fund abnormal 
returns. The results of this section provide insight into the validity of Hypotheses 3.1 
and 3.2. The following cross-sectional regression is estimated: 
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0                (3.7) 
 
Each jtα  is calculated using the actual fund return (in excess of the interbank cash 
rate) in that month less the predicted fund return, estimated from either a univariate 
market model or quadratic market model. The two specifications are (respectively): 
 
 εψψ ++= mtjtjtjt RR 10                 (3.8) 
 εψψψ +++= 2210 )( mtjtmtjtjtjt RRR               (3.9) 
 
Where jtR  is the return on fund j in month t, less the return on the Australian 
interbank cash rate and mtR  is the return on the ASX200 Accumulation Index in 
month t in excess of the interbank cash rate.  
 
Since many studies document short-term serial correlation in mutual fund 
performance (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman, 1992; Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 
1993; Carhart, 1997; Huij and Verbeek, 2007), nine lagged values of jtα are included 
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in the regression specification (Equation 3.7).52 This specification is in the spirit of 
Edelen (1999). However, unlike Edelen, this study does not have access to gross flow 
or fund transaction data. Therefore, it is not possible to decompose flow into 
components of liquidity motivated and discretionary trading. This is not a material 
problem, since Edelen finds a strong relationship between gross flow and incremental 
liquidity-motivated trading activity. This implies that fund flow is a reasonable proxy 
for liquidity motivated trading and probably more so when net flow is considered. 
Gross flow will not lead to trading when it is netted against gross flow of the opposite 
sign during the fund’s cash accumulation period. By definition, this cannot happen to 
net flow and therefore the incidence of net flow should be more closely correlated to 
liquidity motivated trading than gross flow. With respect to the discretionary trading 
component, its omission is not likely to lead to specification bias. The coefficient on 
the discretionary trading component in Edelen’s analysis is not significant for almost 
all of his regression specifications (pp. 458-459). 
 
Edelen (1999) points to a number of econometric issues that need to be considered in 
a regression of this nature. Firstly, literature shows that fund returns can influence 
subsequent flow into the fund as investors engage in return-chasing behaviour 
(Ippolito, 1992; Friesen and Sapp, 2007). This essay examines the opposite scenario – 
the impact of flow on fund returns. This represents a problem of endogeneity, and 
leads to inconsistent estimators if not properly addressed. A second problem relates to 
cross correlated residuals. As Edelen (1999) points out, fund returns are likely to 
possess cross correlated errors, which biases any standard error estimates. 
                                               
52
 Using six lags of alpha does not seem to control for all the autocorrelation and places a positive bias 
on λ . Utilising twelve lags of alpha involves problems of micronumerosity since each cross-sectional 
regression for non-users of derivatives only has at a maximum 28 observations and we are concerned 
about having sufficient degrees of freedom in each regression. A specification involving nine lags of 
alpha is chosen as a compromise. 
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To overcome these problems, two-stage least squares regression technique is utilised, 
where the first pass regression is described by: 
 
tjtijt
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0             (3.10) 
 
Both equations 3.7 and 3.10 are estimated cross-sectionally for each month to avoid 
cross-correlation of residuals. Summary statistics are calculated from the time series 
(n=36) of coefficient estimates and test statistics are generated using normal 
transformation. This procedure is consistent with the approach taken in Edelen 
(1999), though he uses a single variable – lagged flow – as the instrument of current 
flow. Lagged abnormal returns are additionally incorporated into the regression since 
the correlation between consecutive monthly fund flows in the sample is low 
(approximately 9% in the sample – see Table 3.1). Therefore, the use of lagged flow 
as the sole instrument of current flow is not appropriate for the sample. The use of 
prior abnormal returns as instruments is motivated by prior research which documents 
correlation between returns and subsequent fund flow (Ippolito, 1992). 
 
The issue of small sample size requires consideration. The number of non-user funds 
is 28, which represents the maximum number of observations used to calculate 
Equations 3.7 and 3.10 for that class of funds. The number of parameters to be 
estimated is 10. A small sample size, per se, does not violate the assumptions of the 
classical linear regression model, though it does affect the precision of the standard 
errors and increases the likelihood of Type II error. Therefore, Equation 3.7 is re-
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with pooled cross-sectional data, 
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which substantially improves the sample size for the class of non-user funds. The use 
of maximum likelihood estimation removes the need for two stage regressions.  
 
Table 3.2  
The effect of flow on abnormal returns 
The following regression is estimated: 
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jtα is estimated from a time series regression of excess fund returns on i) excess ASX 200 
Accumulation Index returns (univariate market model) or ii) excess ASX 200 Accumulation Index 
returns and its square (quadratic market model). |SFF| is the absolute value of the monthly standardised 
net fund flow as defined in Equation 6. The model is estimated cross-sectionally over 36 months using 
two stage least squares regression where the first pass regression is defined by: 
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The figures presented represent the mean coefficient across 36 months, and t-stats are calculated by 
normalising the mean by the standard error of λ. T-stats are shown in brackets. Alternatively, the 
coefficient is estimated from pooled cross-sectional data using maximum likelihood estimation. The 
results are split between non-users and users of derivatives. 
 
 Cross-sectional 
two stage least squares 
Pooled cross-sectional maximum 
likelihood 
 Univariate 
market 
model 
Quadratic 
market model 
Univariate 
market model 
Quadratic market 
model 
Panel A: Non-user funds     
0β  -0.002 (-0.67) 
0.001 
(0.55) 
-0.000 
(-0.73) 
0.000 
(0.24) 
λ -0.022 
(-1.89) *** 
-0.011 
(-0.85) 
-0.012 
(-2.25) ** 
-0.015 
(-2.72) * 
Panel B: User funds     
0β  -0.001 (-0.97) 
-0.002 
(-1.51) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
λ -0.006 
(-0.11) 
0.020 
(0.61) 
0.003 
(1.16) 
0.001 
(0.48) 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
*** Denotes significance at the 0.10 level 
 
The estimated values of λ  under various estimation techniques are presented in Table 
3.2. The results confirm Hypotheses 3.1, 3.1a, 3.2 and 3.2a. The alpha performance of 
funds that do not use derivatives to manage cash flow are negatively related to fund 
flow. When alpha returns are measured from a univariate market model, every 100 
basis point increase in fund flow as a percentage of fund size, leads to a  2.2 (1.2) 
basis points reduction in abnormal returns in a cross-sectional (pooled cross-sectional) 
regression specification. For a quadratic market model the reduction in performance is 
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1.1 (1.5) basis points in a cross-sectional (pooled cross-sectional) regression 
specification. All of these figures are statistically significant at conventional levels, 
except for the cross-sectional regression where returns are measured from a quadratic 
market model. However, the coefficient obtained (-0.011) is economically significant 
and similar to the values obtained in other regression specifications. Interestingly, the 
losses attributable to fund flow documented in this study are comparable in magnitude 
to those obtained by Edelen (1999). Between 1-2% of new net investor flows are lost 
in the trading process. 
 
Fund managers who use index funds to manage cash flows do not appear to be at all 
burdened by the liquidity demands of fund investors. Estimated values of λ under all 
regression specifications are not significantly different from zero. The distinction 
between user and non-user funds could not be clearer. Funds that manage cash flows 
with derivatives are not affected by flow, despite summary statistics indicating that 
the average monthly flow is similar between users and non-users of derivatives. These 
results indicate that the use of index futures to manage cash flows can significantly 
improve fund flow conditional performance. 
 
When considered together, the results from both samples of funds strongly support 
Edelen’s (1999) hypothesis that investor flows are the source of negative alpha 
performance. Firstly, the results show that the alpha performance of funds is 
negatively related to investor flows. This is consistent with the theory, but it does not 
preclude the existence in this study or his, of some statistical or sample specific 
anomaly driving the results. However, it is also shown that when fund managers take 
steps to limit the costs associated with investor flows, the negative relationship 
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between alpha performance and flow disappears. This suggests that fund flows effect 
negative alpha performance, rather than merely covary with it.  
 
Finally, the findings point to the parity of fund managers when all other things are 
equal. The intercept on Equation 3.7 represents the average alpha return controlling 
for fund flow and autocorrelation in returns. In a pooled cross-sectional regression 
and when alpha is measured from a univariate (quadratic) model of returns the 
intercept is equivalent to -0.51% p.a. (0.17% p.a.) for funds that do not use 
derivatives. For funds that use derivatives the intercept value represents a fund flow 
neutral alpha of 0.04%p.a. (-0.11%p.a.).53 All of these values are insignificantly 
different from zero. This result is also consistent with Hypotheses 3.1, 3.1a, 3.2 and 
3.2a. In the absence of flow, there is no a priori reason why the fund mangers from 
the group of funds that use derivatives should be any more skilled in stock selection 
than those that do not use derivatives. The relative superiority of the user group is 
inherently linked to the occurrence of fund flow and the fact that they manage this 
flow with index futures. It is not because these managers happen to be, on average, 
better at stock selection than the non-users. Furthermore these insignificant alpha 
returns (conditional on zero fund flow) indicate that the average manager is only able 
to achieve abnormal returns to the point that it covers fund expenses. This is the case 
regardless of whether the fund is a derivative user or not. As with Edelen’s (1999) 
sample, the managers in this study fit the role of informed traders in the rational 
expectations model of trade. The only difference is that non-user funds also act as 
liquidity motivated traders in the presence of flow, whereas user funds do not. 
 
                                               
53
 The unconditional alpha for user funds is very similar to the fund flow conditional alpha since the 
coefficients on fund flow are trivially small. 
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3.4.2. Market timing 
Models of market timing measure time variation in managerial behaviour across 
different market conditions. During bull (bear) markets, managers should shift 
between high (low) beta portfolios to maximise returns. Models of market timing are 
generally of the form:  
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Where jtr is the fund return in excess of the risk free rate, tmR is the market return in 
excess of the risk free rate, )( mtRf is the market timing variable and itX  represents 
any other factors that may describe returns. Prominent models of market timing 
include Treynor and Mazuy (1966 - hereafter TM) and Henriksson and Merton (1981 
– hereafter HM). In the TM specification of market timing, 2)( mtmt RRf = , whereas in 
the HM specification )0,max()( mtmt RRf −= , with no other factors beside the market 
return used to describe the model. 
 
Both of these measures of market timing are known to suffer from several biases 
(Grinblatt and Titman, 1989b). In particular, Ferson and Schadt (1996) show that time 
variation in market risk and the market risk premium cause funds to exhibit negative 
market timing performance. The average fund in their sample exhibits statistically 
significant negative market timing skills using either the TM or HM model of market 
timing. Their result is consistent with a number of studies which show that managers 
exhibit perverse levels of market timing, that is, they hold low beta portfolios when 
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markets are rising and vice versa.54 However, after controlling for time variation using 
lagged public information variables, Ferson and Schadt (1996) show that the market 
timing performance of funds improves relative to regressions involving an 
unconditional benchmark. Edelen (1999) confirms that the time variation in expected 
returns documented by Ferson and Schadt (1996) is intrinsically linked to fund flows. 
Edelen (1999) estimates the following time series regression: 
 
tjtmtjmtjtmjjjt flowRfRfRr εγγβα ++++= *)()( 21           (3.12) 
 
where tjflow ,  is some measure of fund flow. This model is the same as Equation 3.11 
with an interactive regressor on the market timing regressor to control for flow related 
timing performance (i.e. jtmtt flowRfX *)(1 = ). His results indicate that the market-
timing coefficient, 1γ , is negative when Equation 3.11 is estimated but insignificantly 
different from zero when Equation 3.12 is estimated. Importantly, the coefficient on 
the interaction term is significantly negative. Taken together this shows that the 
causes of fund managers’ seemingly negative market timing skill are exogenously 
determined liquidity shocks. Funds exhibit perverse market timing only when they 
experience fund flow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
54
 For example Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Kon (1983) and Henriksson (1984). 
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Table 3.3 
The effect of fund flow on market timing 
The following time-series regression is estimated: 
tjtmtjmtjtmjjjt SFFRfRfRr εγγβα ++++= *)()( 21  
Where 2)( mtmt RRf = (Treynor Mazuy specification) or )0,max()( mtmt RRf −=  (Henriksson Merton 
specification). The equation is estimated for each fund. The first two columns present the average 
coefficient values across the relevant sub-sample of funds (28 for non-user funds; 175 for user funds). 
T-stats are calculated by normalising the mean by the standard error of the coefficients and are 
presented in brackets. The final two columns indicate the percentage of funds with the indicated 
coefficient value greater than zero.  
 
Treynor Mazuy specification 
 
1γ  2γ  1γ > 0 (%) 2γ > 0 (%) 
Non-user funds -0.77 
(-1.51) 
-30.73 
(-2.45)** 
43.5% 21.7% 
User funds -0.39 
(-1.10) 
0.94 
(0.08) 
45.8% 49.3% 
Henriksson Merton specification 
Non-user funds 0.02 
(0.40) 
-3.57 
(-1.74)*** 
54.2% 37.5% 
User funds -0.06 
(-1.21) 
0.29 
(0.15) 
40.3% 49.3% 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
*** Denotes significance at the 0.10 level 
 
To test the effect of derivative use on market-timing Equation 3.12 is estimated for 
each fund, where jttj SFFflow =, , under both the TM and HM specifications. Results 
are presented in Table 3.3. The funds that do not use derivatives exhibit 
characteristics similar to Edelen’s (1999) sample. In the absence of fund flow, the 
average fund in the sample does not possess superior nor perverse market timing 
skills, as indicated by the coefficient on 1γ . All negative timing ability is due to the 
effects of fund flow as indicated by the coefficient on 2γ which is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Tellingly, only 21.7% (37.5%) of funds have 
positive coefficient values for this variable in a TM (HM) model of market-timing. 
 
For user funds, the coefficient on 1γ  indicates that this class of funds does not exhibit 
market timing significantly different from zero, in the absence of fund flow. The 
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interesting result is that the coefficient on the interaction term is also not significantly 
different from zero, rather than being significantly negative. Slightly less than half of 
the funds have coefficient values on the interaction term greater than zero in either 
specification of the market timing model. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
cash equitising funds are able to mitigate the negative consequences of fund flow by 
rapidly exposing new cash to market risk via index futures. As in the previous section, 
the findings show that the average fund manager from each group is statistically 
equivalent, ceteris paribus. Upon controlling for investor flows, the average fund 
manager, whether derivative trader or not, is a neutral market timer.  
 
At this point it is worth noting the results of Koski and Pontiff (1999) whose findings 
are closely linked to the findings in this essay. The results indicate that user funds do 
not exhibit negative market timing when they experience fund flow. It is hypothesised 
that these funds invest new cash in index futures to rapidly obtain market risk and this 
has the effect of keeping portfolio beta higher during rising markets. If this hypothesis 
is true then a natural corollary is that fund risk is not significantly altered by fund 
flows. Koski and Pontiff (1999) show that fund risk is affected by period to period 
fund flows but the effect is less pronounced for derivative traders. Furthermore this 
phenomenon is only apparent for fund systematic risk, not idiosyncratic. They note 
that this result is consistent with funds using index based derivatives to manage cash 
flows. It appears that the ‘user’ funds in both the sample used in this study and theirs 
exhibit similar derivative trading behaviour – the management of investor flows with 
index futures. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
The results of this study indicate that using index futures to manage funds flow can 
significantly reduce the negative consequences of investors’ desire for liquidity. 
Funds that choose not to use derivatives lose around 1.5% of flow in trading. These 
funds also exhibit negative market timing skills, a phenomenon which is directly 
attributable to investor flows. In contrast, funds that use index futures are not 
materially affected by the liquidity demands of investors. Alpha and market timing 
measures of performance are independent of flow. The average manager that uses 
index futures approximates the average manager that does not cash equitise and 
experiences zero fund flow. The results suggest that index futures are an important 
mechanism for enhancing performance, especially when a fund provides significant 
liquidity services to its investors.55 
 
The conclusion of this study appears at odds with several others which state, for 
example, that ‘funds that use derivatives have similar performance as funds that do 
not use derivatives’ (Koski and Pontiff, 1999 – p813).56 Statements such as this are 
often based on analyses of the unconditional performance of funds. This study, 
however, examines fund flow conditional performance. This difference in 
methodology and focus is a likely cause of the divergent conclusions. Using index 
futures to reduce the costs of liquidity-motivated trading can improve performance, 
but only at the margin and only when fund flow is substantial. The benefits of using 
index futures for cash flow management are likely to be subsumed by the natural 
                                               
55
 It is possible that investment in derivatives for the purposes of cash equitisation has ancillary benefits 
for fund holders beyond enhancing returns. Since index futures are able to mitigate the costs of investor 
flows, funds that engage in this strategy may have less need to impose restrictive conditions, such as 
minimum holding periods or redemption fees, to deter costly redemptions. For a discussion on the use 
of redemption fees to deter short-run redemptions see Greene, Hodges and Rakowski (2007). 
56
 Other studies take a neutral view of derivatives e.g. Johnson and Yu (2004); Gallagher, Fong and Ng 
(2005); Pinnuck, (2004); and Fletcher, Forbes and Marshall. (2002). 
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volatility of fund returns in an unconditional analysis of performance. This is an 
important consideration for future research into the relation between derivative 
trading and mutual fund performance. 
 
Finally, the results provide some insight into the debate regarding whether mutual 
funds should be able to invest in derivatives. Deli and Varma (2002) show that the 
freedom to invest in derivatives is positively related to the likelihood of transaction 
cost savings associated with using derivatives. They note that these potential savings 
are likely to be weighed against the agency costs of using derivatives. The results of 
this study indicate that these potential savings are actually realised by managers that 
trade index futures and the magnitude of the savings is material, in the order of 1.5% 
of new cash flow. To maximise returns, fund managers should be permitted to trade 
derivatives when expected agency costs of using these securities are less than this 
value.  
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Chapter 4. How Much Does an Illegal Insider Trade? 
(N.B. The mathematical model of insider trading described in Section 4.2 and the 
Appendix to this chapter was primarily authored by Stephen Satchell of Cambridge 
University. All other work contained in this chapter, including an outline of the 
hypothesis derived from Equation 4.4, empirical analysis and write up remains the 
work of the PhD candidate). 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Drawing upon the intuition developed by Becker (1968), this study provides a model 
which describes the volume traded by an illegal insider as a function of the expected 
profit and penalty from trade. The study uses data sourced from SEC case files to test 
the predictions of the model. The literature outlined in Section 2.2.3 shows that 
empirical studies of illegal insider trading to date focus on the effects of illegal insider 
trading on market behaviour. This essay extends this literature by instead, examining 
the behaviour of the illegal insider. Besides academic interest, this work is relevant to 
regulators who wish to better understand the behaviour of illegal insider traders. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 describes the model of 
illegal insider trading and related hypotheses. Section 4.3 presents the data and sample 
selection criteria. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results, while Section 4.5 presents 
the results of additional tests. Section 4.6 concludes and summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2. Hypothesis development – a model of insider trading 
The literature outlined in Section 2.2 reveals that illegal insiders are sensitive to the 
expected returns and expected penalty of their crime. The purpose of this section is to 
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describe a model that predicts the volume to be traded by an individual that has access 
to non-public price sensitive information (“the insider”). Traded volume is denoted by 
s. Let z be the event that crime is committed. Let h be the event that it is detected. 
Both z and h are Bernoulli variables. 
 
In looking at transgressions, this essay explicitly conditions upon z = 1. In the case of 
h, Prob (h = 1) = P(s). The transgressor has a utility function U(sr) where r is the 
return of the risky asset. Transgressing implies that ),(~1 2σµ ∆+= Nzr  whilst if 
there is no inside information, and therefore no crime, 20 ~ ( , ); 0r z N µ σ= ∆ > . It is 
possible to endogenise z by letting the investor choose the maximum of 
( ( ) / 1) ( ( ) / 0)E U sr z versus E U sr z= = . However, since the data are for 
transgressors only, this avenue shall not be pursued further and the analysis continues 
with the suppressing conditioning on z = 1. Thus the investor chooses s to maximise 
expected utility: 
 
max ( ( )) ( ( ) / 1) ( )
( ( ) / 0)(1 ( )).
E U sr E U sr h P s
E U sr h P s
= =
+ = −
               (4.1)
            
This function is directly inspired by Becker (1968) who was the first to model the 
supply of crime using expected utility theory (see Becker, 1968, p177). In the 
analysis, it is assumed that the investor is concerned with expected utility over one 
period. Clearly, this is a simplification though an extension to a multi-period setting 
adds complexity without providing additional insight into understanding the total 
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volume traded by illegal insider traders.57 Denoting the left hand side of Equation 4.1 
by V(s), one needs to solve for '( ) 0V s = . That is: 
 
'( ) '( )( ( ( ) / 1) ( ( ) / 0))
( )( ( '( ) / 1)) (1 ( )) ( '( ) / 0)
'( )[ ( ( ) / 1) ( ( ) / 0)]
( '( ) ) 0
V s P s E U sr h E U sr h
P s E U sr r h P s E U sr r h
P s E U sr h E U sr h
E U sr r
= = − =
+ = + − =
= = − =
+ =
           (4.2)
   
The expectation is that P(s) is increasing in s, '( ) 0P s > . This is equivalent to saying 
that as traded volume increases, the probability of detection increases. Also the term 
( ) ( ( ) / 1) ( ( ) / 0)s E U sr h E U sr hϕ = = − =  should be negative since the utility of the 
investor of detection should be smaller than the utility associated with non-detection. 
This proves that for an interior maximum, ( '( ) ) 0E U sr r > . Now considering the 
second derivative,  ''( )V s , for this to be negative corresponding to a maximum, note 
that 2''( ) ''( ) ( ) '( ) '( ) ( ''( ) ).V s P s s P s s E U sr rϕ ϕ= + +  Sufficient conditions for a 
maximum are that ''( )P s  is non-negative, that ''() 0U < , that is, the investor is risk-
averse, and that '( ) 0.sϕ ≤  The last assumption implies that: 
 
( '( ) / 1) ( '( ) / 0).E U sr r h E U sr r h= ≤ =                          (4.3) 
    
This means that the “marginal utility” from increasing s under detection must be less 
than the marginal utility of increasing s under non-detection.58 
                                               
57
 In any case, summary statistics contained in Section 4.3 indicate that the median insider trades only 
once, consistent with a one period allocation decision. 
58
 It is not implausible to consider a risk-loving transgressor. In this case, different sufficient conditions 
on '( ) 0.sϕ ≤  and P(s) need to apply. 
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Particular choices of functional form for U(sr) and P(s) lead to particular solutions. 
For example, Seyhun’s (1992) empirical work is motivated by ( )U w w=  (risk-
neutrality), where w is more generally wealth and ( )P s sλ=  (a linear probability 
model in s). More complex forms can be computed but these in turn lead to complex 
first-order conditions that can only be solved by non-linear methods or approximation. 
Whilst this is certainly an area for future research, in this dissertation only potential 
solutions leading to closed-form or approximate solutions are considered.  
 
Proposition 1. As an example, suppose that ( ) (0)exp( )P s P sv= . P(0) could be 
interpreted as the probability of detection of insider trading for trading one share (the 
smallest tradeable amount to be liable for insider trading). Furthermore, assuming 
),(~1 2σµ ∆+= Nzr  and ( ) exp( ); 0U rz rzλ λ= − − > , and c is the fixed detection 
penalty expressed as a return. Then the optimal traded volume, s, is given by: 
 
2
( (0) )
2 (0)
P c
s
P cv
µ
λ σ λ
+ ∆ −
=
 + 
 
                (4.4) 
 
Proof : see Appendix to this Chapter. 
It is worth noting that the units of s and r have not been fully specified. The variable, s 
is referred to as the volume traded and r as the return. A number of interpretations 
here are possible. For example, s might be the proportion of wealth invested, whilst r 
might be the rate of return. An alternative version could be that s is the number of 
shares and r is the return i.e. the change in price associated with buying and selling 
the share. The hypotheses are equivalent whichever interpretation is taken, however, 
the estimation of parameters, especially those of t
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Proposition 1 leads to several hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis4.1: An increase in µ + ∆  (the sum of the unconditional expected return of 
the asset and the incremental return associated with the information event) will 
increase s.  
 
Hypothesis4.2: The volume transacted by the insider, s, is reduced by an increase in c 
(penalty rate per share) not just through the mean effect (numerator) but also via the 
variance effect (denominator).  
 
Hypothesis4.3: An increase in the variability of the asset ( 2σ ) will also decrease s.59 
 
Hypothesis4.4: An increase in v (the sensitivity of the detection function with respect 
to volume) will decrease s as will an increase in P(0) (baseline probability of 
detection).  
 
Hypothesis 4.4 concerns changes to the two components which make up the 
probability of detection function, P(s). Unlike the other variables derived from 
Equation 4.4, this function is not directly observable. However, in the empirical 
analysis in Section 4.4, the following factors are considered as proxies for the 
detection function: 
 
                                               
59
 This is driven by the model and the independence of P(s) from 2σ . It would be straightforward to 
extend the above analysis to make 2σ  a parameter of P(s) which decreases the probability of 
detection. This would then have a countervailing affect on the magnitude of s so that, in an extended 
model at least the impact of volatility could be ambiguous.  
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1. Specialist versus dealer markets – Several empirical studies examine whether 
specialist market makers are better at detecting informed trading than dealers in a 
multiple market maker environment. In an analysis of repeated illegal insider trading 
in 116 stocks, Fishe and Robe (2004) show that specialists on exchange-listed 
securities reduce depth and increase bid-ask spreads after illegal insiders begin 
trading. In contrast, for NASDAQ listed securities quoted depth decreases, but less so 
than for NYSE-listed stocks, and there is no appreciable reduction in bid-ask spreads. 
Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) show that effective bid-ask spreads for NYSE-
listed stocks, are larger vis-à-vis NASDAQ-listed stocks on days when registered 
(legal) insiders trade. Rather than analyse particular incidences of informed trading, 
Heidle and Huang (2002) examine how the probability of informed trading in general 
differs as stocks transfer from dealer to specialist markets, and vice versa. Their 
results indicate a move to a multiple dealer environment coincides with a higher 
likelihood of informed trading overall, suggestive of the fact that this market structure 
is less able to constrain informed investors. Theoretical work also predicts that 
specialists might be better able to avoid informed trading.60 Given the results of these 
studies, insiders wishing to conceal the fact they are trading illegally may choose to 
be less aggressive when trading in a specialist market such as the NYSE.  
 
2. Days between trade and information announcement – the probability of being 
detected may be a function of the time between the trade by the insider and the date of 
the announcement. If insiders believe that trading immediately before an information 
announcement is more likely to attract a penalty then a rational insider will trade as 
                                               
60
 For example, Benveniste, Marcus and Wilhelm (1992) model the repeated interactions between 
brokers and specialists on the floor of the exchange. Their model predicts that floor brokers have an 
incentive to signal to specialists when they suspect their client is informed, in order to avoid subsequent 
sanctions from the specialist and to reduce overall costs for their clients. 
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far away from the information event as possible.61 Park, Jang and Loeb (1995) 
provide a simple model of how insiders time their trades with respect to forthcoming 
earnings announcements. Their model predicts that insider trading decreases 
substantially as the earnings day approaches to the point where immediately before 
the announcement insiders trade less than they ‘normally’ would. Their analysis of 
reported (i.e. legal) insider trades supports the predictions of their hypothesis. Ke, 
Huddart and Petroni (2003) provide contributing evidence for this conclusion. They 
examine reported insider trading activity before earnings announcements, in which 
reported earnings decrease compared to the corresponding quarter of the previous 
year. Such events, which the authors term a ‘break’, are shown to involve significant 
abnormal negative price reactions on the announcement day. The authors find an 
absence of insider selling activity in the two quarters prior to a break. However, there 
is evidence of significant selling activity between seven to three quarters prior to the 
break. This is consistent with detection minimisation behaviour on the part of insiders 
and like Park, Jang and Loeb (1995) suggests that the probability of detection is lower 
the further away an insider trades from the event. Both of these papers examine SEC 
lodged trades by insiders prior to earnings announcements. To the extent that this 
behaviour extends to covert trades committed before earnings and merger 
announcements, trading further away from the announcement should decrease the 
probability of detection. 
 
3. Proximity to the non-public information – the degrees of separation between 
the trader and any individual who has access to non-public information might 
determine the volume they trade. To successfully prosecute an individual for illegal 
                                               
61
 An alternative explanation, unrelated to the probability of sanction but with the same expected 
outcome, is that insiders will trade larger amounts as early as possible to maximise expected profit 
before the information is impounded into the price by other informed traders. 
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insider trading, the regulator must establish possession of material non-public 
information. If it is easier to establish possession of information for employees of the 
company in question than those that are separated from that information, then direct 
insiders will trade less, if at all, because their probability of sanction is higher. 
 
4. Normal trading volume of security – if the volume traded by the insider is 
significant relative to the usual volume traded in the security then the regulator may 
be more likely to investigate those particular trades. If this is the case, then the insider 
will trade fewer shares in illiquid securities. 
 
4.3. Data and sample selection 
To construct the variables necessary to test the predictions of the model, the following 
data for each insider trade are required: the position taken by the insider in the 
relevant security, the day of the insider’s trade, general trading data for the security, 
the penalty levied against the insider and features of the case or insider’s employment 
to determine how proximate the insider is to the information. This section describes 
the sources and collection methodology of these data. 
 
Insider trading data are drawn from litigation reports made available on the SEC 
website (http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml) when the SEC formally 
brings an action against a defendant. This source is similar to the one used by 
Meulbroek (1992), but the sample period is more recent than that covered in her paper 
and is not supplemented by non-public information. Data collection involves 
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examining all litigation reports62 available on the website between the creation of the 
SEC website, 28 September, 1995, and 31 December, 2007. On the website, the 
litigation reports are ordered according to the date on which the litigation report is 
released, rather than the actual date of the defendants’ crimes. There can be 
considerable difference between these two dates. The delay between the commission 
of the crime and subsequent regulatory action reflects the time needed to detect the 
transgression, establish the case and finally initiate civil proceedings. It is at this stage 
when the website would first make mention of the defendant and the alleged 
transgression. After this step, more time is required as the matter is seen through the 
relevant court to determine if the defendant is indeed liable and if so, the penalty to be 
imposed upon the defendant. Each of these additional determinations might warrant a 
separate litigation report. Care is taken to follow through all cases to determine the 
eventual verdict and penalty. All cases for which the defendant is deemed not liable 
are removed from the sample. 
 
Due to the significant time lags involved in this process, the dates for which litigation 
reports are available do not correspond to the dates on which illegal insiders 
performed their trades. For example, the first insider trading case covered by these 
litigation reports concerns a trade made in 1988. A natural question arises as to 
whether the sample period is determined according to the date of the defendants’ 
crimes or the date of its first public release by the regulator on the SEC website. The 
former is chosen because, it is considered more useful to have results which reflect 
the totality of insider trading activity that occurred during a particular period, rather 
than the totality of insider trading activity that was reported by the regulator during a 
                                               
62
 The litigation reports presented on the website concern all types of securities fraud, however this 
essay concerns insider trading cases only. For expositional convenience the phrase ‘litigation reports’ 
implies only litigation reports concerning illegal insider trading. 
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particular period. As such, this essay concerns all illegal insider transactions that were 
made between 1 January, 1996 and 31 December, 2004.63 
 
These dates are chosen to ensure that over the course of the sample period, there is 
maximum access to the population of detected insider trading activity that occurred 
during that period. Outside of this range there is less certainty with respect to this 
criterion. For example the electronic data available on the SEC website provides 
information for only one case (within the relevant sample of mergers and earnings 
announcements in common stock) in 1988. Meulbroek (1992) shows that there is 
clearly more than one case of insider trading that occurred in 1988, and therefore, if 
the sample begins in 1988, the data available from the SEC website captures only a 
very small percentage of the insider trading activity that occurred in that year. 
Therefore, the start of the sample period corresponds with the first full year in which 
the SEC began publishing litigation reports on its website, 1996. The sample period 
ends in 2004 because beyond this date, one cannot be certain of the outcome of many 
of the civil proceedings because a significant majority are not resolved before 31 
December, 2007. 
 
To further focus the scope of this study, only trades in common stock are investigated 
because the model outlined in Section 4.2 is relevant for describing the volume traded 
by an insider in a given type of security (e.g. common stock, options, futures, 
contracts for difference), but not how they allocate across multiple types of 
                                               
63
 Using the alternative sample period criterion of all litigation reports released between 28 September, 
1995 and 31 December, 2007 only increases the sample size by 20 – as such, the results remain 
relatively unchanged under the alternate sample period criterion. 
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securities.64 Since common stock trades have by far the greatest representation in the 
litigation reports available on the SEC website, this security type is chosen for 
analysis. This essay focuses exclusively on trades before merger and earnings 
announcements since these are common yet significant events in financial markets. 
Furthermore, as recommended by Chakravaty and McConnell (1999), part of the 
methodology involves matching insider trades to non-insider trades to determine the 
extent of the difference in behaviour between insiders and the uninformed. One aspect 
of the matching criteria involves matching on information type and often it is not 
possible to match trades associated with (relatively) rare or idiosyncratic information 
events. 
 
The litigation reports are non-standardised documents and provide varying levels of 
detail about the insiders’ trades. The name of the defendant, the volume traded, the 
price of the transaction, the date of trade, the date the insider’s information became 
public, the security being traded and the penalty levelled against the insider are 
collected from the litigation reports if available. Additional information is sourced 
from Lexis Nexis database which provides case judgements. These judgements are 
primarily used to track down the penalty imposed upon the defendant. 
 
Using this information, trade packages are constructed by aggregating all volume 
traded by an individual before a given news announcement in a given security. 
Aggregation of insider volume occurs because the model outlined in Section 4.2 is a 
one period model and describes the total volume traded by an insider before a given 
announcement, and not how the insider chooses to break up orders across time before 
                                               
64
 Cases involving solely options or derivatives trading are not examined. Cases where the insider(s) 
traded both options and common stock are included but only the common stock trades are analysed. 
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the announcement. Therefore trade ‘packages’ rather than individual trades are the 
unit of observation in this study. 
 
While it is possible for individuals to trade in more than one listed company or for 
several different individuals to trade shares in the same company, each observation in 
the sample represents a unique insider-company combination.65 For each trade 
package, the closing and opening prices surrounding the first trading day in the 
package and the date of the news announcement are collected. Total daily traded 
volume in the security in the 30 days preceding the first trade in the package is also 
collected. All price and volume data is sourced from Bloomberg. Finally, the annual 
report corresponding to the financial year of the insider’s trade is consulted to 
determine which exchange the stock was listed on at the time of the illegal trading 
activity. 
 
The litigation reports are not standardised and therefore, many observations are lost 
due to incomplete case data. Table 4.1 describes the proportion of observations that 
are included in the sample compared to the population of all trade packages over the 
sample period. The sample consists of 296 trade packages out of a possible 441 
(earnings and merger announcements for publicly listed companies only), 
representing 67.12% of the population. As a point of comparison, Meulbroek (1992) 
who uses publicly available litigation reports and confidential case files to build her 
sample, is only able to analyse data that captures 69% of defendants charged with 
                                               
65
 In one case an individual traded the same security before two different news announcements 
pertaining to the same company. This was defined as two separate trade packages and so technically 
each observation in the sample represents a unique insider-company-news announcement combination. 
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insider trading between the years 1980 to 1989.66 While this unit of observation –
‘defendants’  – is not the same as the unit analysed in this study – ‘trade packages’ – it 
nevertheless highlights the fact that significant data loss occurs when attempting to 
extract information from non-standardised litigation reports. 
Table 4.1 
Trade packages: January 1996 to December 2004 
This table reports the total population of trade packages in all litigation reports filed between January 
1996 and December 2007. The population of trade packages consists of all trades in common stock 
before merger and earnings announcements. The year corresponds to the year in which the insider 
trade occurred (not the year of prosecution). This table also reports the number of trade packages 
remaining in the sample once all filters are applied. 
 
Table 4.2 depicts the sample selection criteria. There are 441 observations available 
over the sample period. Sixty nine observations are lost because the litigation reports 
do not provide the number of shares traded by the insider. A further 67 observations 
are removed from the sample because the litigation reports do not mention the penalty 
imposed upon the illegal insider. Finally nine observations are lost because the date 
on which the insider executed the trade is unavailable. The final sample is 296 
packages which represents the trading of 256 defendants across 156 stocks, 
prosecuted in 158 cases (see Table 4.3). Two hundred and forty eight observations 
involve prior knowledge of mergers or tender offers, while 48 observations relate to 
earnings announcements. 
                                               
66
 The sample selection criteria are similar to Meulbroek’s (1992) except that her analysis does not 
require data on the penalty levelled against the insider. 
Year Trade packages in population 
Trade packages in 
sample Percent in sample 
1996 33 23 69.70% 
1997 53 32 60.38% 
1998 57 31 54.39% 
1999 65 47 72.31% 
2000 98 67 68.37% 
2001 38 25 65.79% 
2002 28 19 67.86% 
2003 47 40 85.11% 
2004 22 12 54.55% 
Total 441 296 67.12% 
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Table 4.2 
Sample selection criteria 
This table shows how the final sample of 296 insider trading packages is determined 
from an initial pool of 441 available observations. All data is sourced from SEC 
litigation reports available from the SEC website. 
Filter Observations Lost 
Observations 
Available 
All insider trade packages 0 441 
No data on volume traded by insider 69 372 
No data on penalty 67 305 
No data on date of trade 9 296 
 
  
Total Available trade packages  296 
Percentage of total  67.12% 
 
Table 4.3 
Distribution of sample across years 
This table reports the distribution of the sample across years, by trade packages, 
defendants, stocks and cases. The value in the “All years” field does not necessarily 
equal the sum of the individual years because several defendants / stocks / cases are 
present in the sample in more than one year. 
Year Trade Packages Defendants Stocks Cases 
1996 23 23 13 17 
1997 32 20 22 16 
1998 31 29 17 19 
1999 47 42 26 29 
2000 67 59 31 31 
2001 25 24 13 15 
2002 19 19 12 10 
2003 40 37 16 21 
2004 12 12 10 11 
All years 296 256 156 158 
 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 4.4. Table 4.4 documents 
significant skewness to the right in almost all the variables. The median amount of 
stock traded by insiders is 4625 shares per package with a value of approximately 
$75,000. This amount of stock is within the range designated by Barclay and Warner 
(1993) as ‘medium sized’ trades (500 – 9,900), the amount most likely to be used by 
informed traders to ‘stealth trade’.67 The volume traded by insiders represents 4.54% 
                                               
67
 Barclay and Warner (1993) analyse individual trades rather than trade packages as is the case in this 
study. The median individual trade size of the sample is 2000, which also fits within the ‘medium 
sized’ category of Barclay and Warner. 
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(median) of the average daily trading volume in the security over the previous 30 
days, indicating that insiders have a reasonably significant presence in the market 
during their trading window. Insiders trade around seven days before the 
announcement and use between one to two transactions to implement their strategy, 
suggesting that the behaviour of the median insider is consistent with a one period 
allocation decision. 
 
Table 4.4 also presents the imputed profit or loss avoided by the insiders. This value 
is calculated by first determining the absolute price change between the closing price 
the day before the first trade in the package and the last trade on the day of the news 
announcement.68 This is then multiplied by the number of shares in the package to 
calculate the imputed profit or loss avoided. The median profit reaped by insiders per 
security they traded is $26,860. 
 
The median penalty is $67,511 and the median penalty per dollar of (imputed) profit 
is 2.00. In civil cases the penalty assessment is the sum of all monies that the 
defendant is forced to pay. This usually involves full disgorgement of profits, some 
civil penalty and interest assessments. If a defendant is given a criminal sanction 
beyond a civil penalty, this is added to the total penalty levelled against the individual. 
In a handful of instances, defendants who have been tipped are not required to pay 
any penalty. Instead, the tipper is ordered to pay the full disgorgement and civil 
penalties of the tippee. When this happens, the penalty of the tippee is truncated to $1 
                                               
68
 Where the last trade on the day prior to the first trade of the package is not available, the price 
documented in the litigation report is used, if available. 
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to ensure in the empirical analysis definability of the natural log of the variable.69 In 
litigation reports sanctions are often reported per individual. When determining the 
penalty per trade package, penalty assessments for individuals are scaled by the profit 
made per trade package for the individual in question. For example, if a defendant 
makes a profit of $10,000 in one trade package and $40,000 in another trade package, 
the penalty for that individual is split across those packages using a ratio of 1:4. 
Legislation restricts civil penalties to three times the profit made, implying an upper 
limit of this variable to four times (assuming full disgorgement). However, it is 
possible for the penalty per dollar profit ratio to exceed four times. This can occur if 
insiders are ordered to pay the disgorgement of tippees as well as their own penalties. 
The ratio can also exceed theoretical statutory limits if there is a significant period 
between the trade and the imposition of sanction, leading to very large interest 
assessments. Finally, the penalty per profit ratio can exceed four if significant 
criminal sanctions are imposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
69
 To test the sensitivity of the results to this truncation all observations where the defendant is not 
required to pay a penalty are excluded. The results are very similar to those reported in the body of the 
text. 
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Table 4.4 
Descriptive statistics of illegal insider trading 
This table provides mean, median, maximum and minimum values for the sample of trade packages 
across several variables. Volume represents the amount of stock traded by the insider per package. 
Volume / Liquidity represents the total insider volume divided by the average daily market volume in the 
30 days prior to the day in which the insider traded.  Dollar Value is equal to the volume of the trade 
package multiplied by the closing price on the day before the first trade in the package. Price Change is 
the absolute percentage price change between the closing price on the day of the announcement and the 
day before the first trade in the package (net of market). Days represents the volume weighted average 
number of calendar days before the information announcement that the insider executed the trades. 
Number of trades is the number of trades per trade package executed by the insider. Imputed Profit (Loss 
Avoided) is the dollar value of profit made or losses avoided by the insider. This value is calculated by 
first determining the absolute price change between the closing price the day before the first trade in the 
package and the last trade on the day of the news announcement. This is then multiplied by the number 
of shares in the package to calculate the imputed profit or loss avoided. Penalty is equal to the dollar 
value of the penalty imposed by the SEC. The penalty is the total sum of disgorgement, civil penalties, 
criminal sanctions and interest and is on a per trade package basis. The penalty is also scaled by the profit 
of the insider and reported below.  
 Mean Median Maximum  Minimum 
Volume 24454 4625 1400000 50 
Volume / Liquidity 34.49% 4.54% 1224.63% 0.02% 
Dollar Value $531,597 $74,969 $29,844,030 $995 
Absolute Price Change (dollar value) $10.18 $6.78 $64.50 $0.02 
Absolute Price Change (%) 48.11% 40.27% 297.62% 0.00% 
Days 18.33 7.00 254.00 0.00 
Number of trades 1.52 1.00 12.00 1.00 
Imputed Profit (Loss Avoided) $215,696 $26,860 $15,050,000  $30 
Penalty $341,068 $67,511 $7,819,509 $0.00 
Penalty (scaled by imputed profit) 11.96 2.09 897.00 0.00 
 
4.4. Empirical results 
To test the hypotheses outlined in Section 4.2 several different specifications of a log 
linear model of insider volume is estimated. The dependent variable is regressed 
against a suite of determinants designed to proxy for the theoretical determinants 
mentioned previously. A log-linear model is estimated because Table 4.4 indicates 
that many of the variables exhibit significant skewness. The dependent variable, 
ln(volume) is the natural log of total volume transacted by the insider in the trade 
package standardised by the average daily traded volume in the security over the 
previous thirty days. As is apparent from the specification of the dependent variable, 
the analysis does not explicitly consider the effect that ‘normal’ liquidity of the 
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security has on insider volume by incorporating it on the right hand side of the 
equation. Rather insider volume is scaled by extant liquidity. This produces a more 
appropriate measure of the dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression where 
traded volumes can differ substantially simply due to variations in liquidity. 
Furthermore, scaling insider volume by some measure of broader liquidity is common 
in papers on insider trading.71  
 
The variable ln(price change) is the natural log of the absolute dollar return between 
the last trade on the day before the first trade in the package and the last trade on the 
day of the information announcement. When the information announcement occurs 
after the market close, the opening price on the next day is used to calculate the price 
change. This variable captures the expected return of the stock plus the incremental 
return associated with the news announcement, µ + ∆ , in Equation 4.4. The variable, 
ln(penalty) is equal to the natural log of the penalty per trade package (described 
earlier) scaled by volume of the trade package and represents c, in Equation 4.4. The 
variable, ln(std. dev.) is the natural log of the standard deviation of daily closing price 
returns (in dollars) in the thirty days prior to the first trade of the package. This 
variable captures the variability of the asset returns, 2σ , in Equation 4.4. It is apparent 
that the specification of these three variables implies that the return of the asset, r, is 
defined using dollar returns, rather than rates of return.72 
 
Several variables are used to proxy for the detection function, P(s). Specialist is a 
dummy variable which equals one if the insider traded on the NYSE or AMEX and 
                                               
71
 See for example Seyhun, (1992 p. 168); Cornell and Sirri, (1992, p.1045); Chakravaty and 
McConnel, (1997, p26); Fishe and Robe (2005, p479). 
72
 The analysis contained in Section 4.4 is repeated using rates of returns. The signs of the coefficients 
and the significance of the variables remain the same under either specification. 
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zero otherwise (NASDAQ). The variable ln(days) is equal to the natural log of one 
plus the volume weighted average number of calendar days before the information 
announcement that the insider executed the trades.73 Direct insider captures the 
proximity of the illegal trader to the inside information. It equals one if the individual 
is an employee, legal advisor or consultant to the company about to make the 
information announcement or in the case of a merger an employee, consultant or legal 
advisor of the target or acquiring firm. It is equal to zero otherwise. 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 4.5. Model 1 denotes the most 
parsimonious representation of the theoretical model – containing only those variables 
which are readily observable – the price change, penalty and variance determinants. 
The results of Models 2, 3 and 4 depict how the model changes as an extra 
determinant, from those designed to proxy for the detection function, is added to this 
base specification. Models 5, 6, 7 represent the basic specification plus two additional 
determinants, while Model 8 represents the full specification. As indicated by the 
respective F-statistics, the variables are jointly significant at the 1% level across all 
specifications. The models describe between 23.45% (Model 1) to 28.89% (Model 8) 
of the variation in the dependent variable. As for individual coefficients the results are 
generally consistent regardless of the specification. 
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 where n is the number of trades in the package,  id is the number of calendar days 
before the information announcement that the insider performed trade i, iv  is the volume for trade i, 
and nV is the total volume traded in the package. 
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Table 4.5 
Regression results 
Coefficient estimates and corresponding test statistics for several regression specifications. The 
regressions contain the following variables: the dependent variable, ln(volume) is equal to the natural 
log of the total volume traded by an individual before a given news announcement standardised by the 
average daily traded volume in the preceding 30 days; ln(price change) is the natural log of the return 
between the last price on the day preceding the first trade in a package and the last price on the day of 
the news announcement; ln(penalty) is equal to the natural log of the penalty levelled against the 
insider for that particular trade, divided by trade size; ln(std. dev.) is the natural log of the standard 
deviation of closing prices in the 30 days preceding the first trade by the insider; Specialist is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the stock is traded on the NYSE or AMEX and zero otherwise; ln(days) is the 
natural log of the volume weighted number of days before the information announcement that the 
insider traded the shares; and insider is a variable equal to one if the individual is an employee, legal 
advisor or consultant to the company and zero otherwise. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept -3.83 (-11.10)* 
-3.39 
(-9.54)* 
-4.36 
(-11.28)* 
-3.61 
(-9.83)* 
-3.89 
(-9.68)* 
-3.24 
(-8.69)* 
-4.14 
(-10.45)* 
-3.74 
(-9.18)* 
ln(price 
change) 
0.46 
(3.71)* 
0.49 
(3.98)* 
0.46 
(3.69)* 
0.43 
(3.45)* 
0.48 
(3.95)* 
0.46 
(3.76)* 
0.42 
(3.36)* 
0.45 
(3.65)* 
ln(penalty) -0.33 (-4.34)* 
-0.36 
(-4.74)* 
-0.35 
(-4.66)* 
-0.33 
(-4.36)* 
-0.37 
(-5.00)* 
-0.36 
(-4.73)* 
-0.36 
(-4.74)* 
-0.37 
(-5.03)* 
ln(std. dev.) -1.08 (-6.91)* 
-1.01 
(-6.55)* 
-1.04 
(-6.69)* 
-1.06 
(-6.83)* 
-0.97 
(-6.38)* 
-1.00 
(-6.50)* 
-1.01 
(-6.55)* 
-0.96 
(-6.28)* 
Specialist  -0.91 (-3.87)*   
-0.85 
(-3.61)* 
-0.88 
(-3.69)*  
-0.79 
(-3.34)* 
ln(days)   0.28 (2.90)*  
0.28 
(2.56)**  
0.32 
(3.26)* 
0.28 
(3.28)* 
Direct 
Insider    
-0.42 
(-1.73)  
-0.32 
(-1.33) 
-0.56 
(-2.28)** 
-0.45 
(-1.84) 
n 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 
F-Stat 31.12* 28.20* 26.03* 24.24* 24.30* 22.97* 22.17* 20.98* 
Adjusted R2 23.45% 26.94% 25.34% 23.96% 28.31% 27.13% 26.40% 28.89% 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
 
The following discussion will refer to the results from all models but with a focus 
primarily on the results from the fully specified model (Model 8). Consistent with 
Hypothesis 4.1, the coefficient on the price change variable is positive across all 
models, ranging from 0.42 (Model 7) to 0.49 (Model 2). The value of the coefficient 
in the full model (Model 8), 0.45, indicates that for every 1% increase in dollar return, 
insiders will trade 0.45% more shares relative to the average daily volume in the 
security. Therefore, in total dollar terms and holding all other things equal, a 1% 
increase in the dollar return increases the payoff to the insider by 1.45%, because the 
 157 
insider also enlarges their trading position. This is consistent with models of informed 
and insider trading, where individuals trade larger volumes when there are greater 
rents to be made (e.g. Seyhun, 1992, Easley and O’Hara, 1987). As indicated by the 
respective t-statistics, this variable is significantly different from zero at the 1% level 
across all specifications. 
 
The coefficient on the natural log of penalty is negative and significant at the 1% level 
across all models. The parameter coefficient is robust to the exact model specification 
ranging from -0.33 to -0.37, suggesting that the volume traded by insiders is sensitive 
to the magnitude of the penalty. The results from Model 8 indicate that for every 1% 
increase in penalty per share traded volume decreases by 0.37%. The finding of 
penalty effect is supported empirically by Garfinkel (1997) who examines the effect 
of increased sanctions under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act (1988) (ITSFEA) on insider trading before earnings announcements. In the post-
ITSFEA environment, the paper documents significantly less (legal) insider trading 
before announcements as well as larger price movements after the date of the earnings 
announcement. Both of these findings are consistent with the notion that insiders 
respond to the possibility of harsher sanctions by reducing their traded volume. 
 
Consistent with Hypothesis 4.3, it appears that insiders respond to variability in asset 
returns by reducing their traded volume. The coefficient on the natural log of return 
standard deviation is a significantly negative 0.96. This is an interesting finding, given 
that one might not expect insiders, with certainty of information, to consider the 
variability of asset returns. This result suggests that insiders may not have completely 
precise information, or at the very least, do not believe they have perfect information. 
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This might occur, for example, when an insider is aware a takeover is about to occur, 
but does not know the exact offer price. This result is consistent with Markowitz 
(1957) mean-variance optimisation behaviour, with the obvious difference that 
insiders, because they tend to have inside information in only a very small number of 
securities (typically one), are concerned with the total variability of the assets they 
trade rather than beta variability. 
 
The variables used to proxy for the detection function indicate that insiders respond to 
the probability of detection by reducing their traded volume. The coefficient on 
specialist, -0.79 (Model 8), is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that 
insiders are more likely to trade greater volumes in a multiple dealer environment 
than with a specialist on the NYSE or AMEX. This is consistent with previous studies 
that show NYSE specialists are more easily able to detect informed trading and adjust 
their quotes or spreads accordingly (Fishe and Robe, 2004; Garfinkel and 
Nimalendran, 2003). Insiders appear to have their volume constrained when trading 
with specialists compared to other market structures. 
 
The coefficient on ln(days) (0.28 – Model 8) is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
indicating that insiders trade less as the announcement day approaches, consistent 
with detection minimization behaviour and the model proposed by Park, Jang and 
Loeb, (1995). Finally, as indicated by the coefficient on direct insider, direct insiders 
of companies – employees, legal advisors and consultants – trade 45% less volume 
than those tipped off by direct insiders. This coefficient is slightly outside the 5% 
significance level (p-value is 0.066). Nevertheless, the sign on the coefficient is 
consistent with the hypothesis that those closer to the information will trade less 
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(assuming they choose to trade at all) because it is easier for the regulator to establish 
a connection between the insider and the information. 
 
Overall the results are consistent with the model and associated hypotheses outlined in 
Section 4.2. Consistent with Becker (1968), the magnitude of crime is positively 
related to the expected gains, and negatively related to the expected penalty. 
Interestingly, illegal insider traders also appear to be sensitive to the variability of 
asset returns, consistent with risk-return optimisation behaviour. 
 
4.5. Additional tests 
4.5.1. Sample selection bias 
The sample used in this study consists of illegal insiders who were caught and 
successfully prosecuted by the SEC. However, the model described in Section 4.2 and 
the conclusions drawn in this essay concern all individuals who trade on non-public 
information, not just those who are caught. Since some proportion of illegal insider 
trading goes undetected it is possible that the results provided in Section 4.4 are 
biased because the behaviour of detected insider traders may be systematically 
different to the behaviour of non-detected insider traders.  
 
It is worthwhile considering what this bias might be. It is reasonable to expect that 
non-detected insider traders, because of the fact they remain undetected, might exhibit 
behaviour that is more furtive than their detected counterparts. For example, for a 
given level of expected return, the non-detected sample of insiders might be less 
aggressive in their trading – i.e. they trade less relative to the detected group. Seeing 
as the sample consists only of detected transgressors, this might create a bias towards 
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finding a significant relationship between expected returns and the position taken by 
the insider.  
 
What about the other determinants outlined in the model? In terms of the expected 
penalty components – the magnitude of the penalty and the probability of detection - 
any bias of this nature probably works against finding significance. This is because, 
for a given level of expected penalty, less aggressive trading implies greater 
sensitivity to this determinant in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. Therefore, 
the coefficients on levied penalty and the variables that proxy for the detection 
functions, presented in Section 4.4, would likely be greater in magnitude with a non-
detected sample. A similar argument can be made for the other determinant – asset 
return variability. Therefore, if sample selection bias exists it might change the 
magnitude, but not the overall conclusions for the penalty, detection and asset 
variability components. However, as stated previously, it might affect the conclusions 
drawn from the interpretation of the coefficient on ln(price change). 
 
To empirically test for the affects of any bias, this essay broadly draws upon the same 
rationale that Meulbroek (1992) uses to account for sample selection bias in her study. 
Meulbroek’s (1992) study concludes that insider trading moves stock prices. This 
conclusion is reached because the author documents a correlation between insider 
trading days and abnormal returns. A selection bias exists because a part of the 
detection methodology used by the SEC is to examine days of abnormal price 
movements. Meulbroek (1992) overcomes this potential bias by dividing up her 
sample based on the method used to detect the illegality, noting that some forms of 
detection do not necessarily involve abnormal price movements as part of the 
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detection criteria. Essentially her methodology involves identifying those 
observations in her sample that most closely resemble the non-detected sample of 
traders. Thus, she is able to divide her sample of insider trades into two groups - those 
likely to exhibit a bias in the same direction as her findings and those that are least 
likely to exhibit a bias.74 A comparison between the two groups provides an indication 
of the extent of sample selection bias, if any. 
 
Meulbroek (1992) recognises that there are numerous ways for an individual to be 
detected and prosecuted by the SEC. She uses confidential and unique referral data 
sourced from the SEC to ascertain how an individual is detected. Similar data are not 
available for the sample used in this study. Fortunately, an insight into the primary 
detection methodology can be found in Harris (2003). He states that large price and 
volume movements before an information announcement trigger suspicion (Harris, 
2003, p588). After this the investigators compare lists of traders in that security with 
those that could know the information (Harris, 2003, p589). His description of the 
typical investigation procedure implies three potential criteria for detection – trading 
with concurrent abnormal price movements, trading with concurrent abnormal volume 
movements and trading with apparent access to the sensitive information. 
 
Of course, not all insiders are detected in this fashion. Some are incidentally detected 
outside of this methodology. Using this fact, the sample is split into two groups based 
on the potential for bias, as per Meulbroek (1992). For each trade package in the 
sample, analysis is conducted to determine if one of the trades in that package 
corresponds to a day with abnormal price movements or abnormal volume. Following 
                                               
74
 For more detail see Meulbroek (1992, p1679). 
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Meulbroek ‘abnormal’ refers to any value that is more than three standard deviations 
away from the mean, where mean and standard deviation benchmarks are calculated 
during the 150 days before the first trade by the insider in that security. Furthermore, 
all individuals classified as direct insiders are considered to satisfy the criteria of 
apparent access to non-public information. Extreme conservatism is used when 
assessing a trade package as having a low potential for sample selection bias. 
Therefore, any trade package that satisfies at least one of the three criteria is 
considered ‘detected under normal SEC and exchange procedures’ and has a high 
potential for sample selection bias. 
 
Of the 296 trade packages, 185 are considered to be detected via the method described 
in Harris (2003). The remaining 111 observations are considered to have a low 
potential for sample selection bias. The log-linear regression is re-estimated for each 
sub-sample. However since the dummy variable, direct insider, is used to partition the 
sample it cannot be used in the regression. This is unproblematic since the variable 
had marginal significance in the first instance. The results of the regression are 
presented in Table 4.6.  
 
The results indicate that there are only modest differences between the two sub-
samples. In terms of sign, all coefficients are the same and in the direction predicted 
by the model. Sample selection bias, however, might affect the magnitude of the 
response to the determinants. Previous discussion of potential sample selection bias 
issues highlights ln(price change) as the variable that could be most affected by 
sample selection bias. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient value on ln(price 
change) is considerably larger for the low sample selection bias sample. This is 
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actually contrary to ex ante expectations of how sample selection bias should affect 
the estimates. Interestingly, the low sample selection bias group appears to be about 
2.5 times more sensitive to price changes, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 4.6 
Sample selection bias 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in brackets) for the following regression: 
1 2 3
4 5 7
ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( . .)
ln( )i i
volume price change penalty std dev
specialist days specialist
α β β β
β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + +
 
The first column presents the results from the regression using a sub-sample of trade packages deemed 
to have a high potential for sample selection bias. These observations are concurrent with abnormal 
volume or abnormal price movements of the security on the day, or are traded by an individual who is 
an employee, legal or financial consultant to the firm (direct insider = 1). The second column presents 
the results from the regression from the remaining observations which are deemed to have a low 
potential for sample selection bias. 
 High potential for sample 
selection bias (n=185) 
Low potential for sample 
selection bias (n=111) 
Intercept -3.84 (-7.70)* 
-3.93 
(-5.70)* 
ln(price change) 0.35 (2.44)* 
0.81 
(3.48)* 
ln(penalty) -0.31 (-3.07)* 
-0.46 
(-3.68)* 
ln(std. dev.) -0.91 (-4.77)* 
-1.11 
(-4.11)* 
Specialist -0.70 (-2.39)* 
-1.31 
(-2.96)* 
ln(days) 0.27 (2.39)* 
0.08 
(0.42) 
F-Stat 11.09* 13.58* 
Adjusted R2 21.51% 36.38% 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
 
A Chow test is performed to formally test the overall differences in the coefficient 
values between the two models. The resultant test statistic is 0.87 (degrees of freedom 
6, 284) which does not allow rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
values between the models are equal (p-value is 0.52). This is reassuring since it 
appears the conclusions with respect to how illegal insiders respond to key drivers of 
the model are not materially affected by sample selection bias.  
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4.5.2. Comparison to ‘normal’ trades 
The results of Section 4.4 are not completely conclusive insofar as they may just 
reflect normal trading behaviour of which insider trading behaviour is a subset. For 
example, the results show that insiders trade less when engaging with specialists. It is 
unclear whether this is a general phenomenon of all trading or unique to illegal 
insiders. Essentially, the initial results are not able to distinguish between insider and 
normal trading behaviour, and therefore any implications drawn from these results 
may not be useful.75  
 
To overcome this problem the analysis in Section 4.4 is repeated using a sample of 
matched trades which are not committed by illegal insiders. After pooling both insider 
trades (the treatment sample) and non-insider trades (the control sample), a regression 
is estimated that allows identification of the effect of the variables on insider volume 
beyond what would otherwise occur with regular trades. 
 
For each announcement, a suitable control announcement is found which most closely 
resembles the features of the treatment announcement. Following Huang and Stoll 
(1996), Cao, Choe and Hatheway (1997) and Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005), matching 
is based on three primary criteria – price, volume and market capitalisation. An 
additional criterion is imposed that announcements of the same information type are 
matched to each other (i.e. treatment merger announcements are matched against a 
pool of other merger announcements) and also that the control announcement is made 
within one year of the treatment announcement. A list of merger and earnings 
announcements, sourced from Thomson DataStream, forms the pool of potential 
                                               
75
 One of the first papers to incorporate non-insider trades into their analysis of insider trading 
behaviour is Park, Jang and Loeb (1995), p600. This issue is also raised by Chakravaty and McConnell 
(1999). 
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control announcements. For each unique announcement in the treatment sample, i, the 
following score is constructed for each potential control announcement, j: 
 
2 2 2
,
2 2 2
i j i j i j
i j i j i j
i j price price volume volume size size
price price volume volume size size
score
+ + +
     
− − −
= + +          
     
     (4.5) 
where price, volume and size represent the daily averages of price, traded volume and 
market capitalisation over the period t = -200 to t = -100 (t = 0 is the announcement 
date). This benchmark period is consistent with Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005). The 
announcement which has the minimum score is chosen as the control announcement. 
 
Once a suitable announcement is found, the entire stream of trades x days prior to the 
announcement are sourced from the Securities Research Centre for the Asia Pacific 
(SIRCA), where x corresponds to the closest integer value for the days variable of the 
particular package. A trade is drawn at random to match the insider’s trades, with 
each trade in the sampling window having an equal probability of selection. For each 
matched trade, the dependent variable and the covariates ln(price change), ln(std. 
dev.), ln(days) and specialist are constructed in the same manner as for the treatment 
sample. The variables ln(penalty) and direct insider can be constructed for the control 
sample though their utility in regression analysis is questionable given that all 
observations in the control sample have the same value for these variables. 
 
Consistent with the matching criteria, there is little difference in either the market 
capitalisation or trading activity between the treatment and control samples. The 
average market capitalisation of the firms in the treatment sample is $3.44 billion 
while for the control sample it is $3.51 billion. The average traded volume for the 
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treatment sample is 426,300 shares while for the control sample it is 432,000 shares. 
The average score is 0.07 indicating that the cumulative difference over the three 
matching criteria is small. Overall, the control sample is a reasonable match to the 
treatment sample. 
 
As a first test to determine the overall difference between the control and treatment 
samples the following restricted regression is estimated: 
 
  
1 2 3
4
ln( ) ln( ) ln( . .)
ln( )
volume price change std dev specialist
days
α β β β
β ε
= + + +
+ +
        (4.6) 
 
for the entire sample and for each sample of control and treatment samples. This 
regression omits the variables ln(penalty) and direct insider, since these variables 
exhibit zero variability (and therefore, perfect multicollinearity) for the control 
sample. The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4.7.  
 
For the treatment sample, the results are broadly similar to those reported in Table 
4.5. The value of the information and the number of days till the announcement date 
both have a positive effect on traded volume. Greater variability of asset returns and 
trading with a specialist have a negative effect on traded volume. In contrast, the 
results of the treatment sample indicate that greater changes in price of the asset have 
a negative correlation with traded volume, while the standard deviation of returns has 
a positive correlation with traded volume. The coefficient on specialist is negative but 
not significant at the 5% level. Only the coefficient on ln(days) exhibits the same sign 
and significance as in the treatment sample. A Chow test is estimated to ascertain 
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whether the regression coefficients of the control sample exhibit overall similarity to 
the treatment sample. The F-statistic is 54.27, which rejects the null hypothesis of 
overall similarity between the samples at the 1% level. This provides evidence that the 
relationship between volume and the determinants is materially different between the 
control and treatment samples and lends greater support to the initial findings. 
 
Table 4.7 
Comparison of insider trades to non-insider trades 
This table presents the results of the following regression: 
1 2 3
4
ln( ) ln( ) ln( . .)
ln( )
volume price change std dev specialist
days
α β β β
β ε
= + + +
+ +
 
The first column presents the results of the regression using the primary sample of 296 trade packages. 
The second column presents the results of the regression using a sample of trades matched to the 
primary sample. The matching procedure involves finding information announcements with similar 
price, volume and market capitalisation characteristics for the stock. 
Variable Treatment Control 
Intercept -4.63 
(-11.60)* 
-5.95 
(-22.67)* 
ln(price change) 0.27 
(2.23)** 
-0.31 
(-4.22)* 
ln(std. dev.) -1.17 
(-7.52)* 
0.48 
(5.06)* 
Specialist -0.62 
(-2.52)** 
-0.38 
(-1.70) 
ln(days) 0.20 
(2.03)** 
0.39 
(4.26)* 
Sum of squared residuals 1211.61 976.34 
F-Stat 21.17* 14.40* 
Adj. R2 21.48% 15.51% 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
 
As a second test the following cross-sectional regression is estimated on the combined 
sample of treatment and control observations: 
 
1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
ln( ) ln( ) ln( . .)
ln( ) * ln( )*
* ln( )*
i
i
i i
volume price change std dev specialist
days D price change D
specialist D days D
α β β β
β β β
β β ε
= + + +
+ + +
+ + +
        (4.7) 
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where D is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the trade is part of the treatment 
sample and zero otherwise. Effectively these coefficients identify the incremental 
effect that a covariate has on volume if the trade is an illegal insider trade. The results 
are presented in column one of Table 4.8.  
 
Table 4.8 
Comparison of insider trades to non-insider trades II 
This table reports the results of several regressions. The first regression specification is: 
1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
ln( ) ln( ) ln( . .)
ln( ) ln( )* *
ln( )* ln( )* *
i
i i
i
volume price change std dev specialist
days D price change D specialist D
days D penalty D direct insider D
α β β β
β β β β
β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
 
which is estimated on a sample representing 296 insider trading packages and a control sample of 
trades matched on announcement type, market capitalisation of security, traded volume and price.  
 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
There are several important findings. Firstly, the results reinforce the initial 
conclusions with respect to the price change variable. The coefficient on ln(price 
change) * D is positive, 0.57, and significant at the 1% level which indicates that 
Variable All  Matched pairs involving only one trade by insider 
Intercept -5.95 (-21.48)* 
-5.85 
(-18.97)* 
ln(price_change) -0.31 (-4.00)* 
-0.36 
(-3.94)* 
ln(std. dev.) 0.48 (4.79)* 
0.47 
(4.08)* 
Specialist -0.38 (-1.61) 
-0.36 
(-1.29) 
ln(days) 0.39 (4.03)* 
0.35 
(3.14)* 
D 1.32 (2.80)* 
1.19 
(2.30)** 
ln(price_change) * D 0.57 (4.18)* 
0.55 
(3.60)* 
ln(std. dev)*D -1.64 (-9.22)* 
-1.67 
(-8.18)* 
Specialist * D -0.24 (-0.73) 
-0.44 
(-1.15) 
ln(days) * D -0.19 (-1.38) 
-0.18 
(-1.18) 
n 592 436 
F-statistic 32.56* 30.24* 
Adj. R2 37.06% 34.62% 
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insiders respond to greater expected returns by increasing their traded volume. This 
outcome stems from the fact that randomly selected trades exhibit a significant 
negative relationship between trade size and absolute price change following the 
announcement. This is to be expected given that there is likely to be a positive 
relationship between absolute price change and share price and, in the course of 
normal trading, there is a negative relationship between share price and trade size.  
 
The second important finding is that the coefficient on ln(std. dev.) * D is negative 
and significant, consistent with the initial findings of Section 4.4. Perhaps the most 
surprising aspect of this result is that the control trades do not exhibit a negative 
relationship between asset variability and volume. This finding is somewhat at odds 
with standard portfolio theory, though it is important to note that the proxy for asset 
return variability (standard deviation) contains both the idiosyncratic and systematic 
components of risk, whereas portfolio theory only describes the relationship between 
systematic risk and overall position in a security. Importantly, in the period just before 
a significant stock specific information announcement, like a merger, it is reasonable 
to expect that the standard deviation of asset returns will primarily describe 
idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk. Therefore, the relationship between standard 
deviation and volume is uncertain ex ante and a finding of a positive correlation 
between the variables is not completely antithetical to portfolio theory. 
 
Thirdly, the results indicate that the two variables which proxy for the detection 
function, specialist and ln(days), are not incrementally significant for insider trades 
beyond what would be expected of normal trades. The coefficient on the specialist * 
D variable is however, in the expected direction and the total effect of trading by 
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insiders in a specialist market (-0.38 + -0.24) is significant. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient on ln(days)*D is insignificantly different from zero, which suggests that 
the strong positive relationship between trade size and days to announcement 
documented in Section 4.4 is consistent with all types of trading, not just that of 
illegal insiders. While, few studies, if any, examine the relationship between trade size 
and days to announcement,76 a large body of literature documents significant price 
increases before mergers and earnings announcements (e.g. Keown and Pinkerton, 
1981; Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Morse, 1981). The 
slight positive relationship between trade size and days to announcement, therefore, 
might be explained by a general negative relationship between trade size and share 
price, and an increase in share price prior to the announcement. The net effect is that 
the significance of the initial finding is totally removed given that randomly selected 
trades also exhibit a similar positive relationship between the size of trades and days 
to announcement.  
 
Fourthly, it appears that illegal insiders trade far larger quantities than non-insider 
traders, even when controlling for the additional determinants. The coefficient on the 
dummy variable is 1.32 and significant at conventional levels. This result, however, 
might be driven by the fact that the dependent variable for the treatment sample might 
represent multiple trades in a security77, whereas the randomly selected trades of the 
control sample represent only one trade in a security. More broadly speaking, this 
feature might affect the preceding results since the dependent variable is biased 
                                               
76
 However, many studies examine the changes in total volume prior to merger announcements and 
typically find significant increases in volume as the announcement day approaches (e.g. Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989; Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; Schwert, 1996; Jayaraman, Frye and Sabherwal, 2001; 
Cao, Chen and Griffin; 2005). 
77
 However, 219 observations, or approximately 74% of the treatment sample involve only one trade 
and 262 observations or 89% of the sample involve one or two trades. 
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upwards for the treatment sample. To further ensure the robustness of the results, the 
analysis is re-run with a sample that only includes those insider trading packages 
involving one trade in the security. There are 219 such observations in the treatment 
sample. The results are presented in column two of Table 4.8. The results of this 
analysis are not materially different from that discussed previously. 
 
The results of this section indicate that the determinants of non-insider volume are not 
the same in an overall sense to the determinants of insider volume. This is evidenced 
by a Chow test which strongly rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients of Equation 
4.6 are the same for the treatment and control samples. However, in a combined 
regression the results indicate that the variables which proxy for the detection function 
do not influence the volume traded by insiders any more than they would influence 
the volume traded by non-insiders.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
This study is the first empirical research of illegal insider trading to examine the 
determinants of the volume traded by individuals who choose to commit this crime. 
Building upon the initial insights of Becker (1968) a model is developed which 
predicts that the volume traded by an insider is positively related to the value of their 
information and negatively related to the expected penalty. Furthermore, the model 
predicts that the volume traded by insiders is negatively related to the idiosyncratic 
risk of the asset for which they have non-public information. 
 
The predictions of the model are tested on a sample of illegal insider trading cases 
drawn from the SEC website. Results indicate that there is a positive relation between 
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subsequent price change in a security and the volume traded by insiders. The results 
also indicate that there is a negative relationship between imposed sanction and 
volume. This suggests that insiders trade off the costs and benefits associated with 
utilising their illegal information. Illegal insider traders are also sensitive to variability 
in asset returns and trade less as the value of their stock specific information becomes 
less precise. This is an interesting result since it suggests that, despite expectations, 
insiders do not possess information (or perceive that they possess information) that is 
completely certain. 
 
The analysis also indicates that insiders trade less as the announcement day 
approaches and if they have a close connection through employment to the firm 
undertaking the information announcement. These initial results provide evidence that 
insiders tend to trade less as the announcement day approaches and also when they 
trade in specialist markets but the results of a final robustness test suggest that this 
phenomenon is typical of all trades in securities before an information announcement, 
not just for insider traders. As such, future research in this area might consider what 
determinants appropriately proxy for the probability of detection of illegal insider 
trading. 
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4.A. Appendix  
Proposition 1. Assume ),(~1 2σµ ∆+= Nzr  and ( ) exp( ); 0U rz rzλ λ= − − >  
, ( ) (0)exp( )P s P sv=  and c is the fixed detection cost expressed as a return. 
 
Then the optimal traded volume, s, is given by 
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maximising this with respect to s is equivalent to minimising –V(s) or ln( ( ))V s− or 
maximising ln( ( ))V s− −  so 
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This is clearly non-linear in s but we can approximate the last term by Taylor’s series 
first on exp(x) and then on ln(1 )x+ : 
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QED. 
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Chapter 5: Does Broker Anonymity Hide Informed 
Traders? 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The literature reviewed in Section 2.3.4 reveals that while the issue of broker 
anonymity in electronic markets has received considerable attention, the predominant 
research focus is limited to the effects of anonymity on market quality. Broker 
anonymity, however, may also affect the market beyond altering liquidity. The 
purpose of this essay is to examine how broker anonymity influences the transmission 
of information in securities markets. This study examines the change that occurred on 
the ASX on 28 November, 2005 when pre- and post-trade broker identifiers were 
removed from trading screens of the ASX. As noted previously, this study 
investigates the ability of informed traders to remain undetected in the lead up to 
takeover announcements and is the first study of broker anonymity to examine periods 
of large information asymmetry. This study provides three pieces of evidence that 
informed traders remain less detected after the switch to broker anonymity – a result 
which has important policy implications for market regulators deciding whether or not 
to reveal broker identifiers around trade. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the theory 
concerning the detection of informed trading and related hypotheses. Section 5.3 
provides institutional detail on the market structure of the ASX and the exact changes 
to broker identification that occurred on 28 November, 2005. Section 5.3 also 
describes the data used in this study. In Section 5.4 the results of the analysis are 
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presented. Section 5.5 includes additional tests, while Section 5.6 presents the 
conclusions of the study. 
 
 5.2. Hypothesis development 
In this section, three hypotheses are outlined which allow for the determination of 
whether informed traders are more hidden after the removal of broker identifiers. 
These three hypotheses relate to the three metrics of informed trading discussed in 
Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. The first hypothesis relates to permanent price impact, 
and how an investigation of this metric at the broker level reveals the extent to which 
the identifier is used to distinguish informed and uninformed traders. The second 
hypothesis relates to the bid-ask spread and how this measure reflects informed 
trading in an electronic market where all traders can provide liquidity. Thirdly, the 
price impact of order imbalances and its connection with informed trading is 
discussed.  
 
5.2.1. Dispersion in broker level permanent price impact 
The price impact of a trade can be divided into two components: transitory and 
permanent (Kraus and Stoll, 1972). The transitory component measures the price 
impact associated with temporary liquidity constraints at the time of the trade. In 
contrast, the permanent component measures the longer lasting price impact of the 
trade. For this dissertation, the metric of interest is the permanent component of price 
impact because it can be used to ascertain the market’s assessment of the information 
content of that order. Since broker identifiers are attached to all orders in the 
transparent regime, but not in the anonymous regime, a comparison of permanent 
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price impact across regimes provides some insight into the information content of the 
identifiers, if any. 
 
Consider two brokers, one which is perceived by the market to execute trades from 
informed traders, broker I and another broker U, which executes trades from 
uninformed investors. In terms of real world examples, broker I could fit the 
description of an institutional broker and broker U could be a discount internet broker 
catering mainly for retail investors. All other things being equal, the trades executed 
by broker I will have greater permanent price impact than those of broker U. Now 
consider the case where the market cannot identify the broker behind each trade and 
thus cannot use the incremental signalling value it provides. In this case, all other 
things being equal, the trades of broker I and broker U should have the same 
perceived information content and thus the same permanent price impact. Therefore, 
in the transparent regime, assuming the broker identifiers have some informational 
value, the dispersion in the average permanent price impact across brokers should be 
higher than in the anonymous regime. On the other hand, if the broker identifiers have 
no value then the dispersion should be similar across the regimes. By definition, if 
broker identifiers have informational value then the absence of these identifiers means 
that informed traders are more hidden after the change to anonymity. Therefore, an 
investigation of the dispersion in permanent price impact furthers the overall aim of 
this study – namely, whether the removal of broker identifiers hides informed traders. 
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Hypothesis5.1: In the lead up to takeover announcements the dispersion in permanent 
price impact across brokers is narrower after the switch to anonymity.78 
 
5.2.2. Bid-ask spread 
It is well established that the bid-ask spread incorporates the risk associated with 
trading with an informed trader (Bagehot, 1971). Therefore, the magnitude of the bid-
ask spread should be an increasing function of the probability of informed trading in 
the market (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and 
O’Hara, 1987). However, this relationship breaks down when liquidity providers and 
dealers incorrectly assess the probability of informed trading or at the extreme, fail to 
discern the presence of informed traders whatsoever. For example, Fishe and Robe 
(2004) show that NASDAQ dealers did not widen bid-ask spreads in the presence of 
trading by those who had foreknowledge of the influential Business Week stock 
analysis column, ‘Inside Wall Street’. Therefore, assuming informed traders are active 
in a market, one can examine bid-ask spreads to determine the extent to which other 
market participants have detected informed traders. Indeed, Garfinkel and 
Nimalendram (2003) use bid-ask spreads as a means to determine the extent to which 
traders are recognised as informed on the NYSE compared to the NASDAQ.  
 
The above reasoning applies when informed traders act as liquidity demanders in a 
market. However, the model outlined in Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007) shows 
that in electronic order driven markets, the bid-ask spread is still a useful indicator of 
uninformed liquidity suppliers’ beliefs concerning the presence of informed liquidity 
suppliers. Whether informed traders demand or supply liquidity, it is hypothesised 
                                               
78
 Note this hypothesis does not require identification of which broker identifiers are associated with 
informed traders and which ones are not. 
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that, if informed traders are able to conceal their informed status as a result of broker 
anonymity, then other liquidity suppliers should factor in a lower adverse selection 
cost component into the spread and hence bid-ask spreads should fall. 
 
Hypothesis5..2: The bid-ask spread of target firms in the lead up to the takeover 
announcement is lower in the anonymous broker regime. 
 
5.2.3. Order imbalance and returns 
The third metric used to determine the extent to which informed traders are detected is 
the relationship between order imbalances and returns. Order imbalance is a measure 
of excess buyer over seller initiated trading in a given period. Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara 
and Paperman (1996) formalise the intuition that this measure can be used to ascertain 
the extent of informed trading in markets. Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005) show that 
contemporaneous and lagged order imbalances are positively related to stock returns 
prior to takeover announcements, providing empirical evidence that order imbalances 
are a manifestation of information transmission in markets.  
 
Before outlining the hypothesis, it is important to note the inferential differences 
between order imbalances in a specialist or dealer market compared to a completely 
order driven market. At the most basic level, order imbalances are equivalent in either 
market structure – order imbalances measure the difference between liquidity 
demanded by buyers over liquidity demanded by sellers of securities. The primary 
difference between the markets is that in order driven markets public traders, rather 
than dealers, provide the liquidity. As such, there is an argument to suggest that the 
term order imbalance, in the context of order driven markets, is a misnomer and 
 180 
therefore uninformative, since ‘for every buyer there is also a seller’. This view is not 
adopted in this study, but it is important to note the difference in interpretation of 
order imbalances in an order driven market vis-à-vis specialist or dealer markets. 
 
In an order driven market, order imbalance represents the magnitude of excess buy 
market orders over sell market orders. This metric is not completely uncorrelated with 
the extent of informed trading in the market, since it can be argued that informed 
traders are more likely to use market orders, rather than limit orders, to rapidly utilise 
their information before others trade on the same information (Conroy and Winkler, 
1981; Glosten, 1994; Harris, 2003). This might be particularly the case in the period 
leading up to takeover announcements where it is likely that a larger group of 
individuals (employees of the target, the bidder and the corporate and legal advisors 
for both parties) possess the price sensitive information, compared to announcements 
for a single company (such as earnings announcements for example). If market orders 
are in general correlated with informed trading during the periods analysed in this 
study, and broker anonymity impairs the discovery of informed traders then this can 
manifest itself in two ways within the order imbalance-return relationship. Firstly, for 
a given return, if uninformed traders cannot discern which trades are informed then 
they are less likely to trade in the same direction as informed traders, reducing the 
level of order imbalance. Alternatively, for a given order imbalance, trades by 
informed individuals should incur a smaller permanent price impact if anonymity 
means that the market does not correctly interpret the information content of their 
trades. In either case, the correlation between order imbalance and returns should be 
weaker when informed traders are hidden due to broker anonymity.  
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Hypothesis5.3: In the lead up to a takeover announcement, the relationship between 
order imbalances and returns for target firms is weaker in the anonymous broker 
regime. 
 
5.3. Institutional detail and data 
The ASX operates a centralised electronic limit order book similar to other prominent 
exchanges in Europe (e.g. Euronext) and Asia (e.g. Tokyo Stock Exchange, Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange and Korea Stock Exchange). The market opens with a call 
auction and thereafter all trading is conducted via a continuous order driven auction, 
until the close of the day when another call auction is used to set the closing price. 
During normal trading, brokers submit orders with size and price conditions which are 
matched with an order(s) on the opposite side of the book, if possible, otherwise they 
remain in the limit order book. Orders with the most competitive price are executed 
first and where prices are the same, orders that were submitted first have precedence. 
Prior to 28 November, 2005 brokers were able to see broker identifiers of other limit 
orders as well as the broker counter parties to a trade after a transaction occurred. 
Since the change to an anonymous regime, all pre-trade identifiers have been 
removed. In terms of post-trade information, participants can obtain, for a fee, an 
aggregated summary of each broker’s transactions after the close of trading. The 
summary provides the total volume per broker per security traded on that day. 
Complete trade by trade broker counterparty information, formerly reported 
immediately after the trade, is now only available three trading days after the initial 
transaction. The purpose of this study is to investigate how this change in the 
disclosure of pre- and post-trade broker identifiers allows informed traders to conceal 
themselves from other market participants. This research investigates the ability of the 
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market to detect informed trading in the forty days prior to takeover announcements 
announced two years either side of the transparency shift on 28 November, 2005. 
 
A list of merger and takeover announcements is obtained from Thomson DataStream 
and supplemented by another list obtained from Bloomberg. To ensure the cleanliness 
of the pre-announcement period, where a firm has been the subject of multiple 
takeover offers, only the first announcement in the list is considered.  
 
The intraday trade and quote data used in this study is obtained from two sources: the 
Securities Institute Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) and the internal database 
of the ASX. Both data sets include the price, size and time of every trade for each 
firm in the sample. Trades that occur during the opening and closing call auctions are 
excluded from the sample. The SIRCA data set provides best quotes that prevailed 
immediately before each trade (required for the calculation of trade direction), while 
the ASX data provides the broker counterparties to each trade. The SIRCA data set 
covers a period that allows analysis of all takeover announcements made two years 
either side of the transparency change – 28 November, 2003 to 28 November, 2007.79 
This dataset is used to test Hypothesis 5.2 and Hypothesis 5.3. The data set sourced 
internally from the ASX covers only one year either side of the change, 28 November, 
2004 to 28 November, 2006. This data set is merged with the SIRCA data set and is 
used to test Hypothesis 5.1. 
 
If a trade is executed at the prevailing ask price (or greater if the order walks up the 
book) then the trade is classified as buyer-initiated. Seller-initiated trades are 
                                               
79
 The actual data set sourced from SIRCA spans a period slightly longer than four years, since the 
analysis also requires 150 days of trading data prior to the announcement in order to calculate various 
benchmarks for volume and returns. 
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classified in a similar way. Unlike studies conducted in U.S. markets, trade 
classification via an algorithm, such as Lee and Ready (1991), is unnecessary since 
the structure of the ASX requires that trades are executed against existing standing 
limit orders. Therefore, there is less ambiguity with respect to whether a trade is 
buyer- or seller-initiated, with all trades classified accurately. 
 
The primary period of analysis for this study is the 40 days prior to the takeover 
announcement not including the day of the takeover announcement (hereafter, the 
‘pre-announcement period’). However, intraday trading data up to 150 days prior to 
the announcement is also required to determine benchmark metrics for the calculation 
of abnormal volume and returns. The benchmark period in this analysis is from days 
t=-50 to t=-150, where t=0 is the day of the announcement.  A target firm is purged 
from the sample if it does not have at least 20 days of trading during the pre-
announcement period or at least 50 days of trading during the benchmark period. Ten 
firms whose pre-announcement period spans both the transparent and anonymous 
regimes are excluded from the main analysis. These firms are kept aside for an 
additional robustness test to ascertain whether the observed results are caused by the 
switch to anonymity or by broader market trends. After all filters are applied, this 
leaves a total of 258 takeover targets over the period 28 November, 2003 to 28 
November, 2007. Of this final sample 95 were announced in the transparent broker 
regime and 163 announcements occurred in the anonymous broker regime. For the 
restricted ASX sample used to test Hypothesis 5.1, there are 178 takeover targets, 68 
in the transparent regime and 110 in the anonymous regime. 
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Table 5.1 
Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the takeover targets in the sample. Market capitalisation is the average 
daily market capitalisation of the firm during the ‘benchmark period’ (days t = -150 to t = -50 where the 
announcement date is t = 0). Daily trading volume is the average daily number of shares traded in the firm’s stock 
during the ‘pre-announcement’ period (days t = -40 to t = -1). Trade Size is the average size of each trade during 
the pre-announcement period. Daily volatility is the average daily value of ( ) / ( ) 2High Low High Low− + ÷  for 
each firm. Pre-announcement return is the simple return over the pre-announcement period. Post-announcement 
return is the return from days t = 0 to t = 2. 
Panel A: All takeovers (n=258) Mean Median Max Min Std Dev 
Market capitalisation (pre-runup, $millions) 736.65 112.85 15893.96 2.12 1780.48 
Daily trading volume ('000s shares) 2610.10 968.04 34799.58 2.79 47840.80 
Trade size (‘000s shares) 13.31 6.96 180.94 0.14 21.11 
Daily volatility (%) 3.31 3.00 12.68 0.61 1.73 
Pre-announcement return (%) 6.61 4.68 121.30 -80.52 20.63 
Post-announcement return (%) 9.10 4.77 79.37 -14.99 14.00 
Panel B: Transparent Regime (n=95)  Mean Median Max Min Std Dev 
Market capitalisation (pre-runup, $millions) 686.44 140.81 7408.82 6.52 1373.95 
Daily trading volume ('000s shares) 2465.07 1157.61 29926.35 2.79 4279.17 
Trade size 13.90 8.42 117.35 0.63 19.41 
Daily volatility 2.98 2.70 12.68 0.80 1.71 
Pre-announcement return (%) 7.26 3.12 121.30 -80.52 21.44 
Post-announcement return (%) 8.11 2.56 79.37 -14.68 14.22 
Panel C: Anonymous Regime (n=163) Mean Median Max Min Std Dev 
Market capitalisation (pre-runup, $millions) 765.92 106.80 15893.96 2.12 1982.78 
Daily trading volume ('000s shares) 2694.62 806.54 34799.58 4.32 5067.10 
Trade size 12.96 6.10 180.94 0.14 22.09 
Daily volatility 3.51 3.26 9.14 0.61 1.72 
Pre-announcement return (%) 6.23 5.54 89.33 -50.49 20.20 
Post-announcement return (%) 9.96 6.34 54.19 -14.99 13.56 
 
Summary statistics of the target firms for the entire sample are presented in Table 5.1. 
The statistics indicate that the nature of the takeover firms is not materially different 
between the two sample periods. The mean value for market capitalisation of the 
firms (calculated by taking the average daily market capitalisation in the benchmark 
period) is reasonably similar between the regimes, taking the value of $686.44 million 
in the transparent environment compared to $765.92 million in the anonymous 
environment. This is important since firm size is correlated with a number of 
important metrics such as the level of informed trading (Hasbrouck, 1991), the bid-
ask spread (Roll, 1984) and the magnitude of the stock price to volume relationship 
(Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk, 2002). This makes it less likely that results are driven 
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by differences in the characteristics of the firms across the two regimes. The daily 
pre-announcement traded volume during both periods is similar, with a mean value of 
2,465,070 shares in the transparent regime compared to 2,694,620 shares in the 
anonymous regime. Again, this is a reassuring statistic since overall trading activity is 
a known determinant of bid-ask spreads (Demsetz, 1968; McInish and Wood, 1992) 
and price impact (Breen, Hodrick and Korajczyk, 2002). Other potential indicators of 
informed trading such as trade size and volatility are also similar between the two 
trading environments. In the transparent (anonymous) period the mean trade size is 
13,900 (12,960) shares and the average daily volatility is 2.98% (3.51%). 
 
There is a difference in the ratio of pre-announcement and post-announcement stock 
abnormal return before and after the structural change. The ratio between mean pre- to 
post-announcement abnormal returns is higher when broker identifiers are visible 
(0.89) compared to when they are anonymous (0.63). This result provides the first 
indication that informed traders are generally more hidden after the switch to an 
anonymous regime since less of the overall abnormal stock return occurs before the 
announcement is made. This issue is examined with greater rigour in the following 
section by examining bid-ask spreads, the order imbalance to return relationship and 
the dispersion in permanent price impact using univariate and multivariate analyses. 
 
5.4. Empirical results 
5.4.1. Dispersion in permanent price impact across brokers 
This section documents the dispersion in broker level permanent price impact and 
compares this metric between the two regimes. For each buyer-initiated market order 
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in the sample80, indicated by the subscript i, the permanent price impact is calculated 
as: 
 
, 5
i,t=+5 i,t=-5
i
i t
P - P
Permant Price Impact (or PPI ) =
P
=−
             (5.1) 
 
where Pi,t represents the midpoint of the bid-ask spread at time t, which denotes the 
trade relative to the trade of interest Pi,t=0.81 Since an important determinant of price 
impact is the size of the trade, trades are divided into four relative trade size groups. 
This is accomplished by first calculating each stock’s median trade size during the 
pre-announcement period and then comparing each trade to the median value: 
 
 
Trade SizeRelative Trade Size = 
Median Trade Size
                         (5.2) 
 
Trade size groups are defined as follows: Group 1 contains all trades where Relative 
Trade Size (RTS) < 1; Group 2 contains all trades where 1 ≤ RTS < 2; Group 3 
contains all trades where 2 ≤ RTS < 5 and Group 4 contains all trades where RTS ≥ 
5.82 The variable of interest is the average permanent price impact per broker, b, per 
trade size group, g subdivided by the two market structure regimes, denoted by the 
Bernoulli variable d (d=0 for the transparent broker regime): 
                                               
80
 Only buyer-initiated orders are considered to restrict the sample to trades which can be motivated by 
information. An assumption is made that seller initiated trades prior to a takeover announcements are 
not informed trades. 
81
 For robustness, alternative specifications are considered, where the permanent price impact is 
calculated from t=-10 to t=+10, from t=-1 to t=-5 and from t=open to t=close. The conclusions drawn 
from the results of these alternate specifications are not different. Thus only the results from t=-5 to 
t=+5 are presented. 
82
 These values are chosen to approximately represent the following percentile groups: Group 1 – 0 to 
50th percentile; Group 2 – 50th to  75th percentile; Group 3 – 75th to 90th percentile; Group 4 – 90th to 
100th percentile. Other cut-off values are considered with similar results. 
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where 
, ,
( )b g dN i  equals the number of market-order buys initiated by broker b, falling 
into trade size group g, in market structure regime d. The dispersion characteristics of 
this value are compared between different transparency regimes. Two measures of 
dispersion are used. The first measure is the standard deviation (or its square, the 
variance) of average permanent price impact across brokers. Differences between the 
regimes are tested using the traditional F-test for equal variances. 
 
The second measure of dispersion, developed by Fligner and Killeen (1976), is a non-
parametric measure which utilises the ranks of the absolute deviates from the median, 
, ,( )b g b gPPI Median PPI− . Once ranked, the variables are transformed into scores 
according to 
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, where Φ  is the function for the standard 
normal distribution, ( )gN b  is the number of brokers which executed trades of size g 
and 
,b gr is the rank of broker b’s absolute deviate from the median for size group g. 
The Fligner-Killeen (1976) test statistic (FK) is calculated by summing these scores 
across the transparent regime,
, 0( )
,
1
g dN b
g b g
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=
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(1999), the z-approximation of the FK statistic is calculated.83 The Fligner-Killeen 
test is preferred to the traditional F-test for equal variances, since the F-test is very 
sensitive to non-normality (McGrath and Yeh, 2005). Furthermore, the Fligner-
Killeen test accounts for differences in scale of the underlying comparison variables. 
Finally, Donnelly and Kramer (1999) show that the Fligner-Killeen (1976) is superior 
to a number of other tests for equal dispersion in terms of maintaining an appropriate 
balance between Type I and Type II error rates. Nevertheless, the traditional F-test is 
included for completeness. 
 
Table 5.2 
Dispersion in permanent price impact across brokers 
This table reports the standard deviation of permanent price impact across brokers according to the size of 
the trade. The trade size groups are defined as such: Group 1 contains all trades where Relative Trade Size 
(RTS) < 1; Group 2 contains all trades where 1 ≤ RTS < 2; Group 3 contains all trades where 2 ≤ RTS < 5 
and Group 4 contains all trades where RTS ≥ 5 where RTS is defined as the size of the trade divided by the 
median trade size in the pre-announcement period. The table reports the F-statistic for the test of equal 
variances and the z-approximation to the Fligner-Killeen statistic for equal dispersion. Both tests are 
unidirectional tests against a null hypothesis of equal dispersion between the regimes. 
 Transparent Regime  Anonymous Regime Test of Differences 
 Std. deviation 
(bp) 
No. of 
brokers 
Std. deviation 
(bp) 
No. of 
brokers 
F statistic Fligner-Killeen 
statistic 
All 32.34 73 27.72 77 1.36 1.67** 
Group 1 39.95 68 29.34 76 1.86* 1.81** 
Group 2 47.37 70 23.58 75 4.02* 3.09* 
Group 3 46.88 68 25.46 74 3.39* 2.75* 
Group 4 40.77 51 25.01 75 2.66* 1.65** 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
 
Table 5.2 reports the results of both tests for equal dispersion. The results indicate that 
the standard deviation of permanent price impact across brokers experiences a 
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reduction from 32.34 basis points to 27.72 basis points. This reduction is not 
significant at the 5% level based on the traditional F-test (p-value is 0.09) but exhibits 
significance at that level based on the Fligner-Killeen (1976) test. When stratified by 
trade size group, the dispersion of permanent price impact between brokers is lower 
after the switch to broker anonymity. The results are significant at the 1% level for all 
groups except Group 1 and Group 4 under the Fligner-Killeen (1976) test, where the 
test statistics are significant at the 5% level. The greater dispersion in permanent price 
impact across brokers in the transparent regime suggests that broker identifiers have 
incremental signalling value when they are visible to the market in the lead up to 
takeover announcements. 
 
The incremental signalling value appears to be greatest for the intermediate trade size 
groups (Groups 2 and 3) which possess the largest test statistics under both dispersion 
tests. This might be expected given the information asymmetry potential of medium-
sized trades. Barclay and Warner (1993) show that ‘medium sized’ trades rather than 
large trades are perceived by the market to contain the greatest information value, 
though of course, not all medium-sized trades are motivated by information. Indeed 
Chakravaty (2001) shows that it is not medium-sized trades per se that generate 
permanent price movements, but rather, medium-sized trades initiated by institutional 
investors that alert other participants to the presence of informed trading. Given this 
uncertainty for medium-sized trades, it might be possible that the broker identifiers 
are used to distinguish medium-sized trades which originate from institutional 
investors (and are therefore more likely to represent informed trading), against those 
which are less likely information motivated. The data do not allow for an exploration 
of this hypothesis, since the broker identifiers are simply alpha-numerical codes and 
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cannot be linked (by the researcher) to institutional investors. Nevertheless, the results 
of this section suggest that broker identifiers possess informational value. As such, 
informed traders are more concealed after the change to an anonymous broker market. 
 
5.4.2. Bid-ask spread 
Table 5.3 compares the magnitude of bid-ask spreads between the two broker 
identification regimes. Using univariate analysis, there is mixed evidence that spreads 
have declined, and therefore informed traders are less detected, after the switch to 
anonymity. Bid-ask spreads are sampled immediately before each trade for a given 
security in a given day. The volume weighted average of these observations is then 
used as a measure of the stock’s percentage bid-ask spread for that day. After pooling 
these daily measures across all stocks and all days, the mean and median of the daily 
percentage bid-ask spreads are calculated. The results are presented in Table 5.3 as 
well as parametric and non-parametric tests for differences between the regimes. 
Univariate analysis provides mixed evidence for Hypothesis 5.2. Both mean and 
median daily percentage spreads are lower in the post period. The mean (median) 
percentage bid ask spread decreases from 1.70% (1.24%) in the transparent regime to 
1.67% (1.11%) in the anonymous regime. A one way t-test indicates that daily 
percentage bid-ask spreads are not significantly lower at the 5% level after the switch 
to anonymity. However, a non-parametric Wilcoxon two-sample rank sum test 
indicates that daily percentage bid-ask spreads are significantly lower in the 
anonymous period. The z-statistic approximation to the Wilcoxon statistic is 3.87 
which is significant at the 1% level. 
 
 191 
To further investigate the robustness of these univariate results, the change in the 
adverse selection component of the spread is also examined. This analysis is 
performed because the theory underpinning Hypothesis 5.2 is that liquidity suppliers 
are less able to detect informed trading in an anonymous regime and therefore factor 
in a lower adverse selection component into the bid-ask spread. Statistics examining 
total bid-ask spreads might therefore be capturing changes in some other aspect of the 
spread (inventory holding or order processing) that is unrelated to adverse selection 
and as such uninformative about the hypothesis. The adverse selection cost 
component of the bid-ask spread is calculated using the method developed in Lin, 
Sanger and Booth (1995) and subsequently applied to an electronic limit order market 
in Brockman and Chung (1999). The adverse selection component is calculated by 
estimating the following regression for each firm over the entire 40 day pre-
announcement period: 
 
11 ++ +=∆ ttt ezQ λ                  (5.4) 
 
where Q is the natural log of the bid-ask spread midpoint, z is the natural log of the 
difference between the transaction price and the bid-ask spread midpoint and e is a 
normally distributed error term. The coefficient on z, λ,, measures the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread. Table 5.3 presents the calculated values of 
the adverse selection cost component, averaged across the number of firms in the 
respective regime, before and after the switch to broker anonymity. The results 
indicate that the mean (median) adverse selection component decreases from 32.09% 
(32.21%) to 27.26% (26.82%) in the anonymous period. The adverse selection cost 
component is significantly lower at conventional levels when assessed using a t-test or 
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a Wilcoxon two sample rank sum test. The results suggest that informed traders are 
not as easily detected after the removal of broker identifiers since liquidity suppliers 
do not incorporate as large an adverse selection cost component into the bid-ask 
spread. 
Table 5.3 
Bid-ask spreads: Univariate analysis 
This table reports the mean and median of the volume weighted average daily percentage bid-ask spread as 
well as the mean and median adverse selection cost component of the spread.  This table also reports tests of 
the hypothesis that the value in the transparent broker identifier regime is larger than the value in the 
anonymous broker identifier regime (one-tailed test). The difference is tested using a parametric t-test and a 
non-parametric Wilcoxon test. 
 Mean Median Tests for differences 
 Transparent Anonymous Transparent Anonymous T-test Wilcoxon 
Percentage bid-ask 
spreads (%) 
1.71 1.67 1.24 1.11 1.09 3.87* 
Adverse selection 
component (%) 
32.09 27.26 32.21 26.82 2.65* 2.94* 
    * Denotes significance at the 0.01 level 
  ** Denotes significance at the 0.05 level 
 
 
Finally, to ascertain the extent to which informed traders go undetected by liquidity 
suppliers in the market in a multivariate setting the following pooled cross-sectional 
regression is estimated:  
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PBAS is the volume weighted daily proportional bid-ask spread for firm j on day t, 
where as previously, the bid-ask spread is sampled immediately before each trade. 
The dummy variable, D, takes the value 0 during the transparent regime and 1 during 
the anonymous regime. Volume, volatility and market capitalisation variables are also 
included in the regression specification as control variables (McInish and Wood, 
1992). Volume is the firm’s turnover for the day. Volatility is defined as the natural 
log of the day’s price range divided by the closing price. To avoid contamination from 
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the stock run up that occurs during the pre-announcement period, firm size is 
calculated by averaging the daily market capitalisation of the firm over the benchmark 
period. The firms are then ranked and placed into four groups based on quartile 
ranking. The quartile cut-off values are $41.92 million (25th percentile), $112.85 
million (50th percentile), $507.38 million (75th percentile) and $15,894 million (100th 
percentile). In the regression, iγ  is equal to one if the firm is in size quartile i and zero 
otherwise. To correct for possible endogeneity problems, two-stage least squares 
regression is employed where the instrument variables are the lag of the dependant 
variable and the average trade size for stock j on day t (Maher, Swan and Westerholm, 
2008). 
Table 5.4 
Bid-ask spreads: Multivariate analysis 
This table reports the coefficient values and t-statistics in brackets of a two-stage least squares regression of 
daily median percentage bid ask spread on the following variables: D is a dummy variable which takes a value 
of one during the anonymous broker regime and zero otherwise; Volume is the firm’s turnover for the day; 
Volatility is defined as the natural log of the day’s price range divided by the closing price. Size 2nd Q is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if the firm falls within the second quartile of firms by market 
capitalisation and zero otherwise. Size 3rd Q and Size 4th Q are similarly defined. The instrument variables for 
this regression are the lag of the dependant variable and the average trade size for stock j on day t. The 
regression is estimated using daily trading data from the forty days prior to 252 takeover announcements. The 
regression is also estimated using various sample subsets partitioned according to proximity to the 
announcement date. The relevant hypothesis is whether the coefficient on the anonymity switch dummy 
variable is significantly less than zero, i.e. Ha: β < 0. With respect to this alternative hypothesis, all anonymity 
switch dummy variable coefficients reported in this table are significant at the 1% level. 
 Days  -40 to -1 Days -10 to -1 Days -20 to -11 Days -30 to -21 Days -40 to -31 
Intercept 21.12 
(18.16) 
24.85 
(7.45) 
22.89 
(9.71) 
19.82 
(10.31) 
18.73 
(8.01) 
D -1.13 
(-9.27) 
-1.29 
(-3.91) 
-1.00 
(-4.42) 
-0.85 
(-4.45) 
-1.44 
(-5.50) 
Volume -424.56 
(-10.99) 
-566.30 
(-4.71) 
-498.69 
(-5.58) 
-342.95 
(-6.41) 
-362.29 
(-5.33) 
Volatility 4.78 
(14.60) 
(5.80 
(6.51) 
5.31 
(8.12) 
4.67 
(8.29) 
3.83 
(5.50) 
Size 2nd Q -0.45 
(-2.08) 
0.24 
(0.47) 
-0.45 
(-1.13) 
-0.03 
(-0.09) 
-1.30 
(-2.28) 
Size 3rd Q -0.16 
(-0.65) 
0.77 
(1.22) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.36 
(0.78) 
-1.39 
(-2.25) 
Size 4th Q 0.36 
(1.23) 
1.36 
(1.76) 
0.89 
(1.52) 
0.84 
(1.56) 
-1.07 
(-1.57) 
n 8505 2100 2159 2110 2136 
Adj. R2 43.61% 39.98% 36.02% 40.93% 38.12% 
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The results of the regression are presented in Table 5.4. The table reports results based 
on the entire pre-announcement period and for robustness, sub-groups of observations 
according to proximity to the announcement date. 
 
The results indicate that after controlling for volatility, volume and firm market 
capitalisation, during the pre-announcement period, bid-ask spreads are smaller in the 
anonymous broker regime. The coefficient on the anonymity dummy variable is 
negative and significant and indicates that spreads are 113 basis points per trade lower 
when broker identifiers are hidden (Table 5.4, column 1). This suggests that liquidity 
suppliers are not price protecting as aggressively and that informed traders are 
therefore, more concealed after a switch to broker anonymity. 
 
An analysis of the results based on the time to the announcement date indicates that 
this result is robust across the pre-announcement period. The magnitude of the 
coefficient on the dummy variable is greatest in the period furthest away, that is 40 to 
31 days, prior to the announcement (Table 5.4, column 5). The value of the coefficient 
is negative 144 basis points. The results of the three other sub-periods are lower in 
magnitude than this ranging between a reduction of 129 basis points to 85 points. This 
result indicates that in the anonymous market, despite the fact that there is less 
detection of informed trading as indicated by the negative coefficient on the dummy 
variable, the ability of informed traders to remain hidden is lower in the final thirty 
days leading up the announcement compared to the days -40 to -31. This might be 
because other indicators, unrelated to broker identifiers, such as rumours, volume or 
price run-ups reveal the presence of informed traders to the market and these 
indicators are more prevalent closer to the announcement date. Alternatively, it is 
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possible to argue that there is negligible informed trading in the period -40 to -31 
during the anonymous regime and the result in this period is driven not by a lack of 
detection, but a lack of informed trading whatsoever. To ensure the robustness of the 
results, the analysis is re-estimated with only a 30 day pre-announcement window. 
The coefficient on the broker anonymity dummy variable is negative (-1.02) and 
significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the conclusions remain unchanged. 
 
5.4.3. Order imbalance and returns 
This part of the analysis tests the sensitivity of daily returns to contemporaneous order 
imbalances. The following pooled cross-sectional regression is estimated: 
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where Rjt and OIjt represent the standardised beta-adjusted excess return84 and 
standardised order imbalance respectively of firm j on day t, and Dt is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one if the day falls on or after 28 November, 2005 
and zero otherwise. Included within the regression are dummy variables to control for 
the effect that firm size and day of the week might have on excess returns. Finally the 
specification also includes five lags of the dependent variable to control for possible 
autocorrelation in excess returns. Following Cao, Chen and Griffin (2005) both excess 
returns and order imbalances are standardised by the mean and standard deviation of 
the variables over the benchmark period. Specifically, the dependent variable is the 
excess return standardized by the standard deviation of excess returns during the 
                                               
84
 Each firms’ beta is calculated by estimating the market model of returns over the benchmark period.  
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benchmark period. Order imbalance is calculated by first taking the difference 
between the number of buyer-initiated market orders and the number of seller-
initiated market orders for a given day then dividing by the average volume over the 
benchmark period. The variable is then standardised using its mean and standard 
deviation during the benchmark period. The standardisation allows observations from 
different firms, with potentially divergent return and volume characteristics, to be 
more suitably combined in a pooled cross-sectional regression. 
 
Table 5.5 
Order imbalance and returns 
This table reports the coefficients and t-stats, in brackets, of the variables of interest from Equation 5.5. The 
dependent variable is the beta-adjusted daily excess return standardised by the variable’s standard deviation 
over the benchmark period. D is a dummy variable which takes a value of one during the anonymous broker 
regime and zero otherwise. OIjt is the standardised daily order imbalance or the total volume imbalance. The 
relevant hypothesis is whether the coefficient on the interaction variable OIjt * D is significantly less than 
zero, i.e. Ha: β < 0. With respect to this alternative hypothesis, both coefficients of OIjt * D reported in this 
table are significant at the 1% level. 
Variable Order imbalance Volume imbalance 
Intercept 0.018 
(0.06) 
-0.009 
(-0.03) 
D 0.351 
(1.40) 
0.437 
(1.71) 
OIjt 0.244 
(28.90) 
0.327 
(26.98) 
OIjt * D -0.032 
(-2.59) 
-0.193 
(-13.52) 
n 8116 8116 
Adjusted R2 14.73% 11.43% 
 
The results of the regression are presented in Table 5.5. The results indicate that in 
both regimes greater order imbalance leads to larger returns. The coefficient on OIjt is 
positive and significant at 0.351 which indicates that when order imbalance is one 
standard deviation greater than its benchmark, mean excess returns are 0.351 standard 
deviations greater than zero. This result is consistent with the notion that excess 
buying conveys positive information about the firm. However, as indicated by the 
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coefficient on the interaction variable OIjt*D, -0.032, this relationship is significantly 
weaker when broker identifiers are anonymous. During the anonymous broker regime 
vis-à-vis the transparent market, similar levels of order imbalance do not lead to as 
large a price movement in target firms prior to the takeover announcement. This 
might be because, for a given return, other traders do not trade as much in the same 
direction as informed traders or, for a given imbalance, there is a lower permanent 
price impact after buying (or both). In any case, it appears that the market does not 
respond as strongly to trading which suggests that a takeover announcement is 
imminent, after the removal of broker identifiers. To test the robustness of these 
results the same regression is estimated using total volume imbalance, rather than 
order imbalance (which disregards the magnitude of the trades). The results based on 
volume imbalance provide corroborating evidence that the switch to an anonymous 
broker market impairs the ability of the market to detect informed trading. 
 
5.5. Additional tests 
One argument that can be made against any research that investigates the effects of a 
one-off change to market structure is that the results could be driven by broader 
market trends over the sample period rather than being directly related to the 
structural change.85 Applied specifically to this study, this argument questions 
whether the results of the preceding analysis are driven by the change in broker 
anonymity or, alternatively, gradual changes to the various metrics being analysed. 
For example, it is well accepted that bid-ask spreads decrease over time, casting doubt 
over the results presented in Section 5.4.  
 
                                               
85
 See Majois (2007) for a critique of natural experiments methodology. 
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A second criticism that can be laid against the findings in Section 5.4 is that the 
results indicate a reduction in informed trading, rather than impaired detection. For 
example, the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads might be lower in the 
anonymous regime because there are less informed traders, not because the market 
has become less efficient at detecting informed traders. This might occur because the 
market information asymmetry is decreasing over time, or there is something 
particular about the takeovers in the anonymous regime, relative to the transparent 
regime, that lends itself to having less information asymmetry. One counter argument 
to this supposition is that the ex ante expectation of increased broker anonymity is 
greater information asymmetry rather than less. Indeed Rindi’s (2008) model of 
information acquisition and transparency predicts that broker anonymity is correlated 
with more informed traders, since the benefits of becoming informed are larger in an 
anonymous market. Therefore, if any bias exists it is likely to be directed against the 
findings of this essay. This however, is only a theoretical objection.  
 
To address both criticisms empirically, the ten firms whose 40 day pre-announcement 
period straddles the change to an anonymous regime on 28 November, 2005 are 
examined. These firms were excluded from the original analysis. The sample period 
of this subset of firms is 71 trading days from 11 October, 2005 to 20 January, 2006. 
The rationale for analysing this sample is that these firms span the shortest possible 
time frame for which there is still variation in the transparency of broker identifiers, 
thereby minimising the effect of any gradual improvement in liquidity while still 
making it possible to perform the analyses conducted in Section 5.4.  
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In terms of the second criticism, it is expected that the level of information asymmetry 
within a particular event is relatively constant throughout the pre-announcement 
period. At the very least, the intra-event variation in information asymmetry is likely 
to be less than inter-event variations in information asymmetry. As such, analysing 
these ten firms minimises the possibility that the results are driven by changes in the 
level of information asymmetry. 
 
As per the analysis in Section 5.4, the dispersion in permanent price impact across 
brokers is calculated for this robustness sample. Since the number of firms is much 
smaller than the main analysis, there are many brokers which only execute a handful 
of trades in these ten securities. To ensure that there is an appropriate representation 
of the average information content of a given broker’s trades, brokers who execute 
less than 15 trades in these ten securities are not considered for analysis. This leaves a 
total of 20 active brokers in the transparent regime and 18 in the anonymous regime. 
When not stratified by trade size, the standard deviation of permanent price impact 
across brokers falls from 43.40 basis points to 19.81 basis points. This implies an F-
statistic of 4.79 which is significant at the 1% level. In the Fligner-Killeen (1976) test 
for equal dispersion, the z-approximation to FK-statistic is 1.77 which is significant at 
the 5% level.86 These results validate the findings of the initial analysis and provide 
evidence that the results are not driven by broader market trends or differences in the 
takeover targets before and after the anonymity switch. 
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 The analysis is also performed with stratification on trade size, though the statistical tests lack power 
due to the very small number of observations. When stratified into two trade size groups divided at RTS 
= 1, the sample size pairs for (transparent, anonymous) are (11,11) and (12,13) for the small and large 
trade size group respectively. Nevertheless, the standard deviation for the small group falls from 47.21 
basis points to 32.91 basis points, while for the large trade size group the standard deviation falls from 
32.98 to 17.89. The F-statistics implied by these values are 2.06 and 3.40 respectively, the latter of 
which is significant at the 5% level. The corresponding (raw) Fligner-Killeen test statistics are 11.68 
and 13.78 respectively. While still in the expected direction these values are not significant at 
conventional levels. 
 200 
To ensure the robustness of the bid-ask spread analysis Equation 5.5 is re-estimated, 
the results of which are presented in Table 5.6. While estimated on a small 
independent sample of firms, the results are reasonably similar to the main analysis. 
The coefficient on the anonymity change dummy variable indicates that this sample 
experiences an 83 basis point reduction in bid-ask spreads after a switch to broker 
anonymity compared to a 113 basis point reduction for the main sample. This result is 
significant at the 5% level, when tested against the hypothesis that the coefficient is 
less than zero. Given the proximity of the sub-sample sample to the anonymity 
switch, this indicates that the concealment effect of informed trades appears to have 
occurred immediately or very soon after the change. The results of this robustness test 
suggest that broader improvements to market quality are not driving the results of the 
main analysis. 
 
Table 5.6 
Additional test for bid-ask spreads 
This table reports the results of regression Equation 5.5, where the regression is estimated using a 
sample of ten firms whose pre-announcement period includes the date of the transparency change. The 
relevant alternative hypothesis is whether the coefficient on the anonymity switch dummy variable is 
significantly less than zero, i.e. Ha: β < 0.  
 Coefficient T-stat 
Intercept 11.36 5.92 
D -0.83 -2.33 
Volatility 2.37 4.28 
Volume -399.72 -4.19 
Size 2nd Q -0.48 -1.00 
Size 3rd Q -0.27 -0.71 
Size 4th Q -0.78 -1.32 
n 313  
Adj. R2 34.56%  
 
The regression of order imbalance and returns is re-estimated using the observations 
of those firms whose pre-announcement period straddles the change on 28 November, 
2005. The results are presented in Table 5.7. The coefficients on the variables of 
interest are similar to those in the main analysis. Excess returns are significantly 
 201 
positively related to order imbalance with a coefficient of 0.688 and also total volume 
imbalance which has a coefficient of 0.549. The coefficient on the interaction variable 
is negative at -0.135 and -0.110 for order imbalance and total volume imbalance 
respectively. This indicates that after the switch to anonymity the relationship 
between returns and imbalances is weaker, a finding which reconfirms Hypothesis 
5.3. The results of this robustness test indicate that informed traders appear to be 
better hidden after the switch to anonymity and this finding is not driven by a secular 
change in the relationship between returns and imbalances over time. 
 
Table 5.7 
Additional test for order imbalance and returns 
This table reports the results of the regression Equation 5.6 where the regression is estimated using a sample 
of ten firms whose pre-announcement period includes the date of the transparency change. Coefficient values 
are presented with t-values presented in brackets. The relevant hypothesis is whether the coefficient on the 
interaction variable OIjt * D is significantly less than zero, i.e. Ha: β < 0.  
Variable Order imbalance Volume imbalance 
Intercept -1.497 
(-1.47) 
0.389 
(0.40) 
D 2.483 
(2.04) 
0.648 
(0.55) 
OIjt 0.688 
(13.44) 
0.549 
(15.50) 
OIjt * D -0.135 
(-1.93) 
-0.123 
(-2.38) 
n 303 303 
Adjusted R2 52.17% 55.48% 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This essay presents three pieces of evidence that show that, in the lead up to takeover 
announcements, informed traders are more concealed, and therefore, better off after 
broker identifiers were removed from the electronic trading screen at the ASX on 28 
November, 2005. Firstly, the dispersion in permanent price impact of trades across 
brokers is significantly lower after the change. This suggests that the market used the 
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identifiers to help distinguish informed from uninformed trades during the transparent 
regime. Put differently, the results suggest that broker identifiers have informational 
value. The fact that they have been removed indicates that informed traders are more 
concealed after the transparency change.  
 
Secondly, it is shown that after the removal of broker identifiers bid-ask spreads are 
significantly lower in the days leading up to a takeover announcement. This suggests 
that liquidity suppliers are not engaging in as much price protection compared to 
when identifiers were revealed. Indeed, the adverse selection component of the spread 
falls significantly in the anonymous regime suggestive of the fact that informed 
traders remain less detected by the market. Finally, an analysis of the relationship 
between returns and order imbalances shows that while there is a positive relationship 
between the two variables, the relationship is weaker in the anonymous broker 
regime. Again, this suggests that the market is not able to detect informed traders as 
readily when broker identifiers are concealed. 
 
The results have important policy implications for exchange officials of electronic 
markets considering whether to reveal or hide the identities of brokers surrounding 
trades. Evidence from prior literature indicates that the concealment of identifiers is 
correlated with lower bid-ask spreads. However, the results of this study indicate that 
bid-ask spreads remain lower, even when a significant information announcement is 
pending. Taken together the research suggests that the removal of broker identifiers 
has a mixed effect for uninformed traders. When no information event is pending 
uninformed traders enjoy improved liquidity. However, when information asymmetry 
is large, the ability of uninformed traders to detect and protect themselves from the 
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informed is impaired. To resolve the issue as to whether broker identifiers should be 
revealed or not, research is required which analyses and quantifies the trade-off 
between these two competing factors. This is left as a possible avenue for future 
investigation. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
This dissertation contains three essays which investigate the interactive relationships 
between informed agents and other parties in investment and securities markets. The 
influential role of informed individuals in shaping both security specific and economy 
wide outcomes provides the primary motivation for exploring these relationships. 
Additional motivation is found in the fact that each essay also contributes to some 
topical yet under-developed research strand. The literature review presented in 
Chapter 2 outlines the literature which considers the relationships examined in this 
dissertation. Furthermore, the review highlights existing gaps in the literature which 
the essays in this dissertation seek to address. 
 
The first essay in this dissertation examines how informed fund managers trade index 
futures to maintain superior returns, even when their trading decisions are determined 
by the liquidity demands of uninformed investors. In particular, the study examines 
the use of index futures by Australian managed funds, for the purposes of cash 
equitisation of investor flows. The study benefits significantly from access to unique 
survey data which indicates whether a fund uses index futures for this purpose or 
otherwise. This survey allows for research which is considerably more focussed than 
previous work on the use of derivatives by mutual fund investors (see, for example 
Koski and Pontiff, 1999).  
 
The results of this study indicate that fund flows have a significant impact on the 
alpha and market timing performance of managers who do not trade index futures. 
Approximately 1.5% of all new flow is lost in trading, a value which is statistically 
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and economically significant. Similarly, the market timing performance of these 
managers is negative in the presence of flow. Absent flow, the average non-user 
fund’s alpha is not significantly different from zero and the average non-user fund’s 
market timing ability is neutral. In contrast, managers who undertake derivative based 
management of new cash appear to be unaffected by investor flows. In fact, the 
unconditional performance of the average user fund is statistically equivalent to the 
performance of the average non-user fund conditional on zero fund flow. Put 
differently, funds that use derivatives are able to achieve returns as if they did not 
experience any investor flows at all. 
 
These results have important implications for practitioners and investors alike. In 
recent years, there has been considerable controversy surrounding mutual funds’ use 
of derivatives and market commentators have played upon perceptions that 
derivatives are uncertain, risky investments (Liase, 2007; 2006, Pollock, 2006). The 
results of this study show that when used correctly, a particular type of derivative 
(index futures) is a value-enhancing tool which allows informed managers to maintain 
their comparative advantage even when fund flows might otherwise reduce this 
advantage. 
 
The essay presented in Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between a peculiar class 
of informed traders – illegal insider traders – and the regulatory body which 
prosecutes these individuals. In particular, the essay examines the determinants of an 
insider trader’s position in a security. The primary determinants are hypothesised to 
be the expected return and expected penalty of the insider’s trade – an insight derived 
from Becker’s (1968) seminal work on criminal behaviour. Furthermore, the essay 
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supposes that insiders also behave as investors and take a position negatively 
proportional to the variability of the asset. This study is the first empirical study of 
illegal insider trading to investigate the behaviour of the insider trader, rather than the 
market’s response to insider trading (see for example, Meulbroek, 1992; Cornell and 
Sirri, 1992; and Fishe and Robe, 2004). Beyond academic interest, an understanding 
of insider trading behaviour is useful for regulators seeking to create better detection 
mechanisms to catch insider traders. One important contribution of this work is that it 
shows that insiders behave as investors would by taking smaller positions in more 
volatile stocks. This is an interesting result for two reasons. Firstly, one might expect 
insiders to take larger positions in more volatile stocks since they are able to hide 
amongst the volatility. The results indicate that this is not the case. Secondly, the 
finding suggests that insiders do not posses, or do not believe they possess, 
completely precise information. 
 
Other results indicate that the volume traded by insiders is directly proportional to the 
value of their information. In other words, insiders trade more when there is more to 
be made. The position taken by an insider is also negatively related to the magnitude 
of the penalty. Both of these findings are consistent with predictions borne out of the 
economic crime literature which suggests that individuals trade off the costs and 
benefits of crime. The initial findings also indicate that the volume traded by insiders 
is influenced by several variables related to the probability of detection. Specifically, 
the volume traded by an insider is smaller if the trade is made in a specialist market. 
Trading closer to the announcement day also serves to reduce the volume traded. 
These results are robust to sample selection bias. Furthermore, as recommended by 
Chakravaty and McConnell (1999) these results are tested against normal trades rather 
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than against a null of zero. The results show that the coefficients on a regression of 
randomly selected trades, matched with the insider trades, are not overall the same as 
the coefficients on a regression of insider trades. The magnitude of trades undertaken 
by insiders is affected by fundamentally different variables than the trades undertaken 
by non-insiders. 
 
The final essay contained in this dissertation investigates the relationship between 
informed and uninformed traders in securities markets. In particular, the essay 
examines whether broker anonymity hinders the ability of uninformed traders and 
liquidity suppliers to detect informed traders in the lead up to a significant 
information event. This essay is the first to examine the effects of broker anonymity 
on information transmission in markets during periods of large information 
asymmetry. The study makes use of a natural experiment which occurred on the ASX 
on 28 November, 2005. Prior to this date broker identifiers were attached to all trades 
pre- and post-execution. After this date, this information was removed. 
 
The study presents three pieces of evidence that after the change to broker anonymity 
informed traders are less detected by other participants. First, the dispersion in the 
average permanent price impact across brokers is lower after the change to broker 
anonymity with the standard deviation of average price impact across brokers 
dropping from 32.34 basis points to 27.72 basis points. The reduction in dispersion is 
most pronounced for trades executed by brokers that are between one to five times the 
median trade size for the security. Second, bid-ask spreads are significantly lower in 
the anonymous market setting. The magnitude of this reduction, 24 basis points, is 
material even after controlling for firm size, volume and volatility. Additional tests 
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indicate that the decrease is attributable to a reduction in the adverse selection 
component of the spread. Third, results indicate that both before and after the switch 
to anonymity excessive buyer-initiated days correspond to days of greater returns. 
However, this relationship is significantly weaker in the post period. This suggests 
that the market is less able to accurately interpret the information content of order 
imbalances during the broker anonymity regime. Overall the results of this study 
suggest that informed traders remain less detected by the market and are therefore, 
better off after a switch to anonymity. 
 
From a policy formation perspective the results of this study are very important for 
market designers. Results of previous studies suggest that broker anonymity is 
correlated with improved liquidity in the form of lower bid-ask spreads. This implies 
that broker anonymity is beneficial for liquidity motivated and other uninformed 
traders since their transaction costs are reduced in this environment. The essay in 
Chapter 5, however, shows that broker identifiers contain valuable information. As 
such, uninformed traders are less able to protect themselves from informed traders 
when this identifier is absent. Market designers need to carefully consider the 
implications of broker anonymity on the trading outcomes of uninformed participants 
in securities markets. 
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